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BELGIUM 
AND   GERMANY 

A  DUTCH  VIEW 

(DE  BELGISCHE  NBUTRALITBIT  GBSCHONDEN) 


BT 

DR.  J.  H.  LABBERTON 


TRANSLATED  BY 

W.  E.  LEONARD 


•  •.•  •    •• 


.'.J  *   j» 


CHICAGO  LONDON 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 

1916 


COPYRIGHT  BY 

THE  OPEN  COURT  PUBLISHING  COMPANY 


1916 


*■ 


TRANSLATOR'S  PREFACE. 

THERE  seem  three  excellent  reasons  for  making 
accessible  to  American  readers  this  little  study 
written  in  a  relatively  inaccessible  tongue. 

1.  It  is  fundamentally  a  study  of  those  philosophic 
ideas  which  will  have  to  be  mastered  before  mankind 
shall  be  able  to  pronounce  a  rational  and  just  verdict 
on  the  present  crisis.  And  there  is  as  yet,  in  the  midst 
of  the  world's  anger,  amazement,  prejudice,  and  re- 
crimination, all  too  little  common  effort  to  master 
them.  The  moral  feeling  of  the  whole  human  race 
was  probably  never  before  so  profoundly  alive  as  since 
the  beginning  of  August  1914;  but  this  excess  of 
moral  feeling,  though  it  must  in  time  deepen  our 
insight,  as  having  so  deepened  our  experience,  seems 
for  the  present  to  render  moral  thinking  well-nigh  im- 
potent. The  new  materials,  the  new  emotions,  are  too 
overwhelming  for  the  needful  new  formulations ;  and, 
because  as  intellectual  beings  we  must  find  some  artic- 
ulate expression,  something  with  subject  and  predicate 
whereby  to  objectify  the  inner  stir,  we  have  instinc- 
tively recourse  to  the  old  formulations.  But  this  won't 
do  forever.    Our  present  routine  application  of  moral 

[iii] 


345207 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

formulas  is  not  thinking  at  all,  certainly  not  moral 
thinking.  The  formulas  as  such  may  be  as  valid  as 
the  binomial  theorem;  they  may  be  founded  in  the 
moral  consciousness,  and  tested  in  the  racial  experi- 
ence: but,  if  their  symbols  do  not  represent  the  facts, 
they  can  only  confuse  and  retard.  But  some  of  the 
formulas  themselves  may  need  revision:  it  is  not  by 
any  means  certain,  for  instance,  that  all  maxims  of 
hoary  antiquity,  even  when  cited  with  approval  by  the 
leading  American  weeklies,  are  the  last  word  on  right- 
eousness in  this  world- war:  they  may  be  a  downright 
libel  not  only  on  righteousness  but  on  common  sense 
— for  in  nothing  is  the  race  slower  to  see  and  to  revise 
than  in  its  "proverbial  philosophy."  Dr.  Labberton  has 
made  in  two  ways  a  conscientious  effort  to  think:  he 
^  •^las  tried  to  realize  the  data  in  their  individual,  concrete 
-—reality;  he  has  tried  to  work  out  formulas  that  shall 
'^^  truly  interpret  the  data  and  truly  satisfy  the  moral 
reason.  I  do  not  say  he  has  altogether  succeeded.  I 
say  only  that  he  has  tried;  and  that  his  effort  should 
help,^  if  only  in  a  small  way,  to  dissipate  the  present 
moral  paradox  of  a  morally  bewildered  world  cocksure 
of  its  moral  judgments. 

^  Note,  too,  Bertrand  Russell's  Justice  in  War  Time,  Open 
Court  Publishing  Co.,  1916.  But  the  most  notable  indication 
that  our  powers  of  moral  thinking  are  coming  back  to  us  is  to 
me  John  Dewey's  masterly  essay  "On  Understanding  the  Mind 
of  Germany,"  Atlantic  Monthly,  February  1916,  though,  if 
space  permitted,  a  number  of  other  excellent  publications  might 
be  mentioned  that  have  appeared  since  the  paragraph  in  the 
text  was  written — very  different  in  insight,  poise,  and  breadth 
from  the  astonishing  superficialities  of  several  very  distin- 
guished Americans — slant  nominum  umbrae! —  in  the  first  year 
of  the  war. 

[iv] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

2.  It  is  a  study  by  a  citizen  of  a  neutral  country,* 
and,  moreover,  a  neutral  country  which  is  in  closest 
relationship  of  all  neutral  countries  to  the  belligerents 
chiefly  concerned  in  the  discussion.  I  refer  less  to 
the  close  physical  relationship,  though  this  must  play 
its  vital  part  in  bringing  home  the  fearful  realities  of 
the  war, — than  to  the  still  more  important  spiritual 
relationship.  The  educated  Hollander —  and  Holland 
is  a  country  of  highly  educated  men  and  women — 
knows  the  literature,  politics,  and  social  life,  through 
travel  and  study,  of  France,  Germany,  and  England, 
as  well — it  is  safe  to  say — as  the  average  educated 
American  knows  any  one  of  these  three  characteristic 
manifestations  of  any  one  of  these  three  countries. 
And  Dr.  Labberton  represents,  moreover,  a  phase  of 
the  Dutch  reaction  to  the  present  events.  More  than 
one  Dutch  writer  has  recently  expressed  (to  use  Lab- 
berton's  perhaps  irritating  expression)  his  "personal 
faith  in  Germany's  vocation" — "persoonlijk  geloof  in 
Duitschlands  roeping/'  And  granted  that  this  faith 
has  yet  to  be  justified,  the  significant  point  is  that  it 

2  Labberton  is  a  doctor  of  law  and  a  doctor  of  political  econ- 
omy from  the  University  of  Groningen,  where  he  was  a  pupil 
of  the  distinguished  philosopher  Professor  Gerh.  Heymans  to 
whom  his  book  so  frequently  refers.  Mr.  (=  me  ester  in  de 
rechten,  master  of  laws)  Labberton  is  now  an  official  of  the 
Dutch  government :  chief  of  the  third  division  of  the  provincial 
record  office  of  Zeeland.  His  home  is  in  Middelburg  in  Zee- 
land,  near  the  Belgian  boundary.  Under  the  pseudonym  "Theo- 
dore van  Ameide"  he  has  published  three  volumes  of  verse, 
which  have  been  accorded  high  praise  for  thought,  feeling  and 
beauty  of  phrase  and  rhythm:  Lof  der  Wijsheid,  1906;  Ver- 
zamelde  Gedichten,  1912;  De  Balkanstrijd,  1912.  The  present 
work  is  an  admirable  illustration  of  the  fusing  of  the  poet's 
insight  with  the  discursive  reason  of  the  logical  thinker. 

[v] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

exists  in  thoughtful  Hollanders  (as  in  thoughtful  citi- 
zens of  other  neutral  countries)  like  Dr.  Labberton, — 
who  are  not  physically  or  spiritually  in  the  pay  of  Ger- 
^  many.  And  this  is  of  at  least  equal  significance  with 
the  faith  in  the  moral  debasement  of  Germany  which 
has  become  almost  a  religious  cult  in  some  intellectual 
circles  in  America.  Presumably  it  would  be  hard  for 
either  party  to  give  altogether  convincing  reasons  for 
its  faith ;  but  there  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  which  party 
has  on  the  whole  the  advantage  in  the  prerequisites  of 
knowledge,  reflection,  and  poise. 

3.  It  is  a  study  by  a  foreigner  well  read  in  German 
literature.  This  is  of  even  greater  significance  than 
at  first  appears.  Roman  literature,  for  example,  began 
and  ended  as  an  exotic  flower,  at  its  best  symbolizing, 
as  in  Virgil,  an  imperial  ideal  of  a  small,  aristocratic 
cult,  or  giving  utterance,  as  in  Catullus,  to  elemental 
personal  passion.  Or  again,  English  literature,  the 
most  comprehensive,  rich,  deep,  and  harmoniously 
unfolding  literature  of  mankind,  has  been  the  creation, 
as  it  were,  of  a  long  hereditary  line,  withdrawn,  almost 
like  the  Egyptian  priesthood,  from  the  rest  of  the 
workers ;  even  when  it  has  interpreted  its  people  it 
has  not  been  essentially  of  its  people.  It  is  a  world, 
a  wonderful  world,  but  largely  a  world  in  itself,  less 
national  than  universal  in  ideas,  beauty,  and  power. 
And  American  literature  seems,  in  the  main,  at  its  best 
an  integral  part  of  this  hereditary  line.  But  more 
than  any  literature  with  which  I  am  acquainted,  more 
even  than  the  Italian,  French,  or  Greek,  German  litera- 
ture is  the  organic,  inevitable  outgrowth  and  expres- 

[vi] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

sion  of  the  folk  mind  and  heart.  It  is  peculiarly  the 
national  literature,^  as  English  is  peculiarly  the  inter- 
national, "the  world-literature."  It  is  not  to  the  point 
here  to  balance  the  intrinsic  merits  of  each  type:  ob- 
viously the  former  will  exert  less  influence  outside  its 
own  national  boundaries  than  the  latter,  and  will  need 
from  time  to  time  sympathetic  foreign  mediators,  like 
Madame  de  Stael  or  Carlyle.  But  it  is  much  to  the 
point  to  emphasize  that  in  the  present  crisis  no  one 
not  spiritually  well-read  in  German  literature,  so  pre- 
eminently the  reflection  of  the  German  spirit,  can 
speak  with  the  requisite  wisdom  on  the  Germany  of 
yesterday,  of  to-day,  and  (presumably)  of  to-morrow, 
either  in  its  temperament  or  in  its  institutions,  or 
above  all  in  its  moral  ideals  of  state  and  personality. 

Thus  the  translator  asks  a  hearing  for  this  Dutch 
presentation.  He  does  not  stand  as  official  sponsor 
for  its  statements  or  reflections.  As  an  American  of 
entirely  English  descent,  some  things  have  cost  him 
a  kind  of  ancestral  pain  in  the  translation.  But  this  is 
a  time  when  all  honest  and  thoughtful  men  should  be 
accorded  honest  and  thoughtful  attention.  If  England, 
or  rather  a  very  small  and  very  closed  group  in  Down- 
ing Street,  is  proven  culpable,  it  may  grieve  us,  as  it 
grieves  some  of  us  to-day  to  find  America  departing 

3  I  mean,  of  course,  "national"  literature  in  an  ethnic,  not  a 
political  sense,  as  voicing  with  peculiar  intimacy  the  customs, 
words,  thoughts,  and  all  the  manifestations  of  life  we  call 
German.  The  fact  that  Goethe  and  Herder,  for  instance, 
preached  the  ideal  of  a  world-literature,  and  the  fact  that  the 
Germans  absorb  so  readily  the  literature  of  other  countries 
are  to  me  really  no  disproof  of  the  contention:  these  very 
phenomena  reflect  a  characteristic  element  in  the  German  out- 
look on  the  world. 

[vii] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

(as  it  seems)  from  her  best  rational  and  moral  ideals ; 
but  it  would  not  be  honest  or  thoughtful  for  us  to 
spare  ourselves  the  possible  grief  by  refusing  to  in- 
quire, impartially  and  fearlessly,  for  ourselves,  or  by 
refusing  to  grant,  yes  and  to  further,  freedom  of  in- 
quiry and  speech  for  others. 

We  must  say  with  Aristotle  (in  the  Nichomachean 
Ethics)  :  "Friends  and  truth  are  both  dear  to  us, 
but  it  is  a  sacred  duty  to  prefer  truth"  [i.  e.,  what 
seems  truth  to  us].  And  whilst  millions  of  men  are 
suffering  pain,  sorrow  and  death  across  the  seas  in 
defense  of  what  each  believes  is  the  truth,  shall  not 
we  be  willing  to  risk  something?  For  this  greatest 
and  most  tragic  of  all  wars  is  essentially  a  war  of 
ideas  ;*  and  in  this  sense  it  is  and  must  be,  a  ''world- 
war":  in  which  every  man  of  ideas,  outside  the  phys- 
ical belligerents,  must  sooner  or  later  play  his  part — 
let  us  hope,  a  manful  and  chivalrous  part. 

William  Ellery  Leonard. 

*  The  Swede  Steffen  finds  it  a  "war  of  imperialism,"  the 
Englishman  Russell  a  "war  of  prestige,"  and  others  stress  one 
or  another  economic  or  political  factor;  but  back  of  all  lay 
from  the  beginning  unreconciled  (not  necessarily  irreconcil- 
able!) worlds  of  thought,  which  have  become  more  and  more 
consciously  conceived  and  developed  as  the  war  has  gone  on. 
Nor  are  the  thought-elements  mere  "afterthoughts" — as  if 
merely  the  belated  effort  of  man's  intellect  to  give  some  re- 
spectability to  man's  brutality.  But  this  calls  for  a  chapter — 
not  a  footnote. 


[viii] 


NOTE. 


Acknowledgments  must  be  made  to  Mr.  B.  Q.  Morgan  and 
to  Mr.  Arnold  Dresden  (formerly  of  Amsterdam)  for  help  in 
the  translation,  and  to  my  wife  for  some  drudgery  in  the  prep- 
aration for  the  press.  Mr.  Friedrich  Bruns  kindly  assisted  in 
collating  the  English  proof  sheets  with  the  proof  sheets  of  the 
German  translation  (by  Frl.  Dr.  Johanna  Rugeberg,  Berlin, 
Carl  Curtius,  1916,  under  the  title  Die  sittliche  Berechtigung 
der  Verletzung  der  belgischen  Neutralitdt,  with  an  introduction 
by  Prof.  K.  D.  Biilbring),  which,  as  having  been  personally  re- 
vised and  improved  by  Dr.  Labberton,  is  in  effect  a  second 
edition.  I  am,  however,  responsible  for  all  defects ;  but,  with 
the  exception  of  slight  condensations — amounting  altogether 
to  a  page  or  so, — I  trust  I  have  rendered  the  author's  ideas 
and  style  as  nearly  as  is  practicable  in  a  language  so  radically 
different  in  atmosphere  and  structure.  My  few  notes — chiefly 
explanatory  of  the  text — are  in  brackets^  The  more  important 
of  the  numerous  quotations  from  the  prose  of  other  languages 
(French,  German  and  Latin,  besides  English),  always  given  by 
Labberton  in  the  original,  appear  in  this  edition  as  Englished 
by  the  translator  of  the  Dutch.  Verse,  with  one  exception,  is 
left  untranslated.  W.  E.  L. 


[ix] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY. 

"The  peculiar  virtue  of  the  German  has 
from  time  immemorial  found  expression  in 
his  tendency  to  solve  acute  practical  ques- 
tions in  connection  with  the  profoundest 
principles  and  thus  to  unite  the  temporal 
and  the  eternal." — August  Dorner,  Politik, 
Recht  und  Moral  mit  Beziehung  auf  den 
gegenwdrtigen  Krieg,  p.  1. 

OF  the  tremendous  historical  events  which  it  is 
to-day  our  privilege  to  witness, — a  privilege 
but  seldom  duly  appreciated, — there  is  perhaps  none 
of  such  far-reaching  significance  as  the  fate  that  has 
overtaken  Belgium.  For  this  makes  a  strong  and 
immediate  appeal  to  the  moral  consciousness;  and 
virtually  compels  a  moral  judgment  of  vast  scope 
and  range.  The  first  impression  is,  undoubtedly,  in 
the  highest  degree  unfavorable  to  Germany,  and 
England  has  left  nothing  undone  to  strengthen  and 
confirm  that  impression.  Her  statesmen,  excellent 
and  clever  judges  of  human  nature,  know  well 
enough  that  for  most  people  first  impressions  are 
lasting  impressions,  that  the  mass  of  mankind  can 

[1] 


'i>^l 


*  ^ELGIUM^  AND  GERMANY 


neither  see  nor  think,  and  that  nothing  is  so  sure  to 
take  effect  as  an  appeal  to  its  ethical  instinct,  at  least 
in  the  business  of  shaping  that  usually  rather  ex- 
ternal phenomenon  known  as  public  opinion.  It  is 
truly  extraordinary  how  hugely  virtuous  we  all  are 
in  our  public  judgments  of  others,  and  especially  on 
paper.  In  the  inner  reality  perhaps  our  moral  sense 
turns  out  to  be  a  rather  small  affair ;  in  the  market- 
place righteous  indignation  commonly  prevents  re- 
flection. 

I  see  no  risque  d'honneiir  in  the  confession  that 
I  myself  was  in  the  beginning  somewhat  under  the 
influence  of  the  English  presentation  of  the  case: 
even  so  cautious  and  discriminating  a  critic  as  Pro- 
fessor Heymans^  seems  to  imply  Germany's  crime 
when  he  refers  to  the  justice  of  the  Belgian  cause 
on  page  8  of  his  brochure,  De  oorlog  en  de  vredes- 
beweging  [''The  War  and  the  Peace  Movement"]. 
Yet  I  soon  felt  how  improbable,  after  all,  it  was 
that  a  great  people  like  the  Germans  should  really 
be  sunk  so  low.  Thus,  too,  I  soon  felt  it  my  duty 
to  investigate  and  test  my  initial  judgment.  With 
the  publication  of  that  investigation,  I  desire  to  do 
my  modest  part  in  the  service  of  truth  and  right. 

^  [The  distinguished  philosopher  at  Groningen.] 


[2] 


THE  English  bill  of  indictment  (English  "White 
Book,"  No.  159)  has  it  that  Germany  refused  to 
abide  by  a  treaty  "to  which  Germany  is  as  much 
a  party  as  ourselves."^  The  reference  is  to  article  7 
of  the  London  treaty  of  1839,  whereby,  with  Eng- 
land, France,  Prussia,  Russia,  and  Austria  as  gua- 
rantors, Belgium  was  declared  to  be  an  independent 
and  permanently  neutral  state,  on  her  part  obligated 
to  preserve  her  neutrality  toward  all  other  states. 
When  this  treaty  was  concluded,  its  primary  pur- 
pose, the  direct  outgrowth  of  preceding  historical 
events,  was  to  prevent  France  from  sending  her 
troops  through  Belgium;  in  so  far,  the  treaty  took 
the  place  of  the  Barriere  Treaty,  which  had  con- 
trolled the  situation  during  the  eighteenth  century. 
Furthermore,  it  is  worth  noting  that  this  principle 
was  established,  not  in  the  interests  of  Belgium,  but 
in  the  interests  of  the  great  powers. 

This  is  recognized  by  such  unimpeachable  wit- 
nesses as  the  authors  of  Why  We  Are  at  War,  Ox- 

1  [Cited  by  Labberton  in  Dutch,  and  retranslated.] 

[31 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

ford,  1914:  page  13,  "for  the  convenience  of 
Europe";  page  14,  "It  was  in  their  interest,  rather 
than  her  own,  that  the  great  powers  made  her  a 
sovereign  independent  state." 

Under  the  stipulation  Belgium  acquired  only 
\  duties,  no  claims  of  her  own.  The  powers  pledged 
themselves  simply  to  one  another. 

When  on  the  second  of  August,  1914,  Germany 
requested  Belgium  to  permit  the  passage  of  the 
German  army  into  France,  Germany  was  already  at 
war  with  two  of  the  guarantors,  Russia  and  France, 
and  in  most  strained  relations  with  the  third,  Eng- 
land. In  his  admirable  book,  Bijdrage  tot  de  wor- 
dingsgeschiedenis  van  den  grooten  oorlog  ["Con- 
tributions to  the  History  of  the  Origin  of  the  Great 
War"],  M.  P.  C.  Valter  says  (p.  62)  that  under  the 
existing  circumstances  the  treaty  must  be  considered 
as  nullified  ipso  facto.  Moreover,  he  seems  to  be 
practically  of  the  opinion  that  the  treaty,  on  the 
ground  of  its  original  historic  intention,  was  bind- 
ing for  France,  but  not  for  Germany.  But  I  think 
his  pro-German  zeal  has  seriously  misled  him  in 
both  points.  Inasmuch  as  Germany  and  France 
were  now  in  a  state  of  war,  all  treaties  between  the 
two  countries  were,  according  to  the  established  law 
of  nations,  thereby  nullified,  and  among  them  the 
treaty  of  1839.  But  Germany  was  not  at  war  with 
England  on  the  4th  of  August,  and  the  fact  that 
war  was  imminent  has  no  bearing  on  the  status  of 

[4] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

treaties.  Thus  there  existed  on  the  4th  of  August 
a  formally  valid  treaty  obligation  on  the  part  of 
Germany  toward  England  to  respect  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium;  nor  is  this  altered  by  the  historical  in- 
tention of  the  agreement,  since  the  terms  were  en- 
tirely general.  This  obligation  was  not  fulfilled  by 
Germany. 

It  is  solely  upon  this  illegality  that  England  rests 
her  case.  Read  the  first  chapter  of  Why  We  Are 
at  War,  and  you  will  see  that  nothing  else,  literally 
nothing,  is  adduced  to  buttress  the  accusation.  The 
formal  violation  is  affirmed,  and  the  comment  im- 
mediately follows:  "It  is  unnecessary  to  elaborate 
further  the  point  of  law"  (p.  19).^ 

2  The  Belgian  Minister  of  State,  J.  van  den  Heuyel,  confines 
himself  to  an  equally  bare  formal  treatment  in  his  pamphlet, 
Het  schenden  van  de  Belgische  neutraliteit,  and  similarly  the 
Parisian  expert  in  international  law,  Andre  Weiss,  La  violation 
de  la  neutralite  beige  et  luxembourgeoise ;  further  the  Ameri- 
can, James  M.  Beck,  The  Case  of  Belgium,  Dutch  translation 
by  W.  de  Veer  and  H.  W.  Massingham,  Waarom  Engeland 
Belgi'e  te  hulp  gekomen  is. 


[5] 


n. 


NOW  there  is  surely  something  more  to  be  said ; 
but  we  must  delve  deeper.  That  the  situation 
of  August  1914  was  in  every  respect  totally  different 
from  that  of  1839  when  the  treaty  was  concluded, 
will  presumably  be  conceded  without  further  argu- 
ment. For  any  one  who  consistently  supf)orts  the 
doctrine  that  any  treaty  is  alone  valid  under  the  un- 
expressed, but  well  understood,  conditions,  rebus  sic 
stantibus,  Germany's  further  obligation  is  obviously 
canceled.  But  this  doctrine  is  itself  unsatisfactory 
to  me. 

The  question  of  the  binding  power  of  treaties  is 
in  my  opinion  not  a  legal,  but  a  purely  ethical  one. 
If  we  ask  ourselves,  what  is  the  relation  between 
law  and  morality,  we  arrive  at  something  like  the 
following.  In  law  we  find,  first  of  all,  a  great  sub- 
stratum which  is  mere  organization,  social  tech- 
nology, arrangement  and  rule — for  such  there  must 
be.  Here  belongs  first  of  all,  though  by  no  means 
alone,  all  that  lies  within  the  wide  compass  of  merely 
formal  law.    This  part  of  law  is  ethically  indifferent. 


[6] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

Next  come  those  legal  provisions  which,  with  refer- 
ence to  family  and  property  (civil  law),  and  to  per- 
sonal conduct  (criminal  law),  insure  an  ethical 
minimum,  that  is  to  say,  such  small  degree  of  (out- 
ward) morality  as  the  community  must  demand  of 
its  members  for  its  very  existence  and  for  the  possi- 
bility of  the  development  of  a  free  and  higher  ethical 
life,  and  hence  cannot  afford  to  entrust  entirely  to 
the  uncertain  workings  of  the  individual  moral  con- 
sciousness. We  do  not  need  to  assume  ^a  special  "legal 
consciousness"  to  explain  the  existence  of  this  part 
of  law;  we  have  here  merely  our  common  moral 
consciousness  plus  the  necessity  of  establishing  a 
minimum,  if  need  be  by  compulsion.  The  "legal 
consciousness"  is  in  fact  nothing  but  the  "moral 
consciousness"  operating  in  the  spheres  of  life  here 
under  consideration. 

Who  gives  law  its  compelling  character,  its  power  ? 
The  state.  But  what  assurance  is  there  that  the 
state  will  put  its  power  at  the  service  of  the  true, 
the  morally  just  law?  With  this  question  we  come 
upon  the  deepest  problems  of  ethics  and  the  philos- 
ophy of  law,  which  it  is  impossible  to  enter  into  here. 
Suffice  it,  that  there  can  be  no  law,  unless  there  is 
some  power  to  insure  its  operation.  That  we  often 
seem  to  doubt  so  elementary  a  truth,  is  due,  I  believe, 
simply  to  the  ambiguity  in  the  use  of  the  word  right 
[recht]y  which  means  now  the  positive,  statutory 


[7] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

law,  and  now  the  desired  ideal.^  We  must  realize 
clearly  that  there  is  but  one  law  [recht] ,  the  positive 
law,  and  that  the  Right  [Recht]  in  the  sense  of  the 
ethically  just,  the  ideal  right,  belongs  not  to  this 
actual  world  but  to  the  realm  of  ethical  ideals,  unless 
that  Right  be  incorporated  in  the  positive  law — 
which  is  possible  but  by  no  means  always  the  case. 

And  now  the  so-called  law  of  nations.  Here,  too, 
there  is  first  a  part  which  is  merely  organization,  as 
the  law  of  envoys  and  the  rules  governing  the  formal 
validity  of  treaties.  It  is  ethically  indifferent;  it 
depends  on  custom  and  agreement;  and,  because  it 
is  of  such  importance  and  conflicts  with  no  specific 
interests  of  state,  it  is  strictly  and  quite  voluntarily 
observed  by  all  parties..  In  the  second  place  come 
all  those  arrangements  undertaken  by  sovereign 
states  with  respect  to  concrete  interests, — for  in- 
stance the  use  of  Belgian  territory  for  purposes  of 
war.  These  treaties  we  cannot  call  contracts  in  the 
legal  sense,  since  there  is  no  power  on  earth  that 
looks  after  their  fulfilment.  They  are  best  to  be 
compared  to  the  voluntary  promises  made  to  each 
other  by  individuals,  the  fulfilment  of  which  is  not 
a  legal  but  a  moral  duty.  The  punishment  for  non- 
fulfilment  is  in  the  main  moral  condemnation, — the 


1  [The  ambiguity  in  English,  though  analogous,  works  out  a 
little  differently.  We  don't  use  "right"  (Dutch  recht)  in  the 
sense  of  statutory  law.] 

[8] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

weight  of  which,  even  practically,  must  not  be  under- 
estimated. It  is  on  this  account  important  to  empha- 
size the  exclusively  ethical  character  of  the  obliga- 
tion, since  it  will  then  follow  that,  as  to  the  scope  of 
our  obligations,  we  do  not  have  to  resort  to  legal 
reasoning  (based,  for  instance,  on  the  conception  of 
sovereignty),  but  have  to  turn  exclusively  and  di- 
rectly to  our  own  unmediated  ethical  understanding. 
In  the  third  place,  there  are  all  those  formula- 
tions of  moral  rules  of  conduct,  with  respect  to  a 
given  subject  matter,  as  the  Hague  conventions  of 
1907  and  the  declarations  of  Paris  and  London  con- 
cerning the  law  of  naval  warfare.  Here,  too,  is  not  a 
trace  of  legal  compulsion :  they  are  but  moral  codes. 
At  least  that  is  what  they  pretend  to  be,  often  for  a 
fact  quite  unwarrantably,  as  in  the  case  of  the  law  of 
prizes  at  sea,  where  the  stronger  party  simply  formu- 
lates its  will,  or,  again,  where  inexperience  and  illu- 
sion set  up  as  rules  of  conduct  what  are  still  very 
remote  or  in  practice  absolutely  impossible  ideals.^ 
International  law  differs  from  national,  in  addition 
to  the  absence  of  compulsory  power,  chiefly  in  the 
fact  that  it  gives  not  an  ethical  minimum,  but  the 
full  measure  of  zvhat  is  regarded  as  moral:  it  is  the 
codified  morality  of  states,  with  all  the  advantages 

2  The  almost  childlike  disappointment  of  Prof.  A.  A.  H. 
Struycken  in  De  Oorlog  en  het  Volkenrecht  results  exclusively 
from  this  overestimation  of  the  actual  content  of  the  rules 
above  referred  to.  Cf.  Steinmetz,  Philosophie  des  Krieges,  pp. 
333-334,  and  Dragomirof,  Les  lots  de  la  guerre  in  the  publica- 
tions of  the  Vereeniging  voor  Krijgswetenschap,  1897. 

[9] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

and  all  the  great  disadvantages  involved  in  a  codi- 
fication of  what  is  essentially  freedom. 

Our  question  is  now :  what  binding  power  is  there 
to  international  agreements  of  the  kind  mentioned 
under  point  (2)  ?  Does  the  moral  consciousness 
demand  that  the  agreements  be  lived  up  to?  The 
question  runs  exactly  parallel  to  this :  does  the  moral 
consciousness  demand  that  individuals  keep  their 
promises  ? 


[10] 


III. 


IT  will  perhaps  be  asked,  —  although  I  have  af- 
firmed only  a  parallel,  not  a  likeness, — if  states 
in  their  intercourse  may  be  morally  judged  exactly 
as  individuals.  The  question  usually  amounts  to 
this:  whether  politics  have  actually  anything  to  do 
with  morals.  For  the  answer  I  would  merely  refer 
the  inquirer  to  the  moral  consciousness  itself,  which 
appears  to  react  indubitably  upon  the  actions  of 
states  in  quite  the  same  way  as  upon  those  of  indi- 
viduals. This  is  the  gist  of  the  matter  —  ab  esse 
ad  posse  valet  conclusio.  (For  the  rest  read  in 
the  first  part  of  von  Treitschke's  Politik  the  fine 
chapter  on  the  relation  of  politics  to  morality, 
which  will  serve,  moreover,  to  give  one  a  just  esti- 
mate of  the  current  craze  for  decrying  this  writer — 
and  with  him  virtually  all  Prussia — as  suffering 
from  complete  moral  atrophy.  I  present  below,  by 
the  way,  some  objections  to  his  reasoning.)^     At 

1  Compare  August  Dorner,  Politik,  Recht  und  Moral  mit  Be- 
siehung  auf  den  gegenzvdrtigen  Krieg,  a  most  instructive 
little  book.  Indeed  it  is  generally  very  striking  how  much 
higher  the  German  war-literature  ranks  than  the  English  and 
French. 

[11] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

the  same  time  it  will  appear  later  that  in  some  cases 
a  judgment  on  the  actions  of  states  will  necessarily 
turn  out  otherwise  than  a  judgment  on  individuals — 
a  difference,  moreover,  which  to  some  degree  ex- 
plains the  origin  of  the  notion  that  politics  and  ethics 
have  no  relation  with  each  other. 

How  then  does  our  moral  consciousness  operate? 
What  is  the  object  of  a  moral  judgment?  What 
conditions  must  be  fulfilled  in  order  to  pronounce  a 
moral  judgment?^ 

That  which  is  essentially  judged  is  never  the  act 
as  such,  but  the  character  which  thereby  reveals  it- 
self. Therefore,  the  first  condition  for  pronouncing 
a  moral  judgment  is  that  the  act  be  fully  known  and 
clearly  realized  in  its  distinctive  concreteness,  with 
all  the  motivating  circumstances;  the  second,  that 
the  case  in  question  be  of  a  kind  that  admits  a  trust- 
worthy deduction  from  act  and  motives  as  to  char- 
acter. Such  is  not  the  case — according  to  Professor 
Heymans,^  pp.  65-81 — when  physical  force  or  loss 
of  consciousness  has  wholly  unlinked  the  character 
from  the  chain  of  causes  of  the  action;  it  is  in  a 
smaller  measure  the  case  when  psychical  force  or 
undue  persuasion  has  introduced  overpowering  mo- 
tives, or  when  immature  years,  mental  weakness, 
or  an  overpowering  emotion  renders  the  psychic 

2  Cf.  Heymans,  Einfiihrung  in  die  Ethik,  pp.  33-138. 

3  Einfiihrung  in  die  Ethik. 

[12] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

course  abnormal,  so  that  the  common  assumption, 
that  all  the  circumstances  were  known  to  the  persons 
acting  and  as  motives  influenced  their  decision,  no 
longer  holds  good.  Furthermore,  provocation,  temp- 
tation, intoxication,  hypnosis,  seduction,  one-sided 
training,  are  all  named  in  this  same  connection. 
Finally  there  are  various  cases  of  psychic  aberra- 
tions. All  is  to  be  eliminated  which  does  not  belong 
to  "the  true  nature  of  the  personality  willing,  the 
fundamental  law  of  one's  nature,  the  measure  by 
which  one  appraises  the  various  ultimate  aims  of  the 
action,  in  short,  one's  character."*  All  factors  in 
the  action  which  do  not  belong  to  the  character  are, 
for  a  moral  judgment,  quite  indifferent. 

Therefore,  if  a  state  in  its  acts  is  to  be  judged 
morally,  it  must  be  a  "person" — "human  beings  or 
entities  conceived  as  like  human  beings"  (Heymans, 
p.  34) — with  a  definite  "character."  This  is  cer- 
tainly the  case.  What  is  the  state,  when  we  attempt 
to  grasp  its  essential  nature,  apart  from  all  theory, 
but  one  phase  of  the  folk  itself,  namely,  the  practical, 
acting  side  of  the  folk-life,  combining  as  a  unit,  in 
order  to  conduct  as  a  unit  its  activities  at  home  and 
abroad.  The  state  belongs  altogether  in  the  sphere 
of  the  practical  will.  In  this  sphere  the  moral  ideal 
prevails  as  the  directing  aim.  From  this  follows 
inevitably  the  moral  vocation  of  the  state,  expressing 
itself  in  the  realization  of  justice  both  in  its  internal 

*  Heymans,  loc.  cit.,  p.  81. 

[13] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

and  in  its  external  affairs.  Its  conduct  abroad 
toward  other  states  in  diplomacy  and  war  is  in  the 
end  also  nothing  but  the  realization  of  right — a 
realization  in  that  unending  process  of  the  historical 
development  of  the  mutual  relations  of  the  various 
peoples  which,  as  in  agreement  with  their  worth,  is 
exacted  by  the  moral  ideal. ^  From  this  it  follows, 
moreover,  that  the  state  has  no  actual  governing 
vocation  in  theoretical  fields  (science,  religion)  :  it 
can  promote,  but  it  cannot  direct.  Its  exclusively 
practical  power  does  not  extend  into  our  inner  life. 

The  state  is,  therefore,  the  centralized  practical 
power  of  a  people,  a  might,  which  can  set  for  itself 
all  conceivable  practical  ends,  but  which,  in  and  be- 
yond these,  sets  itself,  as  prompted  by  its  very  na- 
ture, at  the  service  of  the  moral  ideal,  and,  in  so  far 
as  it  strives  through  that  power  to  realize  morality, 
creates  law  and  right. 

It  is,  therefore,  beyond  doubt  a  person  with  a 
moral  vocation  and  its  character  can  and  will  be 
judged  according  to  the  measure  with  which  it  ful- 
fils that  vocation.  But  the  moral  judgment  must, 
as  always,  reckon  with  all  the  factors,  which  in 
every  concrete  case  have  to  be  taken  into  account  in 
order  to  draw  any  certain  conclusion  from  an  action 
as  to  character.    There  exists  no  moral  code,  no  set 

^  Read  the  fine  reflections  of  Reinhold  Seeberg  on  "Das  sitt- 
liche  Recht  des  Krieges"  ['The  Moral  Right  of  War"]  in  the 
Internationale  Monatsschrift  fiir  Wissenschaft,  Kunst  und  Tech- 
nik,  Nov.  1,  1914. 

[14] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

of  rules,  from  which  we  can  deduce,  according  to 
specific  law,  whether  any  given  action  is  good  or  bad. 
The  moral  consciousness  knows  no  good  or  bad 
actions ;  it  knows  only  good  or  bad  characters.  One 
and  the  same  action  can  be  at  one  time  approved, 
at  another  condemned, — all  depends  upon  a  full 
knowledge  of  the  given  case,  its  concrete  delimita- 
tions, its  various  attending  factors.  Cum  duo  fa- 
ciunt  idem,  non  est  idem. 

Now  what  factors  come  especially  to  the  fore  in 
a  moral  judgment  on  a  state,  as  distinct  from  a 
judgment  on  individuals? 

If  we  bear  in  mind  the  elements,  previously 
summed  up,  which  hinder  or  complicate  the  deduction 
of  character  from  an  action,  we  will  see  plainly  that 
the  first,  the  subjective,  prerequisite  of  a  just  judg- 
ment— full  and  complete  knowledge  on  the  judger's 
part  of  the  given  case  in  all  its  concrete  delimitations 
— is  far  more  difficult  to  realize  in  regard  to  the 
actions  of  states  than  in  regard  to  the  actions  of 
individuals.  Moderation  and  caution  are  thus  a 
primary  requirement, — always,  but  here  in  partic- 
ular. '7^^<^^g^  "^ot,  that  ye  be  not  judged," — that  is, 
that  your  judgment  itself  may  not  appear  an  ethical 
offense.  It  is  here  especially  that  a  clear,  impartial, 
objective  alignment  of  all  the  elements  of  the  given 
case  will  be  hampered  in  the  judger's  mind,  for 
strong  sympathies  and  antipathies,  or  the  interests 


[15] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

of  one's  own  country,  necessarily  lead  to  a  one-sided 
sifting  of  the  data. 

And  there  is  another  disturbing  influence,  the 
gigantic  dimensions  which  the  results  of  a  state's 
action  can  take  on,  and  the  tremendous  power  with 
which  these  results  can  affect  the  emotional  side  of 
our  personality.  This,  too,  may  vastly  contribute 
to  confuse  our  vision  and  thus  to  render  a  complete 
survey  of  the  whole  well-nigh  impossible.  We  are, 
indeed,  all  too  much  inclined  to  let  our  attention 
dwell  alone  on  the  most  emotional  complex.  Be- 
cause of  that  one  decision  resolved  upon  by  Ger- 
many, we  now  see  all  Belgium  in  a  situation  which 
no  man  with  human  feelings  can  look  upon  without 
a  bleeding  heart,  quite  aside  from  the  causes  and  the 
question  of  guilt.  Yet  we  must  possess  in  our  men- 
tal make-up  something  more  than  a  bleeding  heart, 
in  order  to  reflect — or  at  least  after  a  spell  to  begin 
again  to  reflect  —  that  the  matter  has  still  other 
aspects.  And  our  chance  for  a  correct  judgment 
is  still  slighter  when  our  mood  becomes  interesting 
for  its  own  sake  and  flatters  our  vanity — the  essence 
of  sentimentality. 

All  this  concerns,  however,  entirely  the  subjec- 
tive conditions  of  a  right  judgment:  it  is  in  no 
sense  asserted  that  an  action  of  a  state  also  differs 
objectively  in  its  moral  aspects  from  the  action  of 
an  individual.  If  we  consider  the  objective  factors, 
it  can  then  be  said,  I  think,  that  overpowering  emo- 

[16] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

tion,  provocation,  temptation,  and  one-sided  train- 
ing often  play  a  big  role  in  causing  the  actions  of 
states,  and  thus  in  fairness  deserve  to  be  taken  into 
account. 

In  the  same  connection  the  psychology  of  the  mob 
should  be  reckoned  with,  in  so  far  as  a  strong  and 
homogeneous  public  opinion  can  reduce  a  state  and 
its  instrumentalities  into  a  condition  of  psychic  com- 
pulsion or  undue  persuasion.  It  seems  to  me  both 
theoretically  unsound  and  practically  much  exag- 
gerated to  treat  the  state,  as  does  A.  Christensen 
in  Politik  imd  Massenmoral  ["Politics  and  Mob- 
morality"],  1912,  as  itself  nothing  but  a  "mob,"  and 
to  explain  thus  the  often  low  moral  level  of  its 
actions.  The  will  of  the  state  is  for  me  the  more 
high,  abiding,  reasoning  folk-will,  la  volonte  gene- 
rale,  purified  of  the  baser  alloys  which  characterize 
the  decisions  of  the  will  of  the  mob,  la  volonte  de 
tons)  precisely  as  in  individuals  a  lower  natural 
will  is  to  be  distinguished  from  the  higher  spiritual 
will  that  obtains  when  they  put  on  the  brakes.  The 
question  as  to  the  best  —  or  least  bad  —  form  of 
government  is  in  part  the  question  how  this  put- 
ting on  the  brakes'  can,  in  the  large,  be  best  accom- 
plished. 

The  power  exercised  by  public  opinion  upon  the 
will  of  the  state  must  not  be  overestimated.  In  the 
first  place  it  is  usually  divided  against  itself  and 

[17] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

thus  neutralized  in  its  operation;  secondly,  it  is  in 
part  moulded  by  the  instrumentalities  of  the  state 
itself  in  harmony  with  the  state's  own  purposes. 
Note  what  is  at  the  present  moment  taking  place  in 
Italy  and  the  neutral  Balkan  states :  despite  all  out- 
cries, the  governments  are  calmly  going  their  way. 
Only  when  the  matter  to  be  judged  is  so  vital  and 
elementary  that  an  entire  people  forms  instinctively 
one  common  opinion  does  the  pressure  become  irre- 
sistible (as  the  German  opinion  of  England's  atti- 
tude). But  then  we  have  again  a  parallel  with 
another  phenomenon  in  individuals:  sometimes  in 
a  supreme  moment  a  deep  vital  instinct,  above  and 
beyond  the  discursive  reason,  can  and  must  lead  the 
way. 

But  now  how  are  we  to  explain  the  fact  that  a 
state's  morality  is  lower  than  an  individual's?  It 
seems  to  me  that  we  would  do  well  to  examine  first 
whether  or  no  the  fact  is  in  reality  as  asserted,  and 
then  whether  or  no  certain  errors  of  observation 
have  been  committed  here.  We  should  not  forget 
that  the  actions  of  a  state,  far  more  than  those  of 
private  persons,  lie  open  to  common  view  and  by  their 
very  magnitude  inevitably  attract  our  attention.  I 
venture  to  doubt  for  my  part  whether  the  naturally 
sinful  heart  of  man,  in  its  secret  deeds  and  desires, 
rises  so  very  far  above  the  level  of  states.  We  must 
not  confuse  theoretical  and  actual  morality. 

Further,  in  all  these  objective  factors  it  is  as  yet 

[18] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

altogether  only  a  question  of  quantitative  differences 
from  the  judgment  on  an  individual.  If  the  state 
is  properly  to  lay  claim  to  essentially  qualitative  dif- 
ferences, there  must  be  adduced  some  constant  ele- 
ment which  distinguishes  it  as  an  agent  always  and 
everywhere  from  the  individual.  Von  Treitschke 
believes  he  can  adduce  such  an  element.  For  him 
the  essence  of  the  state  lies  in  power  [de  macht], 
and  concern  for  its  power  is  its  highest,  its  absolute 
duty.  He  adds,  however,  ''that  the  acquired  power 
must  justify  itself,  by  being  used  for  the  highest 
moral  good  of  mankind"  {Politik,  1897,  I,  p.  91). 
It  appears  then  that  the  way  in  which  the  power  is 
acquired  is,  according  to  von  Treitschke,  ethically 
indifferent;  and  that  only  the  way  in  which  it  is 
used  is  subject  to  ethical  judgment.  The  state  in 
its  actions  is  thus  continually,  or  at  least  a  good  part 
of  the  time,  virtually  in  a  moral  conflict :  all  further 
duties  have  to  give  way  as  soon  as  they  clash  with 
"the  unconditional  duty  of  self-preservation"  (p. 
103).  "A  sacrifice  for  a  foreign  people  is  not  only 
not  moral,  but  contradicts  the  idea  of  self-affirma- 
tion [Selbstbehauptung],  which  is  for  the  state  its 
highest  ideal."  I  believe  I  may  say  that  this  theory, 
as  here  so  broadly  and  absolutely  presented,  is  con- 
demned by  the  unmediated  moral  consciousness,  al- 
though it  seems  only  too  often  to  be  in  accord  with 
the  actual  practice  of  states.  The  theory  is  also 
logically  unsatisfactory.     It  is  itself  contradictory 

[19] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

to  the  definition  of  the  state  given  by  von  Treitschke 
himself,  namely:  ''a  people  rightly  united  as  an 
independent  power."  In  the  definition  the  people  is 
properly  made  primary,  not  the  power.  The  state  is 
a  phase  of  the  people ;  the  power  is  its  attribute,  not 
its  being.  That  the  preservation  and  acquisition  of 
power  is  the  direct  outgrowth  of  its  nature  is  thus 
not  true.  The  people  that,  in  and  through  its  state, 
makes  power  the  end  to  which  all  else  is  subordi- 
nated acts  not  through  necessity,  by  virtue  of  an 
inescapable  organic  impulse,  but  simply  out  of  pure 
egotism,  and  hence  not  morally.  The  assurance 
that  the  might  so  acquired  is  to  be  used  in  the  ser- 
vice of  morality  does  not  seem  then  the  most  certain. 
Indeed,  the  ethical  vocation  of  the  state  appears  to 
be,  in  von  Treitschke's  exposition,  without  inner 
connection  with  its  nature. 

An  individual,  says  von  Treitschke,  may  sacrifice 
himself  for  something  higher;  but  in  the  case  of  the 
state  there  is  nothing  higher.  Yet  how  comes  it 
then  that  the  state  too  is  morally  bound?  The 
moral  ideal  is  after  all  higher  than  the  state.  And  for 
the  individual  one  could  prove  in  the  same  manner 
that  the  duty  of  self-preservation  is  "unconditional" 
[German,  unbedingt].  The  state  is  the  united  will 
of  the  people  and  as  such  a  concentration  of  power ; 
and  no  less  is  the  practical  part  of  a  vigorous,  strong- 
willed  personality  a  center  of  energy,  an  independent 
power  inside  the  boundaries  of  law.    Does  it  follow 

[20] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

then  that  the  power  has  the  moral  right  to  permit 
itself  unrestrained  exercise  inside  those  boundaries, 
regardless  of  what  its  purposes  may  be?  The  moral 
consciousness  is  not  for  a  moment  in  doubt:  the 
answer  is  a  decided  negative. 

And  therefore  the  duty  of  self-preservation  is  in 
the  end  likewise  for  the  state  not  "unconditional," 
since  the  state  is  in  reality  nothing  but  one  of  the 
forms  in  which  the  population  of  a  definite  territory 
lives  its  life.  If  this  state,  if  this  form  vanishes, 
not  so  the  folk.  It  is  even  quite  possible  that  it  will 
fiind,  in  other  forms — say,  as  a  part  of  a  greater 
state — much  better  advantages  for  the  practical, 
moral  side  of  its  being.  This  is  convincingly  evi- 
denced for  instance  in  the  absorbtion  of  the  number- 
less little  German  states  into  the  German  Empire. 
Is  it  likely  that  von  Treitschke  himself  would  ever 
have  meant  that  the  little  states  before  1870  had  an 
"unconditional  duty  of  self-preservaton" — he  who 
proclaimed,  with  a  measure  of  truth,  a  small  statr 
as  "something  ridiculous"? 

Yet  the  theory  has  in  my  eyes  a  large  kernel  of 
truth,  which  comes  to  light  when  we  apply  the 
necessary  limitations.  At  the  same  time,  it  will 
appear  that  even  the  element  which  we  are  to  get  at 
in  this  way  creates  no  qualitative  difference  between 
the  judgment  on  a  state  and  the  judgment  on  an 
individual.    Before  going  further  into  the  matter — 

[21] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

a  discussion  better  deferred  to  a  later  chapter — ^let 
us  now  return  to  our  question,  which  I  hope  has 
not  been  lost  sight  of  in  this  long  but  unavoidable 
digression:  what  is  the  binding  force  of  promises? 
Is  it  unlimited,  or  are  there  restrictions? 


[22] 


IV. 


AT  first  glance  one  will  presumably  be  inclined  to 
ji\_  call  this  force  unlimited.  "A  man  a  man,  a  word 
a  word."  But  Faust,  when  on  the  point  of  closing 
his  bargain  with  the  devil,  says,  as  a  written  guaran- 
tee is  demanded  of  him: 

"Ist's  nicht  genug,  dass  mein  gesprochnes  Wort 
Auf  ewig  soil  mit  meinen  Tagen  schalten? 
Rast  nicht  die  Welt  in  alien  Stromen  fort, 
Und  mich  soil  ein  Versprechen  halten? 
Doch  dieser  Wahn  ist  uns  ins  Herz  gelegt; 
Wer  mag  sich  gern  davon  befreien? 
Begluckt,  wer  Treue  rein  im  Busen  tragt, 
Kein  Opfer  wird  ihn  je  gereuen!" 

Is  it  not  clear  from  these  words  that  Faust,  in 
spite  of  the  high  ethical  worth  of  "good  faith,"  yet 
feels  this  life-long  promise  as  an  unnatural,  an  un- 
just compulsion?  And  shall  we  not,  in  spite  of  his 
further  asseveration, — 

"Nur  keine  Furcht,  dass  ich  dies  Biindnis  breche, 
Das  Streben  meiner  ganzen  Kraft 
Ist  grade  das,  was  ich  verspreche," — 

Still  be  able  to  call  the  whole  poem,  among  other 
things,  the  story  of  how  in  the  end,  notwithstanding 

123] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

the  fulfilment  of  the  stipulation,  the  devil  neverthe- 
less did  not  get  his  share,  since,  not  Faust,  but  the 
moral  order  of  the  universe  itself,  prevented  such 
an  outcome? 

One  need  not  look  long  in  the  modern  literature 
of  scientific  ethics  for  a  definitive  treatment  of  the 
problem.  One  will  find  it  in  that  justly  popular 
book  of  Th.  Lipps,  Die  ethischen  Grundfragen 
["Principles  of  Ethics"],  pp.  152-167.  Following 
Kant  closely  in  the  essence  of  the  matter — and  in 
his  results  approximating  the  position  of  Professor 
Hey  mans  —  Lipps  has  formulated  as  the  highest 
maxim :  "So  act  that  you  can  be  true  to  yourself" — 
which  is,  as  he  immediately  adds,  not  the  same  as 
"Always  remain  true  to  yourself."  Were  we  ra- 
tionally and  morally  perfect,  then  we  could  and 
might  be  always  true  to  ourselves.  But  we  are 
frail  creatures,  and  thus  in  some  later,  riper  period, 
loyalty  to  ourselves  may  have  to  give  way  before 
the  higher  loyalty  to  truth  and  right.  Even  with 
respect  to  ourselves  we  must  be  able  to  say :  Amicus 
Socrates,  sed  magis  arnica  Veritas  (et  virtus).  In 
such  a  case  of  disloyalty  one  can  deserve  moral 
blame,  yet  "not  on  account  of  the  disloyalty,  but 
solely  because  I  so  acted  that  I  had  to  be  thereafter 
untrue  to  myself,  that  is,  because  I  had  promised 
or  sworn  what  /  had  no  right  to  promise  or  swear" 
(p.  153).    In  such  a  case  for  one  to  remain  true  to 


C24J 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

oneself  would  be  to  add  a  still  greater  wrong  to  the 
one  already  committed. 

Two  factors  combine  in  the  non-keeping  of  prom- 
ises: The  one  is  to  be  observed  in  the  abandoning 
of  a  previous  opinion  or  judgmentj  the  other  in 
lying. 

An  opinion  once  held  has  its  after-effects  within 
us,  and  forms  the  tendency  to  perpetuate  itself.  The 
realization  that  it  must  be  given  up  balks  that  ten- 
dency. This  is  painful ;  we  are  ashamed  of  our  error, 
— all  the  more,  the  more  it  is  our  nature  to  be  loyal 
toward  ourselves.  There  is  in  us  an  inertia,  a  hold- 
ing to  the  past,  a  "loyalty,"  however  different  its 
strength  in  different  individuals.  (I  call  attention 
here  to  the  concept  of  the  secondary  function.)  In 
this  loyalty  there  rests  something  valuable,  a  gen- 
uine force.  Yet  this  becomes  a  weakness,  when  it 
leads  to  closing  our  eyes  to  the  better  insight;  for 
then  the  higher  virtue  of  truthfulness  toward  our- 
selves and  toward  others  is  wrongfully  subordinated 
to  loyalty  to  the  past, — which  cramps  and  shrivels 
the  soul.  We  then  remain  true  to  the  poor,  narrow 
personality  of  an  earlier  day,  kill  our  sense  of  truth, 
and  fail  to  reach  the  richer,  freer,  more  ethical  per- 
sonality, which  we  could  otherwise  have  achieved. 
It  may  be  that  we  console  ourselves  in  idle  self- 
praise  with  phrases  about  the  right  of  our  "indi- 
viduality." To  this  Lipps  answers  (p.  161)  :  "Cer- 
tainly there  is  a  right  of  individuality.    Every  indi- 

[25] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

viduality  has  that  right  in  proportion  to  the  measure 
of  the  positive  human  quahties  it  contains.  Every 
element  of  strength  and  greatness  in  a  man  is  valu- 
able and  has  its  right  to  its  place  in  the  sum-total  of 
his  personality.  But  this  means  at  the  same  time 
that  all  right  of  individuality  is  relative,  and  only 
that  personality  which  is  ethically  complete  and  ab- 
solutely rich  in  content  possesses  an  absolute  right/* 

If  one  possesses  the  freedom  that  is  ready  to 
abandon  the  delimited  personality  of  the  present  in 
the  cause  of  the  richer  and  more  ethical  personality 
with  the  power  of  truth,  then  an  unlimited  loyalty 
to  one's  own  past  is  out  of  the  question — for  the 
very  reason  that  this  is  disloyalty  toward  one's  own 
better  self. 

Lying  is  also  disloyalty  toward  one's  self.  For 
by  our  speech  we  ourselves  give  the  hearer  the  con- 
sciousness of  our  own  will,  so  that  he  believes  and 
trusts  he  is  hearing  our  real  thoughts  in  our  words. 
Thus  we  impose  upon  ourselves  the  obligation  to 
say  what  we  think,  and,  at  the  same  time,  by  our 
lying  fail  to  meet  the  self-imposed  obligation.  So 
at  bottom  we  repudiate  ourselves,  and  do  conscious 
wrong  to  our  own  self-conscious  life.  Hence  the 
deep  feeling  of  degradation  and  shame  that  accom- 
panies the  lie — the  deeper,  the  sounder  and  more 
vigorous  one's  life  at  the  core.  Lying  is  a  sign  of 
weakness,  of  lack  of  respect  for  one's  self  and 
others;  a  sign  too  of  superficiality  and  thoughtless- 

[26] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

ness,  since  it  seems  of  no  moment  to  the  liar  what 
men  believe  and  know. 

But  yet  is  every  lie  such  a  sign?  No.  Higher 
duties  may  conflict  with  the  duty  of  truthfulness  and 
gain  the  upper  hand,  as  humanitarianism  and  con- 
cern for  ends  of  greater  worth  and  range.  But  even 
then  a  lie  is  a  lie,  though  none  the  less  the  moral 
judgment  acquits  us.  "In  lying,  too,  the  real  object 
of  ethical  evaluation  is  not  the  deed,  but  the  entirety 
of  the  mental  content,  from  which,  in  a  given  case, 
it  originates." 

Now  both  factors — loyalty  to  our  own  past  and 
loyalty  to  that  trust  in  our  truthfulness  which  we 
have  ourselves  aroused  in  others — come  together  in 
the  obligation  to  keep  the  promises  we  have  given, 

This  obligation,  therefore,  shares  to  the  full  the 
scope  of  the  two  obligations  which  compose  it. 
Here,  too,  the  present  can  make  demands  before 
which  loyalty  to  the  past  has  to  yield.  Here,  too, 
factors  can  enter  which  compel  the  loyalty  and 
truthfulness  toward  others  to  retire  before  the 
duties  of  still  higher  ethical  worth.  "If  I  can,  I  am 
in  such  a  case  in  duty  bound  to  take  back  my  prom- 
ise in  express  terms,  that  is,  to  remove  that  belief 
in  my  original  volition.  But  if  I  cannot  do  this,  I 
must  nevertheless  perform  what  I  have  perceived  to 
be  right,  regardless  of  the  contradiction  of  my  prom- 
ise. The  condemnation  falls  then  not  on  the  omis- 
sion of  the  thing  promised,  but  on  the  promise  itself 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

made  without  sufficient  reflection  or  foresight"  (p. 
168). 

Thus  there  can  exist  a  moral  duty  to  break  a 
promise :  or,  more  exactly,  a  higher  moral  duty  can 
set  aside  the  duty  to  keep  a  promise.  There  is  then 
an  ethical  conflict.  We  saw  how  this  can  arise: 
neither  loyalty  toward  one*s  own  past  nor  loyalty 
toward  one's  own  declarations  of  the  moment  is  ab- 
solutely obligatory.  Consequently,  both  the  non- 
keeping  of  a  previously  given  promise  and  the  con- 
scious giving  of  a  promise  that  we  do  not  intend  to 
keep^  are  under  specific  circumstances  morally  de- 
fensible. The  "circumstances"  may  be  comprehended 
in  these  general  terms :  the  presence  of  a  still  higher 
ethical  duty  than  that  of  good  faith  and  truthfulness. 

^  [This  is  not  a  logical  non-sequitur,  but  a  well-considered 
reference  to  lying  as  before  discussed.] 


[28] 


WE  may  now  draw  some  conclusions  as  to  the 
mutual  promises  which  those  persons  called 
states  make  to  each  other  when  they  establish  a 
treaty.  Whether  the  case  of  an  ethically  defensible 
conscious  falsehood  ever  appears  also  in  the  prom- 
ises of  states,  is  to  me  doubtful;  yet,  in  view  of  the 
extent  to  which  the  complications  of  the  actually 
possible  contingencies  inevitably  exceed  our  grasp, 
is  as  little  to  be  categorically  denied.  In  any  case 
it  is  here  beside  the  mark,  for  the  pending  suit  ob- 
viously belongs  under  the  first  rubric:  disloyalty 
toward  one's  own  past. 

When  is  the  disloyalty  ethically  defensible?  We 
can  now  answer:  whenever  a  higher  ethical  duty 
renders  it  unavoidable, — in  other  words,  whenever 
the  living  present  utters  commands  of  so  high  and 
imperative  a  character  that  the  past  and  the  ethical 
command  of  loyalty  to  that  past  must  give  way  be- 
fore them.  Does  this  not  amount  to  the  doctrine 
of  the  rebus  sic  stantibus?  No.  That  doctrine  de- 
mands, as  it  appears  to  me,  on  the  one  side  more, 

[29] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

on  the  other  side  less  than  can  be  approved  by  the 
unmediated  moral  consciousness,  which  is  here  alone 
the  point  involved.  The  point  is  not  that  the  status 
quo  at  the  moment  of  concluding  the  treaty  has  been 
changed — for  this  is  a  condition  which,  taken  strictly, 
is  in  truth  being  fulfilled  all  the  time,  since  reality 
never  for  two  instants  remains  exactly  the  same. 
No,  but  that  change  must  have  originated  a  higher 
ethical  duty.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  duty  orig- 
inates rebus  stantibus,  then  the  treaty-obligation 
gives  way  none  the  less,  however  much,  relatively 
speaking,  things  are  as  they  were. 

We  have  already  seen  this  above  in  Lipps :  though 
one  could  not  and  dared  not  act  otherwise,  there 
yet  remains  in  such  cases  an  element  of  moral  guilt; 
the  guilt,  however,  attaches  not  to  the  action  of  the 
moment,  but  to  the  promise  of  the  past.  Hence, 
moreover,  the  requirement  that  one  shall  take  back 
the  promise  as  soon  as  possible, — which,  in  the  case 
of  a  state,  means  it  shall  declare  on  its  part  as  soon 
as  possible  that  it  no  longer  regards  itself  as  bound 
by  the  treaty. 

Now  as  to  these  two  points,  I  think  we  can  con- 
fidently maintain  that  the  acting  state  operates  under 
entirely  different  circumstances  than  an  individual, 
and  thus  has  a  claim  to  special  considerations.  We 
have  sought  above  in  vain  for  a  general,  a  constant 
differentia  that  should  play  a  part  in  each  moral 
judgment  on  the  actions  of  states;  but  here  we  may 

[30] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

admit  such  an  element  in  a  moral  judgment  passed 
specifically  on  the  breaking  of  treaties.  For  the 
great  difference  between  the  promise  of  a  state  and 
of  a  single  person  is  quite  obvious.  It  lies  in  this, 
that  "the  sufficient  reflection  or  foresight,"  de- 
manded by  Lipps  for  the  promise,  is  in  the  instance 
of  a  treaty  often  infinitely  harder  to  achieve  than 
in  that  of  an  individual  promise,  as  a  result,  in  part, 
of  the  far-reaching  scope  of  the  state's  promise,  in 
part,  of  the  unlimited  time  for  which  it  is  given. 
No  man  of  sound  understanding  will  take  it  amiss 
that  Germany  in  1839  did  not  foresee  the  contin- 
gencies of  1914.  There  can  be  simjply  no  question 
here  of  the  heedless  awakening  of  trust;  indeed 
even  in  most  cases  of  individuals  it  appears  at  least 
doubtful. 

Again,  as  to  the  second  point,  the  taking  back  of 
promises,  the  state  is  in  an  entirely  different  position 
from  a  private  person.  If  Germany  had  announced 
a  few  years  ago  that  in  the  event  of  a  war  she  might 
not  be  so  situated  as  to  respect  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium,  that  action,  which  abstractly  and  by  itself 
would  have  been  indubitably  one  of  moral  grandeur, 
would  have  had  in  practice  presumably  the  most 
disastrous  consequences,  in  all  likelihood  bringing 
on  the  war  itself,  and  so  in  the  end  would  have 
seemed  itself  morally  objectionable,  as  the  product 
of  an  exaggerated  concern  for  one's  own  ethical 

[31] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

spotlessness.  Ethical  spotlessness  is  an  ideal  of  the 
cloister,  not  an  ideal  of  historical  reality.  In  order 
to  live  and  to  work  we  must  have  the  courage  to 
take  on  ourselves  our  unavoidable  share  of  the  moral 
guilt,  due  to  the  conflicting  demands  inevitably  made 
upon  our  frail  human  nature. 

The  deciding  difference  lies,  in  my  opinion,  here : 
that  the  gradual  lapse  of  a  treaty-obligation  into 
the  background  is  the  slowly  maturing  result  of  an 
historic  process  visible  to  everybody,  and  thus  an 
occurrence  entirely  different  in  its  proportions  and 
much  easier  of  recognition  than  an  individual's  out- 
growing the  obligations  of  his  promise.  As  to  a 
treaty  there  arises  in  the  end  a  communis  opinio 
that  it  has  had  its  time,  in  other  words,  that  the 
cessation  of  its  binding  force  is  already  known  and 
thus  no  more  needs  to  be  made  known.^  An  express 
declaration  on  the  part  of  the  state  most  interested 
comes,  therefore,  immediately  under  suspicion  of  be- 
ing not  a  simple  official  notification  pour  acquit  de 
conscience  but  something  quite  otherwise —  the  be- 
ginning of  aggression. 

Therefore:  Germany  was  not  longer  hound  by 
the  treaty  of  i8jp,  if  it  can  be  established  that  a 
higher  moral  duty  came  into  conflict  with  the  duty 
of  loyalty  to  her  given  promise.    And  further :  the 

iCf.  Valter,  loc.  cit,  p.  62;  likewise  Why  We  Are  at  War, 
p.  27. 

[32] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

duty  of  loyalty  to  the  given  promise  is  to  be  reckoned 
a  greater  or  a  lesser,  in  the  measure  that  the  prom- 
ise deserves  to  be  regarded  more  or  less  as  altogether 
obsolete,  more  or  less  as  given  under  altogether 
different  circumstances  than  those  now  obtaining. 
(It  is  here  that  the  rebtis  sic  stantibus  plays  its  real 
part  in  the  whole  process  of  moral  judgment.)  The 
more  obsolete  the  treaty  the  readier  we  will  be  in- 
clined to  say :  the  breach  is  defensible. 

But,  no  matter  how  obsolete,  the  treaty  is  binding, 
unless  it  yields  to  a  higher  moral  duty,  a  morally 
more  justifiable  striving  than  the  striving  for  loy- 
alty to  the  promise.  A  moral  duty,  even  when  no 
longer  the  greatest,  can  never  yield  to  purely  selfish 
ends,  without  leading  ultimately  to  moral  condem- 
nation. 

The  question  now  becomes  this :  can  such  a  moral 
duty  be  shown  in  Germany's  case?  My  moral  con- 
sciousness answers  this  question  with  full  conviction 
in  the  affirmative.  Germany  found  herself  on  the 
2nd  of  August  in  the  most  desperate  circumstances 
in  which  we  can  conceive  a  people  to  be :  supported 
only  by  a  weaker  ally,  that  besides  had  to  draw  off  a 
portion  of  its  forces  for  use  against  Servia,  she 
stood  exposed  to  a  concentric  attack  by  two  great 
powers  and  expected  at  any  moment  to  be  compelled 
to  fight  England  to  boot.  It  was  a  life  and  death 
struggle;  and  though  the  duty  of  self-preservation, 
of  straining  all  energies  for  the  safety  of  self,  is 

[33] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

not  the  highest,  we  can  surely  not  deny  its  character 
as  a  moral  duty,  a  duty  toward  oneself.  I  have 
said  already  the  duty  of  self-preservation  is  not  an 
absolute  moral  duty,  not  even  for  states  —  there 
are  no  absolute  moral  duties — but  it  is  beyond  doubt 
a  high,  a  noble  duty.  In  any  case  it  was  more  than 
pressing  enough  to  set  aside  the  old  treaty  of  1839. 
And  it  can  hardly  be  denied  that  a  passage  through 
Belgium  is,  under  the  circumstances  in  which  Ger- 
many found  herself,  properly  to  be  judged  as  the 
demand  of  self-preservation.  I  shall  not  attempt 
to  give  specific  proofs,  for  I  would  then  be  tres- 
passing on  the  terrain  of  the  military  experts.  I 
can  be  content  to  remind  the  reader  that  this  is  the 
common  opinion  of  all  experts. 

I  can  be  the  more  readily  content,  since  the  ques- 
tion whether  or  not  Germany  was  mistaken  in  her 
belief  is  ethically  indifferent.  Of  ethical  import 
are  never  the  circumstances,  as  such,  under  which 
an  action  took  place,  but  the  circumstances  as  they 
were  conceived  by  the  acting  person  and  as  they 
helped  to  motivate  his  decision.  It  is  ethically  of 
no  concern  whether  his  conception  was  correct  or 
incorrect.  This  can  lead  to  a  judgment  on  his  in- 
telligence, not  to  a  judgment  on  his  character.  Thus 
even  if  in  the  end  Germany  seems  to  have  deceived 
herself,  the  only  fact  of  any  weight  ethically  is  that 
her  decision  proceeded  from  the  conviction  that  the 
passage  was  imperative  for  the  accomplishment  of 

[34] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

the  intended  action  against  France.  Therefore, 
Germany  is  not  to  be  condemned  morally  for  the 
fact  that,  under  the  circumstances  in  which  she 
found  herself,  she  regarded  herself  as  released  from 
the  promise  delivered  to  England  in  iSjp. 

Is  her  Hne  of  conduct  thereby  definitively  justified  ? 
Far  from  it.  England  aside,  she  had  also  a  duty 
toward  Belgium,  and  this  aspect  of  the  matter  has 
scarcely  been  touched  upon  as  yet.  Thus  at  the 
present  stage  of  our  investigation  we  are  not  ready 
by  any  means  to  acquit  Germany.  However,  the 
use  made  by  England  of  the  treaty  of  iS^p  can  cer- 
tainly be  ethically  condemned.  In  all  history  was 
ever  a  nation,  struggling  under  such  desperate  cir- 
cumstances, subjected  to  a  more  arbitrary  ethical 
demand  by  another  nation — that  was  besides  less 
ethically  warranted  in  its  demand  by  all  the  con- 
tingencies ?  Is  there  a  crasser  example  of  the  sum- 
mum  jus,  summa  injuria  thinkable?  Have  we  ever 
seen  in  clearer  light  to  what  degree  of  external 
righteousness  legalistic  habits  of  thought,  so-called 
"law-abidingness,"  can  mislead  men, — until  "right"^ 
becomes  the  very  instrument  of  unrighteousness? 
England's  attitude  is  here  ethically  identical  with 
that  of  the  jury-lawyer,  who,  with  the  most  un- 
ruffled composure,  suddenly  cites  a  forgotten  statute 
of  the  good  old  times,  which  seems, — quite  acci- 
dentally of  course, — to  bolster  up  his  case.  We 
2  [Recht  =  "right,"  also  "law" :  see  above  in  text,  pp.  7-8.] 
[35] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

have  here  in  the  crassest  form  the  requirement  of 
loyalty  to  the  past :  it  becomes  downright  immoral- 
ity, and  chiefly  because  in  the  end  the  loyalty  touches 
only  the  outward  form  of  the  past,  not  its  spirit — 
for  this  is  long  since  dead.  This  leads  to  the  most 
brutal  wrong,  under  the  forms  of  right. 

Perhaps  one  will  ask,  why  all  this  discussion? 
Isn't  it  all  too  obvious  that  the  whole  appeal  to  the 
treaty  of  1839  was  nothing  but  a  rather  transparent 
pretext  on  the  part  of  England?^  I  answer  that 
this  does  not  hinder  us  from  critically  examining 
the  ethical  worth  and  purport  of  the  appeal,  and 
that  such  is  the  more  necessary  where  the  appeal  has 
made  such  an  impression.  Moreover,  that  is  but  just. 
England  has  the  same  right  to  an  impartial  exam- 
ination of  her  case,  and,  primarily,  of  her  case  as 
she  herself  conceives  it.  Only  through  that  exam- 
ination can  it  seem  certain  whether  the  appeal  to 
the  treaty  will  do  or  not.  And  if  it  will  not  do,  that 
of  itself  does  not  prove  it  a  deliberate,  conscious 
pretext.  The  legal  habit  of  thought,  in  the  very 
blood  of  that  people,  renders  it  possible  to  believe 
in  the  good  faith  of  citations  of  law,  which,  ob- 
jectively considered,  are  of  the  most  dubious  qual- 
ity. It  is  possible — I  don't  say  I  regard  it  as  prob- 
able— that  Grey  and  his  associates  were  genuinely 

3  Professor  d'Aulnis  de  Bourouill  pointed  out  in  the  Utr. 
Dagb.  ["Utrecht  Daily  Press"]  of  Oct.  26,  1914,  that  the  war- 
speech  of  Grey,  on  Aug.  3,  was  anterior  to  the  violation  of 
Belgium's  neutrality,  Aug.  4;  Ramsay  Macdonald  also. 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

indignant  in  the  foreground  of  their  consciousness 
over  this  devised  breach  of  law.  The  human  con- 
sciousness is  such  a  curiously  complicated  affair 
that  our  own  real  motives  may  lurk  unbeknown  in 
the  background,  when  there  is  present  a  complex 
that  of  itself  presses  to  the  fore  by  virtue  of  our 
accustomed  modes  of  thinking. 

In  any  case,  as  to  a  moral  judgment  on  the  legal 
defense  conducted  by  England,  we  must  bear  in 
mind  the  factor  described  above  as  one-sided  train- 
ing, with  the  accustomed  modes  of  thinking  that 
result  therefrom.  This  element  forms  a  mitigating 
circumstance  not  to  be  overlooked.* 

The  question  of  conscious  pretext  or  unconscious 
self-righteousness  hovers  perpetually  before  our 
minds  on  reading  those  pages  where,  at  the  end  of 
their  indictment  of  "the  new  German  theory  of  the 
state"  (i.  e.,  von  Treitschke's),  the  authors  of  Why 
We  Are  at  War,  once  more  sum  up  their  defense 
of  "Great  Britain^s  Case"  (pp.  115-117).  Under  all 
the  fine  words,  they  still  have  to  recognize  that  it 
was  not  alone  the  menace  against  Right  which 
hastened  her  call  to  arms.     "It  is  true  that  we  are 

*  In  passing,  note  that  in  1870  the  high-minded  Gladstone 
was  far  from  admitting  the  absolute  binding  power  of  the 
treaty  of  1839.  On  the  occasion  of  the  then  concluded  special 
agreements  as  to  the  protection  of  Belgium's  neutrality,  he 
said  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  he  was  not  of  the  opinion 
that  "the  simple  fact  of  the  existence  of  a  guarantee  is  binding 
on  every  party  to  it,  irrespectively  altogether  of  the  particular 
position  in  which  it  may  find  itself  at  the  time  when  the  occa- 
sion for  acting  on  the  guarantee  arises." 

[37] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

fighting  for  our  own  interest.  But  what  is  our 
interest?  We  are  fighting  for  Right,  because  Right 
is  our  supreme  interest.  The  new  German  political 
theory  enunciates  that  *our  interest  is  our  right.' 
The  old — the  very  old — English  political  theory  is : 
*The  Right  is  our  interest.'  It  is  true  that  we  have 
everything  to  gain  by  defending  the  cause  of  inter- 
national law.  Should  that  prevent  us  from  defend- 
ing that  cause?" 

Of  a  truth,  no, — a  sober  reader  will  reply, — and 
I  wish  you  joy  of  the  agreeable  and  convenient  (yet 
still  more  or  less  accidental)  circumstance,  that  you 
found  your  own  interest  formulated  in  the  statutory 
right  [recht] ;  but,  with  permission,  the  question 
really  is  whether  you  would  also  have  defended  that 
right  [recht,  law],  if  it  had  happened  to  be  of  no 
concern  to  your  interest,  not  to  say,  directly  op- 
posed ?  The  beatus  possidens  [the  happy  possessor] 
can  talk  till  doomsday ;  but  there  is  perhaps  another 
party  whose  interest  just  as  much  requires  a  new 
construction  of  that  right  [recht,  law].  Is  it  forth- 
with so  clear  that  the  affair  of  the  first  party  has 
on  its  side  the  moral  law,  too,  as  well  as  the  statu- 
tory law?  Or  is  it  not  alone  the  statutory  law  [het 
positieve  recht]  that  is  subject  to  the  universal  prin- 
ciple, 

"Alles  was  entsteht, 
1st  wert,  dass  es  zu  Grunde  geht"  ? 


[38] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

Is  it  alone  in  Germany  that  Vernunft  [sense] 
becomes  in  the  course  of  time  Unsinn  [nonsense]  ? 

"Our  cause,  as  one  would  expect  from  a  people 
that  has  fought  out  its  ozvn  internal  struggles  under 
the  forms  of  law,  is  a  legal  cause."  The  words 
italicized  are  recommended  for  careful  meditation. 
They  might  be  compared  with  the  words  I  once 
found  somewhere*^  ascribed  to  Bismarck:  'Wo 
Preussens  Macht  in  Frage  kommt,  da  kenne  ich 
kein  Recht'^  ["Where  Prussia's  power  is  in  ques- 
tion, I  know  no  law"].  If  an  English  prime  minis- 
ter, mutatis  mutandis,  had  permitted  himself  this 
speech  of  an  (above  everything  else)  open-hearted, 
truth-loving  giant  who  "heraus  will  mit  der  Sprache'^ 
["who  blurts  it  right  out"]  he  would  have  become 
impossible  in  his  milieu.  An  Englishman's  first 
business  is  to  "save  appearances."  He  fights  for 
his  interests,  but  only  "under  the  forms  of  law." 
That  by  this  very  attitude  the  law  itself  becomes  a 
mere  form  doesn't  bother  him,  for  his  attention  is 
now  concentrated  on  the  form.  Any  one  else  who 
not  only  practically  but  theoretically  is  concerned 
more  with  the  content,  the  real  nature  of  things,  will 
see  above  all  "the  struggle"  and  "the  interests." 

In  the  last  analysis  the  fact  is  this :  The  English 
position  that  the  mutual  existence  of  states  requires 
the  absolute,  eternal  validity  of  treaties  is  simply 

^  I  can't  verify ;  but  se  non  e  vero,  e  hen  trovato. 
[39] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

wrong.  A  relative,  limited  validity  is  alone  practi- 
cable. Reality,  in  which  alone  the  historic  process 
of  eternal  becoming  and  evolution  has  to  fulfil  itself, 
needs  a  certain  degree  of  consistency,  but  no  less  a 
certain  degree  of  plasticity.  Without  the  last  all  is  at 
a  standstill, — that  is,  dead.  The  beatus  possidens 
desires  the  standstill:  an  expanding,  an  advancing 
individual  or  race  desires  movement. 

It  is  this  contrast,  v^hich  is  alv^ays  in  hiding  under 
the  superficial  debate  about  right  and  might.  It  is 
this  eternal  strife,  v^hich  achieved  pregnant  and 
unforgettable  expression  in  the  epoch-making 
[wereld-historisch]  conference  at  Berlin  on  August 
4,  1914,  between  the  German  Imperial  Chancellor 
and  the  British  Ambassador,  of  which  we  possess 
an  account  in  the  latter's  report  to  his  government 
(Why  We  Are  at  War,  pp.  198-201).  It  is  the 
strife  of  new  Content  against  old  Form;  of  bleed- 
ing, wrestling  Reality  against  official  Phrase ;  or,  to 
say  it  roundly,  of  Truth  against  conscious  or  un- 
conscious Falsehood.  How  little  insight  and  com- 
prehension we  have  in  these  matters,  is  seen  from 
the  way  in  which  the  Vox  Populi,  seizing  on  the 
words  "just  for  a  scrap  of  paper," — words  which 
were  a  perfectly  just  characterization  of  the  existing 
circumstances  as  to  that  particular  treaty  which 
was   alone   in   question — proceeded   to  add:   "For 


[40] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

Germany  all  treaties  are  scraps  of  paper.     The  Im- 
perial Chancellor  has  said  so  himself."® 

I  fancy  that  it  would  be  discreet  of  the  Germans 
to  keep  in  check  for  use  only  among  choicer  spirits 
this  so  likeable  and  intelligible  tendency  (recall 
Goethe,  and  Luther's  "Table-talk")  to  "vigorous 
language"  [sterke  woorden].  The  stupid  public 
cannot  grasp  it ;  and  the  might  of  stupidity  is  enor- 
mous. Do  not  the  very  gods  contend  in  vain  against 
it?  Without  doubt,  we  have  here  one  of  the  causes 
of  the  general  antipathy  to  the  Germans  [Duitscher- 
haaf].  Meantime,  the  problem  remains,  if  a  vigor- 
ous forthright,  inner  life  that  breaks  its  way  ahead 
in  such  expressions  permits  of  being  kept  in  check. 
One  may  be  too  great  to  be  discreet. 

®  But  it  is  a  shame  that  such  a  great  authority  in  international 
law  as  Andre  Weiss  (La  violation  de  la  neutralite  beige  et 
luxembourgeoise,  p.  35)  should  do  likewise.  And  how  little 
the  English  Ambassador  Goschen  really  sensed  the  situation, 
appears   from   the  cool   words  with   which  he  continues  his 

story:  "After  this  somewhat  painful  interview" Indeed  it 

was  "somewhat"  painful,  but  it  was  more,  infinitely  more. 


[41] 


VI. 


THE  matter  of  Germany's  treaty-breach  toward 
the  guarantors  is  herewith  concluded;  but 
now  comes  the  more  important,  because  not  merely 
formal,  but  material  side  of  the  case,  the  Belgian 
side.  For  this  side  an  appeal  to  the  duty-  of  self- 
preservation  is  ethically  inadequate.  No  people  has 
the  right  to  save  itself  at  the  expense  of  another 
people.  There  is,  as  Kant  has  already  taught  us, 
nothing  of  absolute  value  except  personality — be  it 
that  of  an  individual  or  that  of  a  people.  No  per- 
sonality is  a  priori  of  more  worth  than  another; 
none  has,  therefore,  the  right  to  use  another  simply 
as  the  means  for  achieving  its  own  ends.  This 
moral  principle  is  the  foundation  of  the  ruling  in 
article  1  of  the  Hague  agreement  of  1907  concern- 
ing the  rights  and  obligations  of  neutral  states  and 
persons  in  case  of  war  on  land:  "The  territory  of 
neutral  powers  is  inviolable,"  with  the  consequences 
summed  up  in  art.  2-4. 

Germany  abrogated  this  duty  also.  She  can  only 
be  defended  if  it  can  be  proven  that  a  still  higher 
duty  than  that  of  self-preservation  came  into  con- 

[42] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

flict  with  the  duty  of  respecting  the  personality  of 
another. 

I  state  the  issue  intentionally  as  sharply  as  pos- 
sible. I  disregard  whatever  mitigating  circum- 
stances there  be  in  the  affirmed  plans  of  the  French 
to  pass  through  or  in  the  affirmed  connivance  of 
Belgium  with  England  and  France;  I  disregard 
likewise  the  fact,  however  undeniable,  that  Ger- 
many's appearance  on  the  scene  is  not  the  only 
cause  of  the  dreadful  situation  in  which  poor  Bel- 
gium finds  herself  to-day.  In  all  damage  wrought 
by  war  the  will  of  the  attacking  army  is  not  the 
only  cause;  the  will  of  the  defenders  is  a  cause  no 
less.  Moreover,  in  my  opinion,  it  is  hard  to  deny 
that  Belgium's  action  overstepped  the  bounds  of  a 
mere  defense  of  neutrality  and  thereby  the  Belgian 
duty  J  and  that  especially  after  the  second  ultimatum 
it  was  no  longer  so  much  a  defense  of  neutrality, 
as  active  participation  on  the  side  of  the  Allies. 
Obviously  Belgium  has  the  fullest  right  to  take  that 
side,  but  then  she  can  no  longer  reproach  Germany 
for  the  greater  harm  thus  occasioned. 

Yet  all  this  is  but  a  question  of  degree,  of  quan- 
tity. The  moral  charge  remains  that  Germany  did 
attack  the  personality  of  another  people, — however 
great  or  little  the  extent  of  the  attack.  For  the 
moral  judgment,  the  extent  itself  is  in  a  way  in- 
different: the  moral  judgment  considers  primarily 
the  quality,  not  the  quantity  of  actions. 

143] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

Properly  to  explain  my  meaning  further,  I  shall 
have  to  make  a  digression  on  the  moral  conflict  in 
general  and  on  a  most  important  case  of  that  con- 
flict in  particular. 

The  moral  conflict.  In  all  that  I  have  thus  far 
read  on  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality,  I  have 
missed  any  explicit  indication  that  the  case  belongs 
to  this  well-known  ethical  category.  Recognition  of 
this  fact  alone  naturally  makes  a  condemnation 
sans  phrase  impossible.  That  its  recognition  seems 
difficult  here  is  not  to  be  wondered  at.  One  side  of 
the  dilemma,  becoming  the  reality,  so  preoccupies  our 
attention  through  the  gigantic  miseries  of  its  effects, 
that  the  other  side  of  the  dilemma,  and  thereby  even 
the  existence  of  any  dilemma  at  all,  is  obscured — 
a  situation  naturally  much  assisted  by  the  now  almost 
universal  partisanship  of  passion. 

One  often  comes  across  the  notion  that  the  moral 
conflict  really  has  no  existence,  and  that  an  ad- 
mission of  the  same  is  a  sign  of  a  flabby  morality  that 
wants  to  excuse  everything.  "Fear  to  obey  the  ideal 
is  considered  a  lack  of  moral  insight  or  of  moral 
courage  and  hence  wrong. "^  The  video  meliora 
proboque,  deteriora  sequor  is  then  conceived  to  be 
simply  a  frivolous  saying.  The  truth  is  that  it  is 
a  tragic  lament  over  the  actual  situation  in  which 


^  Dr.  H.  T.  de  Graaf,  Moeilijkheden  in  het  sedelijke  leven, 
Groningen,  1904. 


i*n 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

every  individual  who  is  both  ethical  and  acting  is 
placed  in  this  world. 

It  is  also  noticeable  that  the  conflict-of-duties 
does  not  occupy  the  high  place  in  ethical  literature 
that  belongs  to  its  preeminent  and  fundamental  sig- 
nificance. The  writer,  who  in  the  more  recent  litera- 
ture has  taken  that  significance  into  account — Georg 
SimmeP  —  expressly  points  out  this  phenomenon 
(loc.  cit.,  p.  423).  The  conflict  is  apparently  very 
often  unconscious.  This  can  conceivably  happen  in 
several  ways,  which  are  presumably  reducible  to 
two  main  groups:  lack  of  moral  insight,  above  all 
of  breadth  of  insight,  of  essentially  deep,  many- 
sided  moral  earnestness,  owing  to  the  relatively 
low  moral  level  of  the  acting  individual ;  and,  next, 
complete  concentration  of  the  whole  individual  upon 
one  idea  and  end,  so  that  in  each  conflict  one  of  the 
possible  paths  is  chosen  unhesitatingly  as  a  matter 
of  course.  This  is  the  significance  of  the  great 
saying  of  Goethe:  ''Der  Handelnde  ist  immer  ge- 
wissenlos/'  In  this  connection  let  me  recall  a 
notable  passage  in  the  "Conversations  with  Ecker- 
mann."  On  May  29,  1831,  the  devoted  famulus 
records :  "Goethe  was  telling  me  of  a  lad  who  was 
quite  inconsolable  over  some  small  fault  he'd  com- 
mitted.    *I  didn't  exactly  like  to  see  this,'  he  said; 


^  Einleitung  in  die  Moralwissenschaft,  1893,  II,  pp.  307-426, 
especially,  3^-426.  The  quintessence  is  in  his  masterly  little 
book,  Die  Hauptprohleme  der  Philosophie,  pp.  151-158. 

[45] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

*for  it  indicates  an  all  too  tender  conscience,  that 
puts  so  high  a  value  on  one's  own  moral  self  that 
it  won't  forgive  that  self  in  anything.  Such  a  con- 
science makes  men  hypochondriacs  if  it  isn't  counter- 
balanced by  great  practical  activity.' "  It  is,  just 
because  of  the  apparently  high  moral  level  upon 
which  this  lad  stood,  more  than  likely — though  not 
exactly  stated — that  his  small  fault  was  committed 
only  amid  the  moral  conflict.  Goethe  gives  here  the 
only  prescription,  I  take  it,  whereby  noble-minded 
men  can  escape  perpetual  qualms  of  conscience:  to 
possess  at  the  same  time  great  practical  activity. 
One  may  see  the  reverse  in  Amiel's  Journal  Intime, 
and  in  the  monologue  of  that  other  sufferer  from 
conscience,  Hamlet: 

"Thus  conscience  does  make  cowards  of  us  all, 
And  thus  the  native  hue  of  resolution 
Is  sicklied  o'er  with  the  pale  cast  of  thought, 
And  enterprises  of  great  pith  and  moment 
With  this  regard  their  currents  turn  awry 
And  lose  the  name  of  action!" 

Amid  this  great  activity  there  are  naturally  con- 
flicts too,  but  they  do  not  come  into  consciousness,  or 
at  least  not  so  strongly.  The  strong,  active  man  en- 
joys the  contrary  of  ''the  too  tender  conscience"  and 
"the  pale  cast  of  thought" ;  his  "native  hue  of  resolu- 
tion," in  other  words,  his  "robust  conscience,"  is,  how- 
ever, truly  toto  genere  different  from  absence  of  con- 
science, making  instinctively,  almost  unconsciously, 
the  right  choice  in  every  conflict  that  comes  up. 

[46] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

There  is  still  another  type  that  reaches  its  goal 
without  trouble  in  all  conflicts,  but  at  all  times  in 
exactly  the  inverted  direction,  since  its  whole  life 
is  guided  not  by  rational  ends  but  by  delusion,  be  it 
a  beautiful  delusion,  a  noble  fiction:  that  is  Don 
Quixote,  with  his  innumerable  descendants.  Its  dis- 
tinguishing peculiarity  is  that  in  ethical  conflicts  it 
invariably  makes  the  inverted  choice, — not  because 
the  character,  but  because  the  insight  is  inverted. 

A  third  cause  of  the  conflict's  remaining  uncon- 
scious, or  rather  of  its  actual  non-appearance  sub- 
jectively even  where  objectively  possible  or  inevi- 
table, is  the  tendency  to  a  one-sided  fixation  of 
attention,  whereby  always  but  one  side  of  the  pend- 
ing affair  comes  into  consciousness.  This  factor  is 
perhaps  ethically  indifferent,  that  is,  stands  in  no 
relation  to  the  character. 

Now,  whereas  in  man's  actions  so  many  conflicts 
either  do  not  exist  even  subconsciously,  or  do  not 
penetrate  into  consciousness,  it  is  no  wonder  that  in 
man's  moral  judgments  this  element  very  often  does 
not  play  the  important  role  that  it  should.  Herein 
lies,  I  believe,  one  of  the  chief  reasons  why  moral 
judgments  often  turn  out  so  cruelly  unfair  and  so 
miserably  stupid;  herein,  too,  the  reason  for  one 
of  the  most  dreadful  situations  in  which  a  noble 
human  being  can  find  himself:  to  be  morally  con- 
demned, with  relative  justice,  by  somebody  who 
intellectually  and  morally  is  not  fit  to  unlace  his 

[47] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

shoes,  and  to  be  compelled  merely  to  abide  in  that 
situation,  since  it  is  precisely  the  lower  moral  level 
that  renders  it  impossible  for  the  other  to  see  the 
exceedingly  relative  justice  and  the  much  greater 
injustice  of  his  judgment.  In  such  a  case  there  is 
but  one  possibility:  to  endure  in  silence,  and  to 
meditate:  'They  know  not  what  they  do';  or,  re- 
calling another  sublime  example,  to  say  in  all  earn- 
estness, as  Huss  at  the  stake  said  to  the  old  woman 
tottering  up  with  her  faggots,  "sancta  simplicitas^' 
— in  other  words,  inwardly  to  recognize  to  the  full 
the  relative  justice  of  the  judger  which  seems  to 
him  the  absolute  justice,  and  to  experience  joy  in 
the  very  earnestness  which  in  each  case  expresses 
itself  through  the  judgment  passed. 

But  let  us  now  consider  the  moral  conflict  a  little 
more  narrowly.  This  conflict  arises,  not  alone  be- 
cause our  single  and  indivisible  personality  stands 
in  divers  relations  to  other  individuals  and  to  other 
spheres — from  which  circumstance  duties  first  arise 
— but,  over  and  above  this,  because  the  interests  of 
the  persons  and  the  spheres  are  dependent  upon  each 
other,  and  can  on  this  account  make  upon  one  indi- 
vidual mutually  contending  demands.  The  individ- 
ual stands  "at  the  intersection  of  many  spheres, 
social,  ideal,  or  in  general  in  some  way  advan- 
tageous" (Hauptprobleme  der  Philosophic,  p.  153). 
Thus  it  comes  that  there  exist  duties  also  toward 

148] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

oneself.  Now,  one  aspect  can  enter  into  another 
and  perpetually  does  enter  into  another.  And  it  is 
not  to  be  expected  that  there  will  be  any  reconcile- 
ment in  the  future,  since  the  more  complex  and  close 
the  structure  of  society,  the  more  numerous  become 
on  the  one  hand  the  relations  in  which  the  individual 
is  involved,  the  spheres  of  interest  in  which  he  has 
part,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  self -conscious- 
ness, the  force  whereby  the  personality  strives  to 
control  and  regulate  the  content  of  consciousness, 
becomes  continually  more  and  more  intensive. 

The  conflict  manifests  itself  mainly  in  two  chief 
forms  which  Simmel  calls  the  logical  (contradic- 
toire)  and  the  material  (contraire) .  By  the  former, 
he  means  a  case  where  one  and  the  same  action  can 
be  demanded  by  one  duty  and  forbidden  by  another ; 
by  the  latter,  the  situation  where  either  of  two 
duties,  though  not  contradictory  in  purpose  and 
content,  yet  takes  for  its  accomplishment  all  one*s 
available  time,  energies,  and  means.  The  second 
form  is  naturally  the  milder,  and  is  the  more  likely 
to  result  in  a  compromise;  the  first  is  the  sharper, 
and  the  decision  usually  demands  that  one  of  the 
two  duties  gives  way  altogether.  Both  forms,  how- 
ever, may  often  intermingle  or  intercross  (pp.  384- 
385). 

Moreover,  of  highest  importance  for  the  whole 
matter  seems  to  me  the  indisputable  fact  that  the 
duty  which  has  been  of  necessity  repudiated  never- 

[49] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

theless  still  maintains  its  moral  effect,  still  remains 
pressing  upon  the  conscience.  It  is,  as  if  the  moral 
ideal  intended  to  begrudge  us  the  benefit  of  the  ultra 
posse  nemo  tenetur.  Precisely  through  this  element 
does  the  conflict  of  duties  become  a  ti-agic  conflict, 
yes,  the  very  groundwork  of  all  tragedy.  The  tragic 
hero  is  the  noble  and  strong  one  who  falls  into  a 
tremendous  ethical  conflict  between  whose  irrecon- 
cilable demands  he  is  crushed  to  death.  In  this  process 
an  important  accompanying  role  is  fulfilled  by  the 
ethical  reaction  of  his  milieu,  which,  being  still  under 
the  influence  of  the  repudiated  duty,  feels  it  must 
punish  him  for  his  offense. 

It  is  on  account  of  its  significance  not  alone  for 
the  acting  party,  but  precisely  on  account  of  its  par- 
ticular significance  for  the  party  judging,  that  I  make 
mention  here  of  this  tragic  side  of  the  ethical  con- 
flict. Just  as  little,  namely,  as  the  action  performed 
in  conflict  can  ever  entirely  satisfy  the  party  acting, 
can  the  judgment  passed  on  that  action  ever  entirely 
satisfy  the  party  judging.  There  always  remains 
a  "yes but " 

In  the  case  pending,  for  example:  Assume  that 
Germany  is  blameless;  still  our  consciousness  con- 
tinues every  instant  unreconciled  to  the  fate  of  Bel- 
gium. We  must  be  on  our  guard  lest  this  unrecon- 
cilement  dominate  our  entire  judgment. 

I  should  like  to  add  here  another  word  or  two 
on  the  cause  of  this  phenomenon  of  un-satisfaction. 

CSO] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

Simmel  sees  in  it  an  argument  against  what  he  calls 
"The  monism  of  morality,"  i.  e.,  the  conception 
that  all  moral  precepts  are  reducible  to  one  funda- 
mental principle.  This  unsatisfaction  proves,  he 
thinks,  that  there  are  several  principles,  ultimately 
different,  or  at  least  for  the  moment  incapable  of 
being  reduced  to  a  unity;  though  it  is  to  be  as  little 
denied  that  we  are,  on  the  other  hand,  compelled 
just  as  much  by  our  whole  make-up  to  demand  such 
a  unity  in  the  realm  of  ideals.  I  believe,  in  all 
modesty,  the  cause  lies  rather  in  this,  that  with 
every  decision  there  persists  in  us  a  greater  or  a 
lesser  remainder  of  uncertainty  as  to  its  justifiability 
— the  more  dubious  the  case,  the  stronger  are  the 
claims  of  the  repudiated  duty — and  that  this  un- 
certainty, on  its  part,  lies  in  the  fact  that  so  many 
times  we  live  and  move  and  have  our  being  in  com- 
plete ignorance  as  to  the  objective  worth  of  the  con- 
tending duties.  I  consider  the  greatest  defect  in 
Heymans's  Einfiihrung  in  die  Ethik  is  that  his  purely 
formalistic  formulation  of  a  basic  ethical  principle, 
*^wolle  objective"  (this  amounts  in  the  main  to  about 
what  Kant  also  intended) ,  is  in  reality  only  applicable 
as  a  formulation  of  the  nature  of  moral  intention.^ 
For  a  complete  ethics,  however,  there  would  be 

^1  believe,  salva  reverentia,  that  Professor  Heymans  (loc. 
cit,  p.  26)  is  nodding,  when  he  contrasts  his  formal  monism 
with  Simmel's  pluralism.  Simmel  means  at  bottom  only  the 
pluralism  of  ultimate  values,  and  does  not  deny,  as  far  as  I 
can  see,  the  possibility  of  a  monistic  formulation  of  the  nature 
of  moral  intention  [gesindheid], 

[51] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

necessary  a  treatment  of  how  moral  intention 
changes  into  moral  deeds,  in  other  words,  a  treatment 
of  by  far  the  deepest  and  weightiest  problem  which 
is  encountered  by  our  blindly  groping  and  bloodily 
wrestling  humanity :  how  the  moral  ideal  gets  itself 
realized,  not  only  in  the  actions  of  an  individual  but 
in  the  historic  process  of  humanity.  Along  with  this 
we  meet  at  once  the  question  concerning  the  value 
of  the  different  aims  which  one  can  set  oneself, 
and  this,  too,  not  the  value  for  me  or  for  my  neigh- 
bor or  for  anybody  else,  but  the  value  in  itself,  the 
objective  value,  —  about  which  in  an  instant  the 
portentous  question  rises,  what  as  a  matter  of  fact 
are  we  to  understand  by  the  value  in  itself,  by 
the  value  which  is  thus  sundered  from  human  evalu- 
ation and  from  evaluating  human  beings?  Some- 
where hereabouts  is  the  point  where  our  human 
thinking  reaches  its  limit,  and  the  counsel  of  silence 
is  good,  and  it  is  only  the  unmediated  life- force 
of  the  moral  urge  that  carries  us  onward.* 

What  does  it  avail  me  that  I  possess  to  the  full 


^  Compare  in  the  "Ode  to  Pan"  of  Keat's  Endymion : 
"Be  thou  the  unimaginable  lodge 
For  solitary  thinkings,  such  as  dodge 
Conception  to  the  very  bourne  of  heaven, 
Then  leave  the  naked  brain ;  be  still  the  leaven 
That,  spreading  in  this  dull  and  clodded  earth, 
Gives  it  a  touch  ethereal,  a  new  birth. 
Be  still  a  symbol  of  immensity, 
A  firmament  reflected  in  a  sea. 
An  element  filling  the  space  between. 
An  Unknown " 

[52] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

the  objective  attitude  [zakelijke  gesindheid],  of 
which  Stumpf  has  so  finely  said  that  it  is  the  moral 
attitude  [zedelijke],  and  that  I,  as  far  as  frail  man 
is  able,  ''mir  selber  sum  Objekt  geworden  bin" 
if,  in  my  desire  to  evaluate  objectively  the  various 
possible  ends  as  conceived,  I  discover  over  and  over 
again  that  /  lack  a  fixed  value-meter j  an  invariable 
standard"^  Does  not  there  lie  here  a  still  greater 
difficulty  than  that  which  lies  in  the  superhuman 
task  of  true  objectivity?  I  believe  that  it  is  the 
difficulty.  Were  our  evaluating  function  as  clear 
and  transparent,  as  relatively  simple,  as  our  logical 
thinking,  then  there  would  be  nothing  necessary  for 
virtue  but  moral  intention  [gezindheid],  practical 
objectivity.  But  it  is  otherwise,  and  that  makes  our 
moral  life  so  difficult  and  so  dim.  That  is  the 
ultimate  cause  why  men  forever  with  one  another 
wage  war  and  must  wage  war.  We  have  not  the 
moral  ideal  before  us,  like  a  bright  lode-star,  which 
points  us  indubitably  the  just  course;  it  is  alone  in 
us,  darkling  and  vague,  as  "dunkler  Drang,'*  and  it 
gives  us  its  revelation  about  the  value  of  things, 
not  according  to  a  system  of  rules,  but  after  its 
own  peculiar,  indescribable  fashion.  It  is  on  this 
account  also  that  axiology,  although  practically  the 
most  important  of  all  the  philosophic  sciences,  is 
scarcely  yet  born. 

The  moral  process  within  us,  the  origin  not  only 
of  moral  intention  but  of  moral  wisdom,  the  knowl- 

[53] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

edge  of  values  which  alone  puts  us  in  a  position  for 
moral  action^  has  been  as  yet  very  incompletely  dis- 
covered by  science,  and  is  indeed  even  for  science 
inaccessible  in' its  fundamental  nature.  We  can  only 
say  here :  'Hndividuum  ineffabile/'  We  are  here  in 
the  midst  of  the  mysteries  of  personality,  where 
only  direct  perception,  not  logic,  is  possible. 

But  it  is  to  be  at  once  emphasized  that  the  moral 
judgment  looks  above  all  to  the  degree  of  moral 
intention.  Of  no  one  can  there  be  required  greater 
moral  wisdom  than  Life  has  given  him  and  could 
give.  We  define  and  we  appraise,  but  do  not  con- 
demn. (Thus  an  Ethics  which  seeks  to  be  in  the 
first  instance  a  psychology  of  the  moral  judgment 
does  entirely  right  to  confine  itself  to  the  moral  in- 
tention. The  moral  judgment,  however,  is  not  the 
whole  of  the  field  of  morals,  and  not  even  the  most 
important  part.)  But  the  individual  moral  life  is 
not  satisfied  with  this.  It  experiences  in  one  way 
or  another  unsatis faction,  unrest  as  to  the  achieved 
degree  of  insight  into  values,  and  feels  an  impulsion 
to  a  higher.  In  reality,  it  can  be  required  of  every 
one — for  it  lies  in  one's  character — that  he  inces- 
santly strive  with  all  his  heart  to  increase  and  deepen 
his  ethical  wisdom.  Only  under  this  condition  can 
there  be  complete  reconciliation  with  one's  mistakes 
of  an  earlier  stage.    Only 

"Wer  immer  strebend  sich  bemiiht" 
is  in  the  end  rescued  from  the  Evil  One. 

[54] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

And  here  three  other  points  must  be  noted.  First, 
the  ethical  conflict  has  usually  this  peculiarity,  that 
one  side  of  the  dilemma  speaks  more  to  the  heart 
and  the  emotions,  whilst  the  other  is  of  more  ob- 
jective nature.  Simmel  {loc.  cit.,  p.  391)  well  and 
justly  points  out  that  in  the  drama,  from  the  very 
nature  of  the  case,  it  is  commonly  the  emotional 
side  which  is  stressed,  and  that,  moreover,  there  is 
not  the  least  guarantee  for  the  ethical  correctness  of 
the  judgment.  The  "feeling"  [''gevoer]  is  the 
unconscious  after-effect  of  earlier  intellectual  reflec- 
tions and  convictions  (p.  393).  This  indicates  that 
the  conflicts  frequently  contain  an  historical  element : 
of  the  clashing  duties  one  is  the  older  and  belongs  to 
an  older  stage  of  civilization  [culttmrstadium]  than 
the  other  which  as  yet  establishes  its  claim  only 
through  the  reason,  and  only  with  the  passage  of 
time  can  *'enter  into  the  category  of  what  pertains 
to  the  feelings."  It  is  obvious  that,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, nothing  can  be  settled  as  to  the  worth 
of  either  of  the  conflicting  duties,  merely  by  virtue  of 
its  more  emotional  or  its  more  intellectual  character. 
It  is  quite  as  possible  that  the  older  duty  belongs  to 
the  immutable  ethical  prudence  of  life, — to  that 
permanent  store  of  racial  experience  already  ren- 
dered respected  and  trustworthy  by  age, — as  that 
it  is  outworn  by  the  historic  process,  and  merely  by 
virtue  of  that  jealous  obstinacy  (with  which  life 
everywhere   clings   to   once   accepted    forms)    still 

[55] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

maintains  in  our  subconsciousness  a  life  no  longer 
at  one  with  present-day  reality.  Every  present  is 
formed,  as  it  were,  of  different  historical  layers ;  the 
past  is  never  altogether  dead.  We  can  "enter  upon 
our  inheritance  from  Mankind,  with  no  discounting 
of  its  inner  contradictions,  as  if  sub  beneficio  inven- 
tarii''  (p.  392)  and  so  even  the  past  gives  us  op- 
posing elements,  which  are  then  augmented  by  those 
which  our  own  thinking  creates  out  of  the  present. 

The  contrast  between  ethical  conservatism  and 
ethical  new  light  [nieuwlichterij]  is,  according  to 
Simmel,  closely  connected  with  that  between  a  pre- 
dominantly emotional  and  a  predominantly  intel- 
lectual life.  And  inasmuch  as  feeling  corresponds 
more  to  the  average  niveau  of  society,  the  contrast 
is  here  at  the  same  time  that  between  prevailing 
custom  and  individual  moral  thinking. 

But  before  going  further,  I  ought  to  remark  that 
it  doesn't  seem  to  me  altogether  right  to  connect  the 
historical  element  in  the  moral  conflict — which  is 
here  my  chief  concern — with  the  contrast,  feeling 
vs.  understanding.  The  transition  from  an  older 
morality — deeply  interwoven  with  the  personality 
and  hence  practically  unconscious  in  its  workings — 
to  another,  a  newer,  seems  to  me  to  be  a  process  that 
is  much  more  and  that  goes  much  deeper  than  the 
reflective  operations  of  the  understanding.  This 
individual  understanding,  with  the  haphazardness  of 
its  available  data  and  its  exposure  to  the  passions 

[56] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

which  demand  protection,  is  I  fancy  not  always  to  be 
implicitly  trusted  in  moralibus  [in  matters  of  mor- 
als]. As  against  rationalistic  radicalism,  conserva- 
tism is  doubtless  in  all  points  pretty  nearly  in  the 
right.  How  is  the  understanding  alone  to  become 
aware  of  new  values?  That  is  the  question.  Here 
there  turns  up  again  the  secret  process  of  how  values 
become  known,  already  mentioned  above.  The  in- 
ner creation  of  new  moral  insights  is  more  than 
a  process  of  the  understanding, — though  by  this  it 
is  not  affirmed  that  the  reason  stands  outside  of  it; 
and  just  as  little  that  the  new  insight,  when  once 
born,  shall  not  frequently  require  for  a  time,  while 
still  young  and  often  uncertain  and  undeveloped,  the 
help  of  reason  in  the  strife  with  others.'^  If,  on  the 
contrary,  we  see  another  acting  according  to  a  moral 
insight  which  is  as  yet  unfamiliar  to  us,  then  the 
older  idea,  usually  persisting  unbeknown,  reacts 
within  us  emotionally. 

T  am  sure  that  Simmel  (p.  401),  in  making  Goethe's 
"dunkler  Drang"  [dim  urge]  equivalent  to  what  he  describes  as 
the  emotional  factor  in  the  moral  process,  overlooks  the  real 
meaning.  The  emotional  factor,  no  less,  can  cause  us  to 
"irren."  Goethe  means  the  secret  working  within  us  of  the 
moral  and  spiritual  ground  of  reality,  which  can  bring  to  birth 
in  ourselves  new  moral  insights: 

"Der  gute  Mensch,  in  seinem  dunklen  Drange, 
1st  sich  des  rechten  Weges  wohl  bewusst." 

The  moral  feeling  must  be  present;  and  then  the  "dunkler 
Drang"  does  the  rest.  But  it  does  it  in  its  own  time  and  in 
its  own  way,  which  are  seldom  our  time  and  our  way. 

[57] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

In  the  second  place.  There  is  one  method  of 
withdrawing  from  the  tragedy  of  the  inevitable 
ethical  conflict :  by  not  acting  at  all,  that  is,  by  func- 
tioning not  creatively,  organically,  from  within,  but 
mechanically,  passively,  from  without.  For  such  a 
life  there  is  opportunity  in  the  cloister;  but  not  only 
there.  Obedience,  perinde  ac  cadaver,  excludes  all 
conflict,  for  it  knows  absolutely  but  one  duty.  Yet 
such  a  practice  is  of  itself  immoral  in  the  end,  for 
life  is  nothing  else  than  an  out-streaming  from 
within;  and  to  mechanize  oneself,  to  make  oneself 
small  and  still,  is  practically  the  same  as  spiritual 
suicide.  If  one  revolts  at  this,  then  the  moral  con- 
flict and  manful  decision  is  the  only  course.  I  can- 
not now  enter  further  into  the  far-reaching  conse- 
quences which  this  undeniable  fact  has  for  the 
whole  philosophy  of  life;  but  I  can't  refrain  from 
making  room  for  two  citations  from  von  Treitsch- 
ke's  Politik.  On  page  99 :  **This  is  indeed  the  hard 
and  the  deep  thing  in  human  life — this,  that,  in  the 
multitude  of  obligations  overwhelming  every  human 
being  by  virtue  of  his  membership  in  different  social 
groups,  he  cannot  get  off  without  collisions  among 
these  duties.  In  passing  judgment,  the  point  is  ulti- 
mately always  whether  the  individual  understood  his 
own  innermost  nature  and  developed  it  to  the  high- 
est perfection  of  which  he  was  capable."  And  on 
page  132:  "There  can  be  no  life  in  the  world  of 
history  without  tragic  guilt." 

[58] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

In  the  third  place :  the  moral  wrong  that  is  com- 
mitted in  the  conflict  remains  a  wrong  not  only  for 
the  consciousness  of  the  doer  but  for  the  conscious- 
ness of  him  who  becomes  the  sacrifice  and  who,  as 
such,  is  not  particularly  prone  to  see  and  to  acknowl- 
edge the  conflict.  On  his  side  possible  reprisals  are 
to  be  expected,  which  necessarily  call  for  preventive 
measures  on  the  side  of  the  original  actor,  if  the 
now  elected  higher  goal  is  not  to  be  endangered. 
Thus  matters  can  easily  go  from  bad  to  worse, 
and  yet  the  original  act  remains  morally  defensible. 
In  this  respect  the  whole  case  can  become  so  in- 
finitely complicated  as  to  quite  transcend  our  ken. 
These  are  the  secondary  entanglements  which  gen- 
erally bring  the  tragic  hero  to  his  ruin. 

"Alle  Schuld  racht  sich  auf  Erden"-— 

tragic  guilt,  no  less. 

Yet  what  is  here  of  chief  importance  for  the 
moral  judgment  is  this  very  complicatedness.  In 
many  a  case  the  conscientious  judger  will  not  have 
the  courage  to  come  to  a  conclusion.  Above  all,  this 
must  be  borne  in  mind:  it  is  never  an  action,  but 
always  the  whole  character  that  is  judged.  If  the 
underbrush  of  complications  is  too  thick  for  us  to 
arrive  at  a  judgment,  let  our  judgment  not  speak. 
And  let  us  at  all  times  leave  room  for  the  possibility 
of  a  mistake  made  in  good  faith.  "Our  portion  of 
goodness  lies  not  in  our  achieving  the  right,  but  in 

[59] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

our  earnest  and  upright  will  to  achieve  it.  If  never- 
theless we  err  and  realize  we  err,  we  will  regret  our 
error ;  but  our  conscience  exonerates  us.  The  most 
that  can  be  demanded  of  human  beings  is  full  con- 
scientiousness."    (Lipps,  loc.  cit.,  p.  217.) 


[60] 


vn. 


AND  now  for  the  promised  discussion  of  the  spe- 
^  cial  ethical  conflict  that  outweighs  all  others 
in  its  importance.  It  belongs  to  the  psychology  of 
genius. 

We  frequently  find  in  those  sciences  which  operate 
with  psychological  concepts,  without  being  de- 
signedly psychology,  the  opinion  that  all  human  ac- 
tions are  either  egoistic  or  altruistic.  Schopenhauer, 
for  instance,  was  also  of  this  opinion.  It  is  mistaken. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  desire  all  sorts  of  things, 
strive  for  the  realization  of  all  sorts  of  objects, 
which  are  of  use  neither  for  ourselves  nor  for 
others,  at  least  not  desired  on  that  account.  "These 
contents  of  our  will  hover  before  us  in  objectivity, 
as  something  that  shall  be,  in  and  for  itself,  inde- 
pendent of  the  pleasurable  or  painful,  egoistic  or 
altruistic,  feeling-reflexes  that  may  attach  them- 
selves thereto."^  Science,  art,  politics,  religion  create 

^  Simmel,  Schopenhauer  und  Nietzsche,  p.  155.  Cf.  Einlei- 
tung  in  die  Moralwissenschaft,  II,  p.  397:  "Objective  ends, 
whose  realization  permits  of  being  felt  as  an  inner,  but  in  some 
degree  impersonal  necessity,  as  the  task  which  comes  to  us  in 
the  world-plan." 

[61] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

such  values-in-themselves.  They  are,  in  the  final 
analysis,  willed  for  but  one  reason,  and  for  but  one 
reason  created,  often  at  the  cost  of  the  greatest 
sacrifices:  because  a  world  wherein  they  become 
realized  appeals  to  us  as  worthier  than  the  world 
at  hand.  With  the  recognition  of  this  scarcely  de- 
niable fact,  we  raise  ourselves  above  the  contrast  of 
optimism  and  pessimism.  The  world  is  then  no 
longer  a  factum  to  be  reacted  upon,  but  a  task  upon 
which  we  must  labor,  while  the  inner  urge  to  this 
labor  relegates  to  the  background  the  question  of 
how  it  affects  us  personally. 

We  are,  therefore,  beings  who  from  within  out- 
ward, impelled  in  strange  wise,  create  objective 
values  in  the  visible  world.  Life  is  an  everlasting 
process  of  forming  and  re-forming.^  But  not  all 
of  us  are  equally  loyal  and  equally  gifted  toilers  on 
that  work.  Genuine  morality  is  always  a  creating — 
or  a  becoming  created — from  within  outward,  but 
with  how  few  of  us  is  that  divine  miracle  completed. 

Every  one  who  concentrates  with  zeal  and  per- 
severance his  entire  power  upon  some  end  conceived 
by  himself  works  creatively;  yet  with  how  few  of 
us  does  this  function  come  to  anything  beyond  the 
writing  of  a  letter  or  the  devising  of  some  every- 
day scheme.  Those  of  us  with  whom  it  does  come 
to  more,  those  who,  by  virtue  of  their  peculiarly 

2  Read  Dr.  A.  H.  de  Hartog,  "De  Beteekenis  van  den  Vorm 
in  het  Wereldgeheel,"  Nieuwe  Gids,  July,  1914. 

[62] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

fortunate  endowment  are  possessed  of  the  gift  to 
give  birth  to  original  combinations  of  ideas,  who 
prove  themselves  capable  of  bringing  forth  new, 
objectively  valuable  creations,  these  favored  ones  we 
call  geniuses.  One  of  the  most  universal  character- 
istics of  their  psychical  structure  is  the  entire,  ex- 
clusive, self-sacrificing  concentration  upon  the  one 
purpose  which  is  the  deepest  expression  of  their 
nature.  That  purpose  they  must  realize  or  perish — 
"sterhen  oder  triumphieren.'' 

In  this  they  think  neither  of  themselves  nor  of 
others,  but  only  of  their  cause.  But,  since  their 
cause  is  objectively  of  worth,  they  are  the  kings  of 
mankind,  at  the  same  time  the  servants  of  all.  Their 
existence  is  more  momentous  for  all  men  than  the 
existence  of  friend  Tom,  or  Dick,  or  Harry  [Jan, 
Piet  of  Klaas]. 

I  may  add  that  he  alone  essentially  deserves  the 
name  of  genius  whose  achievements  are  objectively 
of  worth.  The  fact  that  one  is  stronger,  cleverer, 
slier,  than  all  others  put  together  is  not  enough  to 
make  him  a  genius.  For  the  eminently  moral  factor 
is  lacking.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  a  genius-of- 
the-stock-exchange  or  a  genius-at-deception  [een 
geniaal  speciilant  of  een  geniaal  bedrieger],  for  the 
world  gets  thereby  no  greater  worth  when  a  worth- 
less individual  comes  at  last  to  sit  throned  on  a 
huge  heap  of  gold;  just  as  little  as  it  were  of 
supreme  significance  should    a    morally  worthless 

[63] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

people  establish  a  world-empire.  Each  worker  can 
only  become  a  genius  when  he  works,  not  for  him- 
self, but  for  the  worth  of  the  world. 

Now  just  as  surely  as  morality  is  the  realization 
of  objectively  worthy  ends,  so  surely  has  every  true 
genius  one  all-surpassing  duty:  the  realization  of 
the  end  that  to  him  appears  above  all  others  objec- 
tively of  worth.  His  quality  of  genius  [djn  geniali- 
teit]  lies  precisely  herein,  that  this  end  is,  for  a  fact, 
of  worth. 

Therefore,  such  an  individual  lives  in  a  continual 
ethical  conflict :  with  all  duties  that  make  their  claims 
upon  him,  the  primary  question  will  always  be: 
Does  my  spiritual  vocation  [roeping]  become  thereby 
imperiled  or  not?  For  the  sake  of  this  vocation 
[this  mission,  calling],  he  may  and  he  must  permit 
himself  things  that  for  every  other  man  would  be 
indefensible.  This  is  the  deep  sense  of  the  words : 
^'quod  licet  Jovi,  non  licet  bovi.**  Jupiter  has 
more  rights  than  the  ox,  precisely  because  he  has 
one  weighty,  all-surpassing  duty :  to  be  Jupiter,  the 
Creator.  Only  one  who  really  understands  nothing 
of  all  this  can  suppose  that  duty  is  easy.  Only  one 
who  has  never  reflected  on  the  desperate  quarrel  of 
Spirit  versus  Nature,  on  the  heavy  task  of  "Ought'* 
in  translating  itself  into  "Being,"  and  then  in  sub- 
jecting itself  to  "Being," — in  a  word,  only  one  who 
has  never  reflected  on  the  chances  of  the  Logos,  the 
Moral-reason,  in  getting  itself  realized  in  the  actual 

[64] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

world  can  fancy  that  duty  can  run  its  course  without 
conflicts. 

Here  is  thus  one  duty  higher  than  that  of  self- 
preservation :  the  duty  of  vigilance  for  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  vocation  of  one's  own  genius.^  This  is 
higher  than  that  of  self-preservation,  because  the 
realized  vocation  serves,  at  least  ideally,  the  good 
of  all. 

Now  the  State,  as  we  have  already  seen,  has  (just 
as  has  every  one,  even  the  least  of  us)  a  particular 
calling :  the  ethical.  It  is  called  to  the  realizing  of  the 
ethical  ideal  (just  as  are  we)  in  its  own  being,  that 
is,  in  the  people  of  whom  it  is  a  phase  [verschijnings- 
wijzel,  and  in  that  part  of  the  world  where  the 
authority  of  that  people  obtains.  It  creates,  there- 
fore, among  other  things,  law, — as  the  condition 
for  the  undisturbed  development  of  a  higher  free 
morality. 

Yet,  quite  as  little  as  individuals,  do  states  stand 
all  on  the  same  level.  There  are  strong  states  and 
weak,  enterprising  and  sluggish,  wise  and  foolish, 
intellectual  and  stupid.  There  is  also  a  difference 
in  the  ethical  level.  There  are  high-moral  states 
and  there  are  immoral  states. 

There  is  finally  a  state  with  the  quality  of  genius 

8  The  contrast,  made  by  Lipps,  between  individual  and  per- 
sonality gets  here  a  deeper  significance.  The  individual  of 
genius  sacrifices  both  himself  and  something  much  more,  in 
the  realization  of  his  personality.  Much  of  importance  in  H. 
Tiirck,  Der  geniale  Mensch. 

[65] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

[een  stafen-genialiteit].  As  the  vocation  of  a  state 
can  only  exist  as  a  moral  vocation,  this  quality  of 
genius  must  be  moral  genius. 

We  saw  that  all  true  and  free  morality  has  by 
nature  something  of  genius.  Moral  genius  is  thus 
a  sort  of  genius  to  the  second  power.  It  consists 
not  in  the  fact  that  one  achieves  a  very  high  degree 
of  morality,  a  strong  moral  feeling,  but  in  the  fact 
that  one  renews  morality,  that  one  achieves  a  higher 
morality,  in  a  word,  that  one  becomes,  by  the  "inner 
illumination"  of  his  independent  selfhood,  aware 
of  new  values,  of  values  heretofore  unperceived.  Is 
not  this,  indeed,  the  common  characteristic  of  the 
few  who  are  recognized  in  history  as  moral  geniuses, 
as  creators  in  the  moral  realm? 

This  is  the  highest  stage  to  which  a  human  being 
can  mount :  the  stage  of  ethical  genius. 

Thus  far  absolutely  but  one  State  as  such  has 
manifested  ethical  genius :  the  Roman  state,  to  which 
we  owe  in  part  our  civil  law.  Or  will  one  affirm 
that  England  too  has  had  her  age  of  genius,  during 
which  she  created  her  national  law?  I  deny  this 
emphatically :  the  falsehood  and  the  weakness  of  the 
parliamentary  principle*  as  a  means  of  realizing 
right  and  law  have  become  clearer  than  day;  and  it 

*  [By  "the  parliamentary  principle"  Labberton  does  not  mean 
the^  universal  franchise  and  representative  government,  with 
legislative,  executive  and  judicial  division  of  function.  Compare 
below.] 


im 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

is  precisely  the  glory  of  Prussia  that  she  has  striven 
for  a  different  principle. 

The  people  of  Eckhart,  Tauler  and  Luther,  the 
people  of  Kant,  Schiller  and  Fichte,  of  Bach,  Beet- 
hoven and  Brahms,  the  people  who,  personified  in 
that  unfathomable  marvel  which  dwelt  in  humble 
Weimar  as  His  Excellency  Privy  Councillor  J.  W. 
von  Goethe,  mapped  out  its  program  for  generations 
ahead,  that  people,  as  I  firmly  believe,  now  that  it 
has  in  the  last  forty-four  years  finally  achieved  like- 
wise its  political  unity,  will  form  a  state  which  in  the 
end,  in  so  far  as  it  has  opportunity,  in  so  far  as  the 
natural  foundation  for  this  spiritual  product  is  given, 
will  manifest  equally  an  ethical  genius.  It  is  my 
inner  conviction  that  Prussia  is  the  ethically  sound 
kernel  of  Europe,  from  which  in  the  end  is  to  spring 
the  ethical  regeneration  of  our  desperately  ailing 
world. 

This  is  actually  nothing  more  than  a  belief,  an 
intuition,  an  instinctive  conviction,  of  no  argumen- 
tative force  for  others.  I  admit  this  gladly  and 
fully,  although,  in  my  opinion,  the  Prussian  national 
law  [Staatsrecht]  can  properly  be  adduced  as  the 
beginning  of  the  argument.^  Indeed,  there  lurks 
an  indisputable  symptom  of  genius  in  the  fact  that 

s[Cf.  John  W.  Burgess  (formerly  Professor  of  Constitutional 
and  International  Law  in  Columbia  University),  The  European 
War  of  1914,  pp.  93-105,  for  a  succinct  presentation  of  modern 
Germany's  achievements  in  various  fields  of  organized  human 
endeavor.] 

[67] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

one  is  ill-adapted  to  the  current  notions  of  the  day, 
i.  e.,  that  one  has  one's  own  standards  and  ideals. 
Of  all  European  countries  Prussia  is  the  farthest 
removed  from  Rousseau's  atomism  and  the  dema- 
goguery  of  the  half  plus  one.  And  all  Germany 
has  already  the  strongest  organizations  in  the  inter- 
ests of  the  trades  and  professions,  which  will  form 
the  foundation  for  the  positive  politics  and  for  the 
law-making  of  the  future,  as  the  parliamentary  prin- 
ciple falls  more  and  more  into  general  disrepute.® 

^  Cf.  A.  Christensen,  Politik  und  Massenmoral,  pp.  180-197. 


[68] 


VIII. 


BUT  for  the  proposition  that  the  German  people 
in  any  case  stands  upon  an  altogether  unusual 
moral  level,  one  or  two  other  points  may  be  noted 
which  must  at  least  arrest  the  attention  even  of  the 
doubting  ones. 

In  the  first  place,  there  is  the  fact  that  this  people 
came  to  its  mature  activity  so  late  in  the  world's 
history.  This  people  is  a  people  of  a  profoundly 
deep  inner  life;  it  is  by  nature  not  active,  but  essen- 
tially contemplative.  Its  very  habit  of  dwelling  so 
much  in  the  content  of  life  renders  its  form-giving 
ability  relatively  so  small.  It  had  endured  till  1871 
before  it  gave  form  to  its  external  politics;  all  its 
best  art  is  art  of  content,  not  of  form.  Faust ^  a 
fundamental  work  on  ethics,  is  formally  a  poem 
often  of  rather  dubious  craftsmanship,  here  and 
there  below  the  mark.  German  scholars  are  no- 
torious for  the  form  of  their  works.  Such  a  one 
as  Bergson,  a  philosopher  with  the  style  of  an 
artist — and  the  two,  as  it  were,  unfused,  so  that  a 
peculiar,  intentional,  coquettish  solicitude  for  the 
form  becomes  perceptible  —  would  be  unthinkable 

[69] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

in  Germany;  and  he  is  in  disrepute  among  many 
precisely  because  of  his  external  elegance.  One  does 
not  trust  such  prettiness.  When  a  German  is  a 
"fine"  writer — as  Schopenhauer  and  Nietzsche — 
it  is  nothing  else  than  the  internal  necessity  to  ex- 
press oneself  so  and  not  otherwise. 

"Such'  Er  den  redlichen  Gewinn, 
Sei  Er  kein  schellenlauter  Thor, 
Es  tragt  Verstand  und  rechter  Sinn 
Mit  wenig  Kunst  sich  selber  vor; 
Und  wenn's  euch  Ernst  ist,  was  zu  sagen, 
Ist's  notig,  Worten  naclizujagen?" 

The  endowment  of  this  people  is  not  primarily 
esthetic,  but  ethical/ 

Whenever  a  people  so  devoted  to  the  inner  life, 
a  people  of  "Dichter  und  Denker''  ["poets  and  think- 
ers"], becomes  in  a  large  way  practically  active, 
it  becomes  so  not  by  nature,  not  from  egoistic  mo- 
tives, but  because  it  has  encountered  within  itself 
an  unavoidable  Duty,  because  it  is  driven  on  and 
spurred  on  by  the  Spirit  [den  Geest],  because  it 
has  become  aware  of  a  mission  [vocation]  with 
respect  to  the  world.  We  are  wont  to  be  amazed 
and  indignant  over  the  change  and  to  compare  the 
present  Germany  unfavorably  with  the  earlier.    The 

1  In  the  same  connection  may  be  noted  much  smaller  matters : 
The  German  hasn't  as  good  manners  as  the  Englishman;  he 
has  less  grace  than  the  Frenchman;  he  is  often  badly  dressed, 
etc.,  etc.  Just  these  things  are  wont  to  determine  the  judgment 
on  Jan  Alleman.  And  then  too  he  isn't  ashamed  of  them 
either ! 

[70] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

situation  seems  to  me  quite  the  reverse  :^  the  earlier, 
which  is  absolutely  not  dead,  furnishes  precisely  the 
guarantee  that  in  the  present  Germany  it  is  not 
egotism  but  the  Spirit  that  lives  and  works. 

The  activity  of  a  naturally  contemplative  being 
is  always  something  essentially  peculiar  and  su- 
premely worthy:  it  occurs  only  under  strong  inner 
stress,  and  takes  its  rise  from  the  deepest  and 
clearest  wellsprings  of  life, — ^there  where  ultimately 
both  activity  and  contemplation  have  their  common 
dwelling  and  their  common  birth-place. 

In  all  that  we  can  say  of  Germany,  there  is 
virtually  always  involved  the  wholly  unique  phe- 
nomenon of  this  deep  inner  life.  I  have  already 
referred  to  the  great  openheartedness  and  honesty 
and  tendenc}?-  to  vigorous  language.  No  bon  gout, 
the  Frenchman  would  say:  an  insult  to  the  form. 
Entirely  true,  but  an  unmistakable  symptom  of  the 
strong  living  content,  which  now  and  then,  precisely 
in  its  idea  of  being  more  than  form,  intentionally 
breaks  through  the  form,  from  necessity, — or  from 
playfulness  (as  often  with  Goethe)  to  plague  the 
Philistines.  The  French  "epafer  le  bourgeois"  oc- 
curs rather  by  means  of  just  these  formal  factors. 
(We  might  argue  with  some  propriety  that  the  con- 

2  [Cf.  the  thoughtful,  clear,  and  restrained  presentation  of 
this  idea  in  the  article  "The  True  Germany,"  by  Kuno  Francke, 
Atlantic  Monthly,  Oct.  1915.] 


[71] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

trast  France-Germany  is  really  that  of  love-of-form 
and  content-of-life,  estheticism  and  morality.)^ 

In  close  connection  with  the  foregoing  is  the 
German's  incapacity  to  make  himself  beloved  or 
even  intelligible  among  strangers.  One  who  lives 
inwardly  cannot  be  understood  from  without,  but 
only  from  within  one's  own  innermost  life,  by  vir- 
tue of  "sympathetic  insight"  [a  German  word,  Ein- 
fiihlung,  "a  feeling  into"].  His  outward  manifesta- 
tions often  seem  queer  and  strange,  and  arouse  dis- 
like and  mistrust.  At  the  same  time,  he  is  com- 
pelled by  the  very  depth  and  warmth  of  his  tem- 
perament to  seek  sympathy  and  companionship :  and 
then  we  find  him  intrusive.  If  he  feels  the  impossi- 
bility of  this  and  withdraws  pained  into  himself, 
then  we  call  him  sullen  and  unsocial.  If  you  hap- 
pen to  have  had  dealings  with  him  when  his  state  of 
mind  was  betwixt  and  between,  then  it's  easy  to 
say :  "The  German  is  sweet  as  a  pussy  cat,  when 
he  needs  you;  but  when  he  doesn't  need  you  any 
longer,  then  you  get  a  kick  to  boot." 

The  currency  of  such  opinions  should  not,  how- 
ever,  unduly  impress  us,    for  we  know  that  the 

s  After  this  was  written,  I  saw  that  Rudolph  Eucken  had 
already  so  argued  in  the  Internationale  Monatsschrift  fur  Wis- 
senschaft,  Kunst  und  Technik,  January  15,  1915  [?].  We  might 
add  that,  whereas  the  French  love  of  form  is  of  a  more 
esthetic  and  hence  fairly  harmless  sort,  England  is  an  example 
of  a  national  tendency  to  the  worship  of  ethical  form — some- 
thing much  more  dangerous. 

[72] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

crowd  is  unthinking  and  lives  by  imitation.  It  has 
become  a  fashion,  I  should  almost  say  "good  fun," 
to  call  the  Germans  names.  It  is  ''ton'']  and  Tom 
chatters,  and  Dick  must  chatter  after.  In  a  small 
way  we  have  the  same  phenomenon  in  what  may  be 
considered  closed  groups,  as  a  student  fraternity, 
when  suddenly,  no  one  knows  how,  one  word  or 
another,  one  turn  of  expression  or  another,  becomes 
all  the  go.  Then  everywhere,  in  season  and  out  of 
season,  they  are  dragged  in  and  forever  applauded 
with  unwearied  zest.  For,  to  be  sure,  "it's  the 
latest."  There  is  something  of  this  sort  in  this 
calling  "the  Muffs"  ["c?^  Mo#m'"]  names— only 
that  is  now  no  longer  exactly  "the  latest."  It  is 
simply  a  symptom  of  the  insipidity  of  the  multitude. 

The  Germans — as  they  say  further — have  no  re- 
spect for  another's  personality,  no  conception  of 
another's  human  worth.  They  work  always  with 
force,  with  the  corporal's  stick.  The  English  know 
better,  and  so  they  are  the  good  colonizers,  while  the 
Germans  have  not  been  able  to  pacify  even  such  a 
territory  as  Schleswig-Holstein,  to  say  nothing  of 
Poland  and  Alsace-Lorraine. 

Here,  too,  the  reproach,  I  believe,  turns  finally 
against  him  who  utters  it.  It  is  very  easy  to  leave 
another's  personality  alone,  if  one  on  the  whole  is 


*  ["MofFenland"  is  Dutch  slang  for  Germany.  Moffen  has 
about  the  same  connotations  as  "Dagos"  in  America — it  is  not 
exactly  abusive.] 

[73] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

not  bothering  much  about  personality  and  inner 
personal  life.  The  English  method  of  colonization 
is  directed  toward  a  practical,  outward  organization, 
a  nice  operation  of  the  political  and  economic  ma- 
chine, toward  "Civilization"  in  a  word;  and  it  can 
achieve  that  purpose  so  well,  just  because  it  takes 
no  thought  for  the  essential  inner  refining  process, 
— that  ^'Kultur,"  which  would  make  some  meddling 
with  personality  unavoidable.  It  is  not  so  very 
hard  by  such  means  to  keep  affairs  peaceable. 

The  German  has  been  taught  by  Kant  that  per- 
sonality is  the  only  absolute  value  in  the  world.  He 
has  read  in  his  Goethe: 

"Volk  und  Knecht  und  Ueberwinder 
Sie  gestehn  zu  jeder  Zeit: 
Hochstes  Gliick  der  Erdenkinder 
Sei  nur  die  Personlichkeit." 

He  is  thus  not  satisfied  with  governing  and  ex- 
ploiting; he  strives  to  educate.  Let  us  admit  he 
often  makes  two  mistakes:  first,  he  strives  to  edu- 
cate too  much  according  to  his  own  image;  and, 
second,  he  sometimes  overestimates  man's  capacity 
for  education.  Then  conflicts  arise,  and  then  the 
miserable  "Muff"  [de  leelijke  Mof]  has  gone  and 
done  it  again.  Yet  the  German  labors  uninter- 
ruptedly, with  impressive  earnestness  and  zeal,  upon 
his  own  improvement.  Nothing  is  further  from  his 
thought  than  the  slogan :  "right  or  wrong,  my  coun- 
try."    Thus  it  is  to  be  expected  that,  with  greater 

[74] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

experience  in  this  field,  still  so  new  to  him,  he  will 
learn:  first, 

"Eines  schickt  sich  nicht  fiir  AUe"; 

and,  second,  one  does  not  indeed  gather  grapes  and 
figs  from  thistles  and  thorns,  and  thus  with  many 
a  specimen  of  Homo  Sapiens  can  do  nothing  more 
sane  than  to  let  him  be  what  he  is,  after  having 
bound  him  energetically  to  the  law  of  the  land. 
That  will  be  most  comfortable  for  the  party  con- 
cerned, and  there  will  be  a  good  sight  less  footless 
jobbery  in  this  world,  that  needs  so  much  real  recon- 
structing besides.  And,  finally,  with  the  truly  edu- 
catable  specimens,  the  business  will  be  to  learn  to 
avoid  the  mistake  of  those  educators  who  stand  too 
high  above  their  fosterlings — the  mistake  of  de- 
manding too  much.  The  great  question  is  always 
how  the  power  of  voluntary  attention  and  effort  can 
best  be  quickened,  by  freedom  or  by  compulsion,  or 
rather  by  what  combination  of  both. 

Again,  in  the  so-called  ''Militarism,"  somebody  not 
long  since  (N.  Rott.  C.  ["New  Rotterdam  Cou- 
rant"],  January  19  [1915],  Avondblad  A)  thought 
he  discovered  as  the  characteristic  element  of  the 
Germans  the  refusal  to  recognize  the  humanity  in 
another  creature.  The  hard  discipline  and  above 
all  the  cases  of  ill-treatment  in  the  barracks  were 
instanced  in  proof.  It  was  one  more  indication  of 
the  objective  and  earnest  mind  of  the  German  that 

175] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

Von  Moltke  in  an  appended  reply,  immediately  and 
with  grateful  acknowledgments  to  the  author  of  the 
article  in  question,  admitted  that  rough  characters 
had  been  guilty  of  such  abuses  and  that  there  still 
remained  much  to  be  bettered.  At  the  risk  of  being 
taken  for  ^'plus  Prussien  que  le  roi  de  Prusse"  I'd  like 
to  make  here  another  observation  or  so.  A  rough 
character  is  certainly  not  always  a  had  character; 
roughness  is  sometimes  the  inverted  form  in  which 
a  genuine  moral  feeling  expresses  itself.  Every 
one  appreciates  this  fact  from  his  own  experience 
with  men.  We  know,  moreover,  that,  in  every 
group  of  human  beings  which  has  any  permanence, 
there  is  always  forsooth  one  who  shows  himself 
perpetually  and  in  all  things  the  least  and  the  least 
worthy — even  if  it  be  only  in  those  characteristics 
most  cried-up  in  the  given  milieu — and  who  thereby 
exposes  himself  to  the  tormenting  spirit  of  his  asso- 
ciates. Even  here  we  have  to  do  with  a  reaction, 
in  which  man's  evaluating  function  is  actively  con- 
cerned. For  my  part,  I  should  be  much  interested 
to  know,  whether  the  recruits  that  become  a  sacri- 
fice to  such  treatment  do  not  perhaps  belong  in  the 
great  majority  under  this  class  of  less  worthy  mor- 
tals. In  that  case  we  might  consider  it  not  mere 
cruelty,  but  rather  an  expression,  obviously  inverted, 
of  moral  feeling,  of  a  feeling  for  human  worth. 
Or  is  it  not  true  that  Homo  Sapiens  presents  us 
specimens  that  would  make  a  very  angel  lose  pa- 

[76] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

tience?  No,  the  essence  of  militarism  is  elsewhere 
to  seek, — namely,  in  the  essential,  inspired  readiness 
of  the  immense  multitude  of  the  people  to  throw 
body  and  soul,  when  needful,  into  the  breach  for 
the  Fatherland.  It  is  this  willingness,  too,  which 
teaches  them  to  endure  the  hard  but  necessary  yoke 
of  discipline,  and  ultimately  renders  their  obedience 
a  free  and  willing  obedience,  because  consistent  with 
one's  own  human  worth.  This  readiness  has  enabled 
this  people  now  for  more  than  seven  months  to  hold 
its  place  unshaken  and  unshakable,  under  circum- 
stances which  would  presumably  have  long  since 
driven  any  other  people  to  despair.  Is  the  world, 
then,  blind  and  deaf?  Does  it  not  see,  does  it  not 
feel,  that  what  Germany  is  now  achieving  is  little 
less  than  a  miracle? — A- miracle  of  tremendous  will 
and  earnestness,  of  immeasurable  spirit  and  self- 
sacrifice  f 

And  mankind  shall  live  to  see  still  more,  if  the 
need  become  still  more  dire.  For  let  no  one  deceive 
himself:  Germany  is  fighting  for  her  life  against  a 
physically  superior  host  which  is  coolly  calculating 
her  ruin.  Ruthlessly  upon  her  beautiful  bloom  it 
lays 

"die  kalte  Teufelsfaust  entgegen." 

Peradventure,  we  will  yet  witness  deeds  of  such 
classic  simplicity  and  greatness  that  the  scales  will 
fall  from  the  eyes  of  even  the  most  blinded!    But 

U7] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

what  am  I  prating:  is  it  not  precisely  the  simple 
and  the  great  that  the  average  individual  can  never 
perceive,  because  his  attention  fastens,  of  itself,  for- 
ever upon  the  small?  He  doesn't  see  the  ocean, 
but  the  shells  on  the  strand. 

Where  would  this  people  now  be,  without  its 
much-abused  army?  The  German  army  forms  the 
very  highest  claim  of  this  people  to  our  honest  ad- 
miration. It  is  wholly  and  simply  coincident  with 
the  fact  that  the  population  has  risen  since  1870 
from  40  to  68  millions.  This  people  has  still  the 
courage,  yes,  to  live  as  well  as  to  die.  It  recognizes 
the  Commonwealth  and  the  duties  of  the  individual 
toward  the  same.  Just  as  the  women  still  have  the 
courage  and  the  will  to  bear  numbers  of  children 
and  thus  chronically  to  risk  their  lives  for  the 
Commonwealth,  so  the  men  have  still  the  courage 
and  the  will  to  fight  and  thus  acutely  to  risk  their 
lives  for  the  Commonwealth.  Moreover,  we  have 
been  given  to  poking  fun — the  German  comic  papers 
no  less,  in  their  earlier  misconception — at  the  high 
position  which  the  German  officer  occupies  in  soci- 
ety. But,  duly  considered,  this  position  is  virtually 
nothing  else  than  the  honor  which  properly  belongs 
to  a  class  of  men  who  unceasingly,  day  by  day, 
stand  in  readiness  to  give  their  lives  for  the  Com- 
monwealth, that  is,  for  all.  That  this  is  no  mere 
phrase,  the  world  can  now  well  see. 

A  strong  proof  of  the  moral  earnestness  of  the 

[78] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

Germans  is  their  objectivity  with  regard  to  their 
own  defects — see  von  Moltke  above — and  their  in- 
ner need  to  confess  their  guilt,  even  if  it  be  only 
their  tragic  guilt.  It  is  peculiarly  true  of  the  Ger- 
mans that  the  duty  which  had  to  give  way  in  the 
moral  conflict  still  makes  its  voice  heard  in  the 
conscience.  Sometimes  they  are  driven  to  strong 
expressions  merely  to  convince  themselves  that  it 
was  absolutely  necessary  to  act  so  and  not  other- 
wise. Thus  one  gets  expressions  such  as  those  of 
Bismarck,  the  man  who  was  supposedly  a  monster 
of  stone  and  steel  but  who  in  reality  had  to  perform 
his  hard  duties  with  such  a  sensitive  temperament 
that,  on  his  own  admission,  he  could  never  calmly 
design  a  militant  policy  after  the  day  at  Konigs- 
gratz  when  he  had  looked  into  the  glazed  eyes 
of  a  dying  soldier.  Such  men  would,  indeed, 
prefer  the  course  of  Don  Quixote  in  the  moral 
conflict, — did  not  their  mission  drive  them  with 
iron  necessity  in  the  right  direction.  In  this  con- 
nection, mention  ought  to  be  made  of  the  words 
which  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  in  the  Reichstag  on 
August  4,  1914,  devoted  to  the  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality.    I  incorporate  them  bodily. 

"Gentlemen,  we  are  now  under  the  necessity  of 
self-defense,  and  Necessity  knows  no  law!  Our 
troops  have  occupied  Luxemburg,  have  perhaps  al- 
ready set  foot  upon  Belgian  territory.  Gentlemen, 
that  is  contrary  to  the  Law  of  Nations !  The  French 

[79] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

government  has,  indeed,  declared  at  Brussels  its 
willingness  to  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  as 
long  as  the  enemy  respects  it.  But  we  knew  that 
France  stood  ready  for  the  attack.  France  could 
wait,  we  could  not!  A  French  attack  upon  our 
flank  on  the  lower  Rhine  might  have  been  fateful. 
So  we  were  compelled  to  disregard  the  well-justified 
protest  of  the  governments  of  Luxemburg  and  Bel- 
gium. The  wrong — I  speak  frankly — the  wrong 
that  we  thus  do,  we  will  seek  to  make  good  as  soon 
as  our  military  goal  is  achieved.  One  who  is  threat- 
ened as  we  are,  one  who  is  fighting  as  we  are  for  his 
Highest  and  Best  [sein  Hochstes],  he  dare  think 
only  of  how  to  cut  his  way  out." 

As  I  read  these  words  for  the  first  time,  I  felt  a 
shudder  of  admiration,  of  deep  moral  awe.  For 
conceive  the  situation  clearly  and  sharply.  Here  was 
a  people  in  unheard-of  straits:  suddenly  exposed 
to  a  war  upon  both  fronts  against  powerful  foes. 
Under  these  circumstances  it  had,  justly  or  unjustly, 
committed  a  deed,  which  that  people  well  knew 
would  be  execrated  throughout  all  lands  as  an  un- 
heard-of violation  of  international  law,  and  would 
stamp  the  doer  as  well-nigh  the  enemy  of  the  human 
race, — a  deed,  furthermore,  which  forthwith  gave 
a  third  tremendous  opponent  an  opening  also  to  mix 
in  the  strife.  And  in  the  National  Assembly,  in  the 
hearing  of  the  whole  world,  it  was  acknowledged 
with  full  objectivity  according  to  duty  and  to  con- 

[80] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

science  that  this  deed  was  a  wrong  and  that  the 
protests  of  the  opposing  party  were  justified!  This 
was  acknowledged  without  beating  about  the  bush, 
without  any  rhetoric,  without  fine  phrases,  without 
"sack-cloth  and  ashes"  [''boetekleed"],  and  without 
anxiety  as  to  the  inevitable  lack  of  comprehension 
which  this  acknowledgement  would  find  among  man- 
kind. The  ethical  conflict,  the  tragedy  of  the  guilt, 
is  revealed,  though  not  expressly ;  but  the  guilt  itself 
is  confessed  with  sorrow.  If  this  is  not  the  height 
of  moral  earnestness,  then  I  know  not  where  to 
seek  it.  The  world,  of  course,  interpreted  it  as  the 
height  of  cynicism. 

It  is  so  decidedly  a  height  that  it  is  a  too  much.  I 
believe  that  in  the  times  to  come  men  will  never  men- 
tion without  honor  the  position  taken  by  the  phi- 
losopher nearest  the  German  throne.  It  loses  noth- 
ing in  that  it  was  not  discreet.  The  non-acknowl- 
edgment of  wrong  would  have  been  in  itself  un- 
ethical; the  acknowledgment  in  this  form  was  a 
mistake,  and  in  politics  one  of  the  results  of  the 
tragic  conflict  is  that  a  mistake  is  often  "pire  qu'un 
crime''  ["worse  than  a  crime"].  The  Chancellor's 
words  were  beyond  the  comprehension  or  at  least 
beyond  the  will-to-comprehend  of  the  world,  for 
whom  they  were  intended,  and  for  that  reason  did 
the  German  cause  great  harm.  This  was  clear,  or 
was  made  clear,  ultimately  to  the  Chancellor  himself. 
Therefore,  later  —  then  naturally  too  late  —  he  de- 

[81] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

fended  the  German  action.  The  whole  case  is  a 
sample  of  the  way  precisely  the  high  ethical  stan- 
dards of  the  Germans  now  and  then  mislead  them 
into  political  blunders,  when  the  political  genius  of 
a  Bismarck  is  not  inerrantly  driving  ahead  in  the 
right  direction.  Here  lies  undoubtedly  one  of  the 
causes  of  their  inferior  adroitness  in  the  profession 
of  diplomacy.  One  of  the  strongest  peculiarities  of 
this  profession  is  the  way  this  exalted  company 
speak  among  themselves  a  sort  of  oracle-language 
chiefly  designed  to  conceal  their  ideas.  (Just  read 
that  many-colored  compilation  which  the  various 
governments  have  put  at  the  disposal  of  our  in- 
quiring spirits,  precious  ^'documents  humains/'  val- 
uable only  slightly,  I  take  it,  for  the  historian,  but 
all  the  more  for  the  psychologist  and  the  moralist.) 
Obviously  the  task  then  becomes  to  grasp,  to  feel, 
to  scent,  instinctively  to  guess,  to  ferret  out,  what 
in  fact  the  real  meaning  is.  But  we  can  never  read 
any  one's  soul  directly,  only  indirectly,  by  analogy  or 
by  sympathetic  insight  on  the  basis  of  the  contents 
present  in  our  own  consciousness.  Hence  the  proverb : 
"^ooals  de  waard  is,  vertrouwt  hij  sijn  gasten" 
["The  inn-keeper  trusts  his  guests  according  to  his 
own  character"].  Among  such  high  gentlemen  as 
Sassonof  and  Grey  discussion  is  a  fruitful  amuse- 
ment only  when  one  is  in  a  position  by  affinity  of 
soul  to  comprehend  them,  and  to  fathom  their  de- 
signs.   It  argues  nothing  against  the  ethical  quality 

[82] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

of  German  diplomacy  if  it  plays  a  losing  game — on 
the  contrary!  There  seems  but  one  way  out:  the 
Germans  should  select  as  diplomats  men  of  great 
imagination,  who  can  transport  themselves  into  mo- 
tives and  thought-processes  which  are  almost  en- 
tirely foreign  to  their  own  minds.  The  point  seems 
of  the  highest  importance. 

All  well  and  good,  somebody  will  say;  but,  if 
the  Germans  stand  ethically  so  high,  whence,  then, 
the  general  dislike?  Should  they  not  rather  inspire 
love  and  admiration? 

No.  The  question  is  a  witness  to  our  naive  opti- 
mism: great  qualities  do  not  always  make  one  be- 
loved in  this  world — rather  the  reverse.  This  is 
something  all  great  men  have  always  known.  Read, 
for  example,  in  Ernest  Helloes  UHomme,  the 
chapter  "Le  Monde"  (pp.  108-118).  What  an  army 
of  foes,  for  example,  the  love  of  truth  can  accumu- 
late for  us!     Goethe  knew:  the  truth-speakers 

"Hat  man  von  je  gekreuzigt  und  verbrannt." 

In  two  ways  a  man  can  bring  general  hatred, 
open  or  secret,  down  upon  his  head:  by  standing 
below  or  by  standing  above  the  average  level.  Be- 
low the  average  level  Germany  certainly  does  not 
stand.  The  conclusion  may  be  left  to  the  reader, 
who,  after  all  the  foregoing,  will  concede,  I  trust, 
something  of  my  contention  for  the  high  moral  level 
of  this  nation.    And  in  the  smelting  furnace  of  this 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

tremendous  war  its  spiritual  qualities  are  destined 
to  become  yet  stronger. 

Yet  the  proof  of  moral  genius  is  scarcely  pre- 
sented by  all  this.  It  cannot  he  presented  a  priori. 
It  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  elements  in  the  life 
of  genius  that  it  is  a  tree  which  can  be  known  only 
by  its  fruits. 

But  let  me  make  a  reference  to  one  point:  the 
oft  observed  readiness  of  the  Germans  to  oblige 
[groote  toegefelijkheid].  It  may  well  go  too  far 
on  occasion.  The  average  individual  is  not  obliging 
[accommodating],  because  he  has  no  criterion  of 
the  essential  and  the  non-essential.  The  genius  can 
permit  himself — and  often  gladly  does  permit  him- 
self— to  be  obliging  in  all  things  that  do  not  imperil 
his  spiritual  vocation.  His  stubbornness  first  be- 
gins when  first  his  personality  is  involved.  And  here 
let  me  call  attention  to  the  concluding  words  of 
the  above  citation.  The  Chancellor  did  not  say 
that  Germany  was  fighting  for  her  existence,  but 
for  her  "Highest  and  Best."  I  make  free  to  trans- 
late the  expression  thus:  "for  her  spiritual,  her 
ethical,  vocation."    In  any  case, 

"Das  Leben  ist  der  Guter  hochstes  nicht." 

Furthermore  one  might  ask  here  if  Germany's 
contribution  to  law  does  not  already  show  achieve- 
ments of  ethical  genius.     I  cannot  answer  in  my 

[84] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

present  lack  of  adequate  knowledge.  The  question 
would,  moreover,  lead  us  too  far.^ 

So  I  will  content  myself  with  a  reference  to  Her- 
mann Cohen's  authoritative  wartime  address  Ueber 
das  Eigentumliche  des  deutschen  Geistes.  This  ven- 
erable patriarch  of  the  Marburg  school,  himself  in 
lineage  and  still  in  religion  (p.  23)  a  Jew,  but  know- 
ing himself  one  with  the  German  people  in  a  higher 
cultural  fellowship,  speaks  (p.  4)  expressly  of  the 
"world-historic  originality"  of  that  people,  and  that 
means  in  his  mouth  in  the  first  instance  ethical 
originality.  'This  freedom  of  moral  thinking  and 
of  the  conscience  became  thus  the  historical  charac- 
ter of  the  Reformation.  And  it  is,  perhaps,  more 
than  all  other  historical  symptoms  the  most  indubi- 
table mark  of  the  German  spirit"  (p.  23). 

As  manifestations  of  ethical  genius  he  cites  the 
creation  of  the  German  military  organization  by  von 
Clausewitz  and  his  associates  under  Kant's  influ- 
ence,^ the  immediate  introduction  of  the  universal 
franchise  for  the  Reichstag  and  German  initiative 
with  respect  to  social  law-making  (pp.  32-35). 

"That  which  people  reproach  us  for  under  the 
accusation   of  militarism   is   aimed   chiefly  at  the 

5  Read,  especially,  the  estimate  of  Germany  by  the  Swede 
Rudolf  Kjellen:  Die  Grossm'dchte  der  Gegenwart,  1914.  For 
the  Prussian  code  see  above,  pp.  67-68. 

« Is  it  not  a  typical  specimen  of  ethical  narrowness  that 
England  has  not  been  able  to  decide  for  universal  military 
service,  no  matter  how  clearly  necessity  demanded  it? 

[85] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

fact  that  in  Prussia  this  idea  of  universal  suffrage 
has  not  as  yet  been  realized."  I'll  permit  myself  a 
marginal  note  here.  May  not  this  retention  in 
Prussia  of  a  franchise,  unquestionably  out-of-date, 
have  been  occasioned  in  part  by  the  fact  that  in  this 
franchise  there  is  present  to  a  certain  extent  another 
very  important  principle — namely,  the  organization 
of  individuals  according  to  their  trades  and  pro- 
fessions ?  All — except  those  who  don't  work — hav- 
ing full  rights,  yet  not  as  individuals  but  as  workers, 
and  all  in  the  first  instance  politically  effective  in 
their  natural  group,  the  fellowship  of  their  calling — 
that  is,  I  take  it,  the  basis  of  the  state  of  the  future. 
Prussia  has  realized  the  one  factor,  the  German 
Empire  the  other.  Neither  is  adequate  by  itself 
alone.  See,  e.  g.,  as  to  the  Reichstag  the  bitter 
judgment  of  H.  S.  Chamberlain,  Kriegsaufsdtze, 
pp.  38-40.  (What  people  speaks  with  such  dis- 
concerting objectivity,  so  "kilhl  his  an's  Herz  hinan'' 
with  regard  to  itself?)  It  is  to  be  expected  that 
Reichstag  and  Landtag^  will  in  the  future  both  be 
refashioned  in  the  sense  above  mentioned.  (See 
p.  70.) 

In  any  case  only  the  future  can  pass  final  judg- 
ment in  the  suit  of  Belgium  versus  Germany.  Ger- 
many has  taken  upon  her  shoulders  the  guilt  of 
wrong  toward  Belgium  and  in  Belgium  toward 
mankind.     The  essentially  tragic  character  of  that 

''  [Parliament  of  a  single  one  of  the  German  states.] 
[86] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

guilt  can  only  be  definitely  established,  if  Germany 
in  the  future  gives  convincing  evidences  of  ethical 
genius.  For  only  upon  this  ground  can  her  self- 
preservation — in  service  of  the  moral  vocation  of 
genius — be  of  more  value  than  Belgium's  personality, 
which  has  been  violated,  but  which,  as  a  part  of  an 
ethically  requickened  mankind,  should  receive  in 
the  end  full  recompense  for  the  wrong. 

It  may  well  be  that  the  reader  is  by  this  time 
prepared  to  suspend  judgment  and  to  leave  it  to  the 
future  to  administer  justice  to  Germany.  "Ven- 
geance is  mine,  saith  the  Lord."  It  is  England's 
moral  guilt  that  she  did  not  leave  the  "vengeance"  to 
God,  but  took  it  in  hand  herself,  and  that  too  not  out 
of  righteous  indignation,  but  with  her  eye  upon  a 
personal  advantage — that,  besides,  would  have  been 
adequately  guaranteed  by  the  promise  of  redress  for 
Belgium,  which  Germany  would  only  too  gladly 
have  given. 


[87] 


IX. 


IT  remains  now  to  examine  more  closely,  in  the 
light  of  all  the  foregoing,  the  case  of  Belgium 
versus  Germany;  and  I  shall  now  start  from  the 
hypothesis  that  Germany  is  a  state,  which,  like  the 
old  Roman  state,  possesses  the  quality  of  moral 
genius,  that  she  is,  in  a  word,  the  sound,  fertile  and 
creative  moral  kernel  of  Europe,  wholly  dedicated 
to  the  vocation  of  putting  her  power  at  the  service 
of  the  moral  ideal,  through  creating  and  renewing 
Law  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the  other  through 
creating  the  further  conditions  for  the  unfolding 
of  a  free  morality. 

It  is  clear  that  such  a  state  cannot  fulfil  its  moral 
vocation,  unless  certain  conditions  of  an  obvious 
sort  are  also  fulfilled.  In  the  first  place,  it  must 
continue  to  exist;  in  the  second  place,  it  must  exist 
under  such  circumstances  as  are  indispensable  for 
its  work.  It  shares  this  dependence  with  every 
genius:  even  the  greatest  genius  must  be  able  to 
live  and  must  find  the  conditions  for  its  proper  func- 
tioning; otherwise  it  perishes  useless. 

It  is  furthermore  clear  that  it  is  not  merely  for 

[88] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

the  benefit  of  the  state  itself  that  the  conditions 
aimed  at  be  fulfilled ;  on  the  contrary,  the  fulfilment 
has  a  social  interest  for  all  mankind,  and  indeed  the 
very  highest,  mankind's  one  essential  interest:  the 
realization  of  the  moral  ideal.  For  this  interest, 
sacrifices  can  be  required  of  all  other  states;  and, 
if  their  knowledge  of  the  facts  were  great  enough, 
their  insight  deep  and  their  ethical  will  strong  and 
earnest  enough,  they  would  then  be  glad  to  make 
them  of  their  own  free  will.  (To  be  sure,  the  neces- 
sary knowledge  is  impossible  of  complete  attainment, 
as  it  is  only  subsequent  events  that  can  decide  upon 
the  quality  of  genius ;  in  lieu  of  these,  we  have  to  rely 
on  intuition  and  faith.)  If  the  insight  and  the  will 
are  not  present,  compulsion  is  unavoidable,  just  as 
a  father  has  to  use  compulsion  on  his  undeveloped 
children — not  for  his  own  good,  but  in  the  final 
purpose  for  theirs. 

And  we  now  have  here  the  delimitation  which 
von  Treitschke's  theory  requires.  It  holds  only  for 
the  state  with  ethical  genius.  Inasmuch  as  von 
Treitschke  by  "the  state"  always  meant  Prussia, 
and  believed  in  Prussia  as  in  God  himself,  it  is  no 
wonder  that  he  never  became  aware  of  the  delimi- 
tation. 

In  conclusion:  is  now  this  duty  of  the  vocation 
of  moral  genius  absolute?  No.  Here,  too,  the 
moral  consciousness  sets  bounds.  An  individual  of 
genius  may  not,  even  for  the  sake  of  his  vocation, 

[89] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

annihilate  physically  or  spiritually  another  individ- 
ual who  does  not  aggressively  threaten  him  (Dos- 
toiewsky,  Guilt  and  Punishment)  ^  —  for  the  possi- 
bility of  reconciliation,  of  participation  in  the  values 
when  realized,  is  then  destroyed.  Therefore,  at  the 
time  when  Belgium  had  not  manifested  an  active 
hostility,  Germany  had  no  right  to  annex  her,  as 
the  German  ultimatum,  indeed,  clearly  indicated. 

Now  what  was  the  complexion  of  affairs  for 
Germany  at  the  beginning  of  August?  She  saw 
herself  exposed  to  serious  danger,  if  not  of  destruc- 
tion, at  least  of  long  and  vital  impairment  of  those 
conditions,  under  which  she  had  to  follow  her  moral 
vocation,  her  "Highest  and  Best."  She  had  one 
chance  of  getting  the  upper  hand :  to  utilize  the  ad- 
vantage of  her  wonderfully  organized  method  of 
mobilization  and  to  anticipate  the  foe.  To  make 
full  use  of  that  advantage  was  entirely  her  right, — 
for  in  this  very  organization  abides  a  wealth  of 
valuable  moral  qualities;  and,  with  might  against 
might,  any  moral  factor  that  gives  one  the  upper 
hand  is  not  only  morally  defensible  but  an  impera- 
tive duty.  However,  to  use  that  advantage,  she  had 
to  pass  over  Belgian  territory.  Over  against  the 
duty  toward  her  own  moral  vocation,  rose  that  of 
respecting  another  state's  personality.  After  all  the 
foregoing,  I  now  express  the  firm  conviction :  it  was 


[90] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

unavoidable  that  the  last-named  duty  should  yield 
to  the  first. 

Germany  strove  at  first  to  bring  about  a  com- 
promise, an  adjustment,  between  the  two  duties.  In 
the  ultimatum  to  Brussels  on  August  2,^  on  the  one 
hand  an  unhindered  passage  was  requested,  but  on 
the  other,  the  integrity  and  subsequent  independence 
of  the  kingdom  was  guaranteed,  if  Belgium's  atti- 
tude remained  friendly,  and  the  promise  given,  be- 
sides, that  the  country  would  be  vacated  imme- 
diately after  the  war,  all  requisitions  paid  for  in 
gold,  and  all  damage  made  good. 

Only  after  the  refusal  on  Belgium's  part  did  the 
moral  conflict  take  on  the  acute  form  of  a  complete 
suppression  of  the  lower  duty  by  the  higher. 

There  exists  a  peculiar  symptom  that  England  in 
her  "heart  of  hearts"  is  after  all  not  entirely  content 
with  her  behavior  toward  Belgium.  I  find  that 
symptom  in  the  fact  that  an  Englishman  has  found 
it  necessary  to  present  to  the  unhappy  knight  errant. 

King  Albert a  book,  the  King  Albert's  Book. 

It  was,  for  a  fact,  the  time  for  books!  And  what 
a  book !  Shakespeare  would  have  said  of  it :  "Words, 
words,  words."  It  is  an  extraordinary -compilation, 
contributed  to  by  all  sorts  of  celebrities,  some  also 
from  other  countries.  More  false  feeling,  hollow 
pathos,  and  hysterical  exaggeration  I  have  seldom 
seen  between  two  covers.    Every  one  who  possesses 

1  German  "White  Book,"  No.  41. 
[91] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

the  least  moral  instinct  must  perceive  here  the  un- 
genuineness,  the  untruth.  The  lack  of  a  real,  a  deep 
earnestness  appears  even  in  the  outward  form:  all 
sorts  of  reproductions  are  interspersed,  of  which 
the  majority  have  nothing  to  do  with  the  matter  in 
hand,  and  which  give  the  whole  volume  the  fraudu- 
lent appearance  of  a  supplementary  number  of  the 
Studio.  That  is  no  good  cause  which  brings  forth 
such  things.  The  Germans  at  this  moment  are  not 
making  people  presents  of  elegant  books. 

But  Belgium,  too,  was  in  an  ethical  conflict.  She 
had  on  the  one  side  the  duty  to  preserve  intact  her 
state's  personality,  on  the  other  side  the  higher 
duty,  complementary  to  Germany's  higher  right 
grounded  upon  ethical  genius,  to  put  her  territory 
at  the  service  of  the  march  to  France  along  the 
natural  and  shortest  route.  As  an  individual  state 
she  had  the  former  duty ;  as  a  member  of  the  Society 
of  States  the  second.  The  concept  of  the  Society  of 
States  and  of  the  duty  of  all  its  members  to  make 
sacrifices  for  its  highest  ethical  interests  was  here 
the  newer  concept  in  strife  with  the  older  one  of 
the  individual  state  and  its  duties.  That  our  "feel- 
ing" sides  with  Belgium  (see  above)  is  entirely  in 
accord  with  this  ethical  situation.  We  must  sooner 
or  later  learn  to  think  and  to  feel  according  to  the 
higher  morality,  which  Germany  by  her  epoch- 
making  deed  has  thus  inaugurated.     According  to 

[92] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

this  morality,  states  are  no  longer  isolated  entities, 
wholly  based  upon  themselves,  but  members  of  a 
Society  which  lays  down  new  rights  and  new  duties 
— duties,  which,  e.  g.,  in  the  case  of  a  land  that 
has  been  stamped  geographically  by  nature  herself 
as  a  strategic  thoroughfare,  take  on,  as  a  matter- 
of  course,  the  form  of  the  particular  duty  to  lay  in 
the  path  of  the  more  ethically  endowed  contestant, 
in  the  decision  of  an  epoch-making  suit  whereon  its 
very  life  depends,  no  artificial  hindrances, — hin- 
drances which  still  recall  the  spirit  of  the  Holy 
Alliance  that  imagined  it  could  fashion  historic  real- 
ity by  ingenious  tinkering. 

So  in  the  end  one  should  come  to  perceive  in  this 
very  act  of  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  an 
ethical  new-creation,  and  thus  a  proof  of  ethical 
genius.  The  deep  tragedy  of  the  situation  for  Bel- 
gium— and  in  a  way  her  justification,  besides — was 
the  fact  that,  in  order  to  take  the  right  course,  she 
would  have  needed  to  possess  an  intuition  of  the 
ethical  genius  of  Germany.  And  this  requirement 
was  naturally  beyond  her  power.  Genius  can  never 
be  comprehended  by  the  lesser;  that  lies  in  the 
nature  of  the  case.  Yet  reality  punishes  us  for 
the  absence  of  the  insight  that  the  given  moment 
demands,  even  though  we  were  unable  to  possess  it. 

A  word,  finally,  on  the  significant  purport  which 
this  whole  trend  of  thought  has  for  the  foundations 

[93] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

of  international  law.  International  law  is,  as  we 
have  seen,  properly  no  law  at  all,  since  it  lacks  the 
essential  characteristic  of  compelling  authority.  It 
is  just  as  little  an  entirely  free  morality,  since  it  con- 
tains fixed  rules,  whether  originating  in  custom  or 
in  deliberate  international  formulation.  It  is  a  sort 
of  intermediate  affair  between  law  and  ethics,  a 
moral  code, — formulations,  the  same  for  all  cases, 
of  what  morality  commands  on  definite  points,  or 
at  least  is  supposed  to  command. 

Thus  it  performs  the  service  of  every  moral  code : 
it  reduces  the  experience  of  free  morality  to  rules 
which  can  become  a  guide  of  conduct  for  the  weaker 
brothers,  the  unfree  ones.  It  shares  besides,  how- 
ever, the  difficulty  implicit  in  every  moral  code:  its 
rules,  to  which  the  multitude  ascribes  an  absolute 
validity,  must  ever  be  in  concrete  situations  of  quite 
as  little  absolute  validity  as  any  ethical  duty.  If 
this  is  not  perceived,  the  door  is  opened  for  wran- 
glings  and  diplomatic  notes  without  end,  and  state- 
craft becomes 

"hochstens  eine  Haupt-  und  Staatsaktion 
Mit  trefflichen  pragmatischen  Maximen, 
Wie  sie  den  Puppen  wohl  im  Munde  ziemen." 

But  the  difficulty  is  doubled  if,  in  addition,  the 
rules  established  are  founded  upon  a  fiction,  a  fiction 
which  is  in  flagrant  contradiction  to  reality.  Na- 
tional jurisprudence  is  also  founded  on  a  funda- 
mental fiction,  i.  e.,  that  all  individuals  are  of  equal 

[94] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

importance:  "The  equality  of  all  before  the  law." 
This  is  without  danger,  as  the  law  requires  of  us 
only  an  ethical  minimum,  which  the  vast  majority 
can  fulfil  without  difficulty,  while  the  repression  of 
the  less  worthy  minority  is  precisely  the  intention. 

In  international  law  this  is  not  so.  It  ordains  no 
ethical  minimum,  but  gives  the  full  measure  of  that 
which  is  to  be  considered  moral  in  the  intercourse 
of  states.  It  pretends  to  an  entire  control  of  the 
actions  of  states.  If  the  fundamental  principle  is 
here  fictitious,  then  that  intercourse  is  falsified. 

The  fundamental  principle  is  fictitious.  It  con- 
sists in  the  supposition  that  all  states  as  such  are  of 
equal  value.  That  is  not  true.  One  state  is  more 
a  state  than  another,  and  manifests  in  a  higher 
degree  the  double  characteristic  of  the  state :  power 
in  the  service  of  an  ethical  vocation.  Not  all  states 
are  alike  powerful;  not  all  states  stand  upon  the 
same  moral  level. 

Thus,  international  law  can  well  proceed  upon 
the  supposition  that  all  states  are  equally  justified, 
and  have  equal  claims  to  sovereignty;  but  it  can 
do  so  only  at  the  cost  of  falsifying  reality. 

The  difference  in  power  is  ethically  not  indiffer- 
ent: it  is  entirely  justifiable  for  a  small  state  to 
give  up  some  of  its  sovereignty,  the  better  to  achieve 
its  ethical  vocation.  It  then  gets  substantial  ethical 
possessions  in  exchange  for  its  formal  independence. 
That  is  possible  also  without  complete  unification 

[95] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

with  the  other  state,  although  Bavaria,  for  instance, 
is  not  hkely  to  repent  of  the  step  of  1871.  This  re- 
flection can  become  for  our  own  country  practically 
of  exceeding  significance. 

Theoretically  of  more  importance  seems  to  me 
the  difference  in  moral  level.  That  a  state  such 
as  Servia  is  accorded  full  and  regular  membership 
in  the  European  company  of  states,  is  a  mockery  of 
reality,  and  in  addition  a  symptom  of  defective  moral 
earnestness.  It  has  had,  too,  the  most  disastrous 
consequences.  It  is  noteworthy  that,  in  the  matter 
of  the  Austrian  demands  which  touched  the  formal 
Servian  sovereignty,  it  was  not  once  during  the 
negotiations  asked  simply,  whether  the  concrete 
reality  did  not  render  it  very  just  and  very  neces- 
sary to  make  those  demands.  Those  demands  con- 
flicted with  the  Servian  sovereignty — and  that  was 
enough.  So  a  concept,  a  word,  the  now  once  formed 
abstract  term  "sovereignty,"  provided  Russia  with 
her  "cheval  de  hatailW — for  all  that,  however,  only 
too  practically  useful  for  her  own  designs.  Will 
we  never  learn  not  to  fumble  with  words,  but  as 
rational,  moral  beings  to  operate  with  the  naked 
reality  itself?  We  must  think  in  concepts.  Is  it 
thereby  affirmed  that  we  must  slavishly  act  by  con- 
cepts? Is  not  all  acting  concrete?  It  is  true  that 
reality  makes  much  harder  demands  than  the  world 
of  thought.  Shall  we  ever  learn  to  meet  them? 
One  thing  is  sure:  the  average  rational  and  moral 

[96] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

level  will  have  to  be  a  good  deal  higher  than  it  is 
now.  At  present,  our  practice,  in  the  bonds  of  our 
always  inadequate  concepts,  like  a  hobbled  child 
shuffles  weakly  forward — and  after  all  perhaps  that's 
just  as  well. 


[97] 


As  already  observed,  I  have  thus  far  disregarded 
,  the  mitigating  circumstances  cited  by  Ger- 
many ;  partly,  because  only  by  so  doing  could  I  insure 
for  the  argument  its  complete  theoretical  force ;  partly, 
because  it  appeared  also  practically  most  desirable  to 
show  that  even  with  the  utmost  moral  severity 
toward  Germany  we  can  pronounce  at  most  a  non 
liquet,  and  not  a  condemnation. 

But  now  both  justice  and  completeness  of  treat- 
ment require  some  attention  to  Germany's  own  de- 
fence. 

This  defence  rests  upon  two  contentions:  the 
French  attack,  and  the  Belgian  connivance. 

The  former  was  immediately  cited,  the  latter 
only  sometime  later. 

1.  The  French  attack.  On  August  4,  the  Imperial 
Chancellor  said:  "The  French  government  has  in- 
deed declared  at  Brussels  its  willingness  to  respect 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  as  long  as  the  enemy  re- 
spects it.  But  we  knew  that  France  stood  ready 
for  the  attack.    France  could  wait,  we  could  not !    A 

[98] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

French  attack  upon  our  flank  on  the  lower  Rhine 
might  have  been  fateful." 

And  a  number  of  facts  are  cited  by  Germany, 
from  which  it  would  appear  that  France  had  already 
actually  begun  the  attack  by  way  of  Belgium.  Thus 
according  to  French  wounded,  a  regiment  of  French 
soldiers  had  been  brought  to  Namur^  as  early  as 
July  30,  1914;  the  town  of  Erquelinnes  had  been 
occupied  by  French  troops  before  the  outbreak  of 
hostilites;  French  airmen  had  flown  over  Belgian 
territory;  an  automobile  with  French  officers  had 
undertaken  by  way  of  Belgium  a  first  stroke  on 
German  soil.^ 

With  regard  to  these  facts,  which  are  as  posi- 
tively denied  by  the  opposing  party,  I  would  submit : 
(1)  that  they  are  not  sufficiently  proven,  (2)  that, 
even  if  they  were,  they  would  be  inadequate  to 
establish  the  conviction  that  France  had  in  fact  the 
design,  not  simply  to  construe  Belgian  neutrality 
somewhat  loosely,  but  to  make  by  way  of  Belgium 
a  vast  strategic  attack  upon  Germany.  Yet  that  is 
the  contention.  The  facts  mentioned  are,  I  think,  to 
be  viewed  as  nothing  more  than  an  almost  acciden- 

1  Dr.  Neukamp  in  "Deutschland  und  der  Weltkrieg,  darge- 
stellt  von  deutschen  Volkerrechtslehrern" — "Sonderausgabe  der 
Zeitschrift  fiir  Volkerrecht/'  Band  VIII,  Heft  6,  p.  10. 

2  0.  Nelte,  "Die  belgische  Frage,"  ibid.,  p.  205.  The  German 
ultimatum  to  Belgium  speaks  only  of  "the  intended  advance  of 
French  warring  forces  on  the  Maas  between  Givet-Namur," 
which  "leave  no  doubt  as  to  the  intention  of  France  to  march 
on  Germany  through  Belgian  territory." 

[99] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMA*NY 

tal  boiling-over,  here  and  there,  of  the  brimful 
seething  kettle;  they  do  not  prove  that  the.  kettle 
was,  by  intention,  soon  to  be  poured  out,  or  a  for- 
tiori that  the  pouring-out  had  already  begun.  The 
contention  seems  to  me,  moreover,  considering  the 
whole  situation,  in  fact  without  much  initial  plausi- 
bility. It  is  true  that  Belgium  was  through  and 
through  French  in  her  leanings,  and  presumably 
would  not  have  seriously  opposed  a  French  passage. 
And  we  do  not  know  what  influence  the  expected 
help  of  England  presumably  had  upon  the  French 
frame  of  mind.  Yet,  notwithstanding,  is  it  thinkable 
that  France  would  ruin  the  game  of  her  ally,  who 
had  now  selected  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  as  her 
very  casus  belli  ?  Moreover,  what  benefit  would  the 
whole  business  have  been  to  France  ?  Secure  behind 
her  well-fortified  eastern  boundary  and  behind  Bel- 
gium, with  no  enemy  at  her  rear,  she  could  indeed 
wait — France  could  wait,  we  could  not — and  she 
would  have  committed  a  blunder  if  she  had  ven- 
tured prematurely  into  the  field.  Every  day's  delay 
was  for  France  a  gain,  for  Germany  an  irretrievable 
loss.  I  believe  that,  on  precisely  the  ground  of  an 
absence  of  benefit  in  attacking,  we  may  well  assume 
that  it  was  the  intention  of  France  to  maintain  a 
waiting  attitude.^    If  Germany  had  done  the  same, 

3  Cf.  Andre  Weiss,  La  violation  de  la  neutralite  beige  et 
luxembourgeoise,  p.  23:  "Furthermore,  what  interest  would 
France  have  had  in  carrying  invasion  and  war  into  Belgian 
territory,  without  having  been  provoked  thereto  ?" — Quite  right ! 

[100] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY*>'\  :,,  f ;'  {}''''*  l\l  i  /, 


there  would  then  have  arisen  a  situation  where 
each  would  have  been  defiantly  laying  for  the  other. 
That  Germany  did  not,  could  not  do  so,  lay  not  in 
the  attitude  of  France,  but  in  the  menace  of  Russia 
in  her  rear:  "France  could  wait,  we  could  not/' 
There  is  really  a  contradiction  in  the  explanation 
of  the  Imperial  Chancellor :  ( 1 )  France  stood  ready 
for  the  attack;  (2)  France  could  wait.  The  second, 
though  of  course  logically  not  inconsistent  with 
the  first,  cancels  its  significance  practically,  and  pre- 
cisely on  this  account  it  becomes  clear  that  Ger- 
many's real  reason  for  entering  Belgium  was  not 
the  attitude  of  France  but  the  critical  situation  in 
which  Germany  found  herself.  The  critical  situa- 
tion, born  of  the  Russian  danger  at  her  back,  ren- 
dered it  imperative  not  alone  to  be  beforehand  as 
to  a  possible  attack  from  France,  but  no  less,  by 
means  of  the  strongest  possible  offensive,  to  use  to 
the  utmost  the  advantage  which  her  superior  system 
of  mobilization  bestowed.  That  is  the  fact  and 
there  is  no  earthly  reason  for  dodging  it.  Germany 
could  not  wait;  and  on  this  account,  and  on  this 
alone,  she  marched  forth. 

The  plea  of  self-defense,  as  argued  for  example 
by  Professor  J.  Kohler,*  will  not  do  because  the 
actual  basis,  the  attack  itself,  is  lacking.  Professor 
Kohler,  indeed,  admits  this  implicitly  in  the  state- 
ment :  "Every  one  has  the  right  to  ward  off  an  un- 

*Notwehr  und  Neutralitdt,  pp.  32-36. 
[101] 


'  "^'^  ^  •'*"'  BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 


justifiable  attack,  and,  furthermore,  he  need  not 
wait  till  he  is  struck;  he  has  the  right  to  fall  upon 
the  fellow  who  intends  striking,  and  to  cut  him 
down  or  shoot  him  dead."  Is  that  so?  Can  one 
speak  of  self-defense  in  a  case  of  mere  prevention? 
The  drafter  of  our  Criminal  Code^  in  his  comments 
on  art.  41  proves  to  be  of  another  opinion.  "There 
is  no  state  of  self-defense  without  (1)  unlawful 
assault,  (2)  imminent  danger  to  one's  own  or  an- 
other's body,  honor,  or  property,  (3)  necessity  of 
the  committed  action,  as  the  one  and  only  protec- 
tion against  the  danger  actually  occasioned  by  the 
assault."  With  respect  especially  to  the  first  point, 
I  should  say  that  the  fact  of  the  attack  would  then 
have  to  be  actually  present;  since,  otherwise,  there 
is  necessarily  a  lack  of  the  indispensable  complete 
certainty  that  the  attack  will  really  take  place.  Any 
one  who  in  such  a  case  becomes  preventively  the 
aggressor  acts  presumably  with  entire  ethical  justi- 
fication; but  he  does  not  act  in  self-defense  [nood- 
weer],  but  at  most  in  distress  [noodstand],  where 
the  duty  of  self-preservation  calls  louder  than  usual. 
Moreover,  the  self-defense  theory  needs  a  sup- 
porting theory  to  explain  the  fact  that  the  assault 
was  not  upon  the  understood  aggressor  France  but 
in  the  first  instance  upon  the  neutral  third  party 
Belgium.     On  this  matter.  Professor  Kohler  says 

6  Cf.  Mr.   [=  Meester]   H.  J.  Smidt,  Geschiedenis  van  het 
Wetboek  van  Strafrecht,  I,  p.  277. 

[102] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

(p.  33) y  that,  by  virtue  of  the  aggressive  attitude 
of  France,  the  Belgian  territory — ^the  "precincts" 
of  the  third  party — became  an  instrumentality  for 
the  attack:  "But  I  have  a  right  to  render  instru- 
mentaHties  of  attack  inoperative,  even  when  they 
belong  to  an  innocent  third  party;  anything  that 
is  useful  for  the  attack,  however  innocent  in  itself, 
falls  under  the  law  of  self-defense  and  actions  of 
self-defense."  And  he  makes  this  comparison:  If 
I  am  shot  at  from  a  house  of  a  third  party,  I  may 
shoot  into  that  house. 

But  I  really  think  that  the  German  cause  is  badly 
served  in  such  fashion.  Omnis  comparatio  claudicat 
[Every  comparison  limps],  but  this  one  so  badly 
that  it  ceases  to  have  any  value  at  all.  It  would 
be  in  season,  if  the  act  to  be  defended  consisted 
simply  in  the  fact  that  Germany  had  violated  Bel- 
gian neutrality  only  on  a  small  scale,  i.  e.,  by  way 
of  a  "simple  passage"  through  some  outlying  rela- 
tively unimportant  section.  Such  slight  violations 
are  considered  admissible  by  all  exponents  of  inter- 
national law.®  Here,  however,  the  affair  is  of  so 
much  more  serious  sort  that  (to  use  the  Hegelian 
expression)  quantity  changes  into  quality.  Here  it 
is  not  the  Belgian  house,  but  Belgium  herself,  the 
personality  of  the  Belgian  state,  that  is  assaulted 

^  K.  Strupp,  Vorgeschichte  und  Aushruch  des  Krieges  von 
J914,  p.  189,  where  he  quotes  a  remark  of  Lawrence :  "extreme 
necessity  will  justify  a  temporary  violation  of  neutral  territory." 

[103] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

and  made  continuously  to  serve  the  German  pur- 
pose. And  for  this — see  above,  p.  42 — an  appeal 
to  self-preservation  in  distress  does  not  suffice,  be- 
cause the  personality  of  the  Belgian  state  is  not 
a  priori  inferior  to  that  of  the  German,  and  no  one 
free  personality  may  be  used  merely  as  a  means  to 
another's  end. 

The  question  ought,  then,  to  be  put  thus:  if  a 
possible  attacker  shields  himself  behind  a  third  per- 
son, what  right  have  I  over  against  this  third? 

The  answer  ought  to  be,  I  think:  if  the  third 
person  is  innocent,  impartial,  and  implicated  without 
his  consent,  then  I  am  obligated  to  spare  him,  unless 
there  exists  between  him  and  me  a  difference  in 
value  not  only  quantitative  but  qualitative — as  here 
the  quality  of  ethical  genius — that  renders  my  self- 
preservation  objectively  of  greater  moment  than  his 
being  spared. 

//  the  third  party  is  innocent.  If  he  is  not,  and 
I  know  it,  then  this  fact  exculpates  me,  if  I  treat 
him  as  an  enemy  or  at  least  do  not  spare  him. 

So  we  come  to  the  second  point. 

2.  The  Belgian  Connivance.  One  can  find  all  the 
facts,  with  the  documents  in  facsimile,  under  two 
covers  in  the  German  official  publication.  Die  bel- 
gische  Neutralitdt.  We  know  them  of  course  in  sub- 
stance from  the  so-called  ''Briisseler  Dokumente.'* 
They  show  the  following: 

1.  In  1906  Belgium  had  entered  at  England's  sug- 

[104] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

gestion  upon  very  detailed  discussions  of  Anglo- 
Belgian  cooperation  in  case  of  war.  The  English 
army  was  to  land  at  French  ports,  from  which  it 
appears  that  France  too  was  implicated  in  the  affair. 
England,  for  her  part,  emphasized  that  *'our  con- 
versation was  absolutely  confidential."^  Diplomacy 
too  was  bestirring  itself,  as  appears  from  the  report 
of  April  10,  1906,  of  the  Belgian  General  Ducarne 
to  his  government,  and  especially  from  a  letter  dated 
December  23,  1911,  of  the  then  Belgian  envoy  at 
Berlin,  Baron  Greindl,  who  warned  his  government 
most  earnestly  of  the  consequences  of  such  politics. 
The  document  of  1906  lay  in  an  envelope  with  the 
significant  label  ^'Conventions  anglo-belges"  [Anglo- 
Belgian  Agreement']. 

2.  The  discussions  comprised  under  ( 1 )  expressly 
referred  only  to  a  possible  case  of  German  violation 
of  Belgian  neutrality  and  Belgian  request  for  assis- 
tance against  such  violation. 

From  a  second  document  (of  1912),  it  appears, 
however,  not  only  that  the  discussions  were  still 
going  on,  but  that  now  England  flatly  declared  that 
in  any  case  [^'en  tout  etat  de  cause"],  troops  were  to 
disembark  in  Belgium,  since  Belgium  would  not  be 
in  a  position  to  resist  the  Germans.  In  the  course  of 
six  years  the  relation  of  Belgium  to  England  was 
evidently  becoming  continually  more  dependent. 
This  jibes  entirely  with  an  utterance  of  Lord  Roberts 
'■  [Quoted  in  French.] 

[105] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

in  The  British  Review  of  August,  1913,  concerning 
the  situation  at  the  time  of  the  Morocco  crisis  in 
1911  :  "Our  expeditionary  force  was  held  in  equal 
readiness  instantly  to  embark  for  Flanders  to  do 
its  share  in  maintaining  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe." 

3.  There  were  found,  furthermore,  a  lot  of  blanks 
intended  for  English  requisitions  in  Belgium;  four 
parts  of  a  purely  secret  handbook  prepared  by  the 
English  general  staff  in  cooperation  with  Belgium; 
finally,  on  the  person  of  the  English  embassy-secre- 
tary. Grant  Watson,  arrested  at  Brussels,  a  number 
of  other  documents :  which,  taken  together,  furnish 
the  logically  indisputable  proof  that  there  had  ex- 
isted for  years  an  Anglo-Belgian  cooperation  in 
preparation  of  a  campaign  in  Belgium.^ 

What  relevancy  has  this  fact  for  the  moral  judg- 
ment? 

As  far  as  concerns  Belgium,  it  constitutes  an  utter 
abandonment  of  her  neutrality  duties — which  cer- 
tainly permitted  no  partizan  relationship.  Even  if 
we  grant  that  her  neutrality  seemed  endangered 
from  the  German  side,  still  by  binding  herself  hand 

®  The  defence  of  the  Belgian  government,  which  appeared 
only  at  the  beginning  of  March,  contains  nothing  substantial. 
It  is,  to  say  truth,  a  suspicious  mixture  of  French  ''phrase"  and 
English  "cant."  The  content  is  to  be  found  also  in  Emile 
Brunet,  Calomnies  allemandes.  Les  Conventions  anglo-belges. 
It  is  not  worth  while  going  into  particulars.  For  an  impartial 
judge  the  proof  is  adequate;  though  it  can  convince  no  one, 
of  course,  who  doesn't  want  to  be  convinced. 

[106] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

and  foot  to  the  other  party,  which  on  its  side  flatly 
announced  its  intention  of  operating  in  Belgium 
even  without  her  consent,  she  pitched  matters  so 
much  from  the  frying-pan  into  the  fire  that  we  can 
interpret  her  conduct  not  as  a  mere  mistake,  but 
as  guilt  pure  and  simple.  Belgium  might  have  been 
already  warned  by  her  moral  sense  when  she  per- 
ceived in  1906  that  the  conversations  were  absolutely 
confidential,  in  other  words,  were  not  to  be  com- 
municated to  the  other  guarantors,  especially  Ger- 
many. This  was  self-evident,  for  otherwise  they 
would  have  been  without  meaning ;  yet  for  this  very 
reason  her  unlawful  procedure  is  patent. 

The  sympathy  we  feel  for  Belgium  is,  since  these 
revelations,  not  free  from  that  nuance  of  hesitating 
condescension  which  our  pity  takes  on  when  it  is 
hampered  by  an  absence  of  intellectual  and  moral 
respect.  What  a  well-nigh  inconceivable  fact,  be- 
sides, that  these  documents  were  left  behind! 

For  the  ethical  worth  of  England's  attitude,  for 
her  utilization  of  the  Belgian  question  as  casus  belli, 
this  affair  is  the  death-blow — (if  such  were  still 
needed) — la  mort  sans  phrase.^ 

^  The  Times  of  March  8  throws  the  whole  fiction  overboard. 
This  sudden,  cynical  unmasking  is  truly  astounding.  Up  to 
that  time  people  had  left  the  truth  on  this  point  to  Mr.  Bernard 
Shaw  (Common  Sense  about  the  War).  There  must  be  a 
very  definite  reason  for  the  Times  adopting  Shaw's  role  now. 
But  what?  The  matter  makes  an  "uncanny"  impression — as 
if  the  English  people  were  losing  all  inner  control,  all  sense 
of  proportion  and  right.  Is  it,  indeed,  that  we  are  really  liv- 
ing to  see  the  beginning  of  an  end? 

[107] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

But  for  the  judgment  on  Germany's  attitude 
toward  Belgium's  neutrality — and  that  is  ultimately 
our  point — the  Brussels  discoveries  are  entirely  in- 
different. Indeed,  for  any  moral  judgment  on  an 
action,  the  question  is  not  what  circumstances  were 
objectively  given,  but  how  these  circumstances  were 
subjectively  conceived.  That  Germany  later  on  ac- 
quired knowledge  of  the  real  situation,  in  no  sense 
alters  the  fact  that  she  acted  in  the  first  instance 
without  such  knozvledge. 

Or  is  this  last,  after  all,  not  so?  Were  there 
found  at  Brussels  merely  official  proofs  of  what  was 
actually  already  known?  If  so,  then  the  Chancel- 
lor's speech  of  August  4,  1914,  that  made  no  men- 
tion of  this  all-decisive  point,  is  no  longer  simply 
a  Quixotism,  but  downright  clumsiness. 

We  are  now  often  given  to  understand  by  Ger- 
many, that,  in  truth,  "the  discovered  manuscripts 
but  furnish  the  documentary  proof  of  Belgian  con- 
nivance with  the  Entente-powers,  a  fact  known  to 
the  authorities  long  before  the  outbreak  of  the 
war."^°  So,  too,  in  Die  belgische  Neutralitdt,  p.  5 : 
"The  Imperial  Chancellor  did  not  know  as  yet,  al- 
though he  already  surmised,  that  he  had  a  right  to 
employ  quite  different  language." 

But  assertion  is  not  proof.  If  Germany  wishes 
our  moral  judgment  to  accept,  among  the  motives 

10  Dr.  H.  F.  Helmolt,  Die  geheime  Vorgeschichte  des  Welt- 
krieges,  p.  63. 

[108] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

for  her  conduct,  the  fact  also  of  the  EngHsh-Belgian 
entente,  she  must  then  make  clear  by  pertinent  evi- 
dence that  the  fact  was  known  to  Germany  at  the 
beginning  of  August,  1914."  Such  a  proof  would 
lead  at  once  to  acquittal.  Otherwise,  the  case  rests 
where  my  main  argument  left  it,  non  liquet ;  though 
personal  faith  in  Germany's  vocation  subjoins  to  this 
a  conviction  that  the  future  will  bring  the  full  moral 
reconciliation  and  consequently  the  acquittal. 

I  feel,  however,  that  even  this  may  not  be  the 
last  word.  Life  often  presents  situations,  pro- 
foundly affecting  our  interests  but  kept  hid  by  the 
other  party  concerned,  of  which  we  have  not  the 
least  objective  knowledge,  but  rather  a  sort  of  intui- 
tive, practical  certainty.  An  excellent  example  is 
conjugal  unfaithfulness.  One  may  know  nothing 
and  yet  be  in  mind  and  soul  thoroughly  convinced. ^^ 

^1  The  Chancellor's  speech  of  December  2,  1914,  plainly  in- 
dicates that  the  Anglo-Belgian  connivance  was  brought  into 
the  discussion  officially  not  to  exonerate  Germany  but  to  set 
forth  the  real  nature  of  England's  motive  in  the  war. 

12  Of  course  there  are  usually  some  factual  indications  too. 
In  the  present  case,  for  example,  the  disposition  of  the  Belgian 
fortifications,  the  Belgian  fear  of  German  industrial  competi- 
tion, the  general  leanings  to  France  and  the  strong  anti-German 
sentiment  in  Belgium.  Compare  the  warm  and  meaty  compo- 
sition of  Conrad  Borchling:  Das  belgische  Problem  ["The  Bel- 
gian Problem"]  (in  the  series,  "Deutsche  Vortrage  hamburgi- 
scher  Professoren"  ["German  Lectures  of  Hamburg  Profes- 
sors"]). There,  for  example,  p.  5:  "The  way  our  opponents 
conceive  this  neutrality  may  be  most  strikingly  summarized  in 
the  proposition  formulated  by  the  Paris  newspaper,  Le  Na- 
tional, on  November  16,  1834:  'The  day  will  come  when  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium,  in  case  of  a  European  war,  will  dis- 
appear before  the  will  of  the  Belgian  people Belgium  will 

[109] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

If  in  such  a  situation  there  comes  a  moment  when 
one  has  to  act,  then  those  who  ail  from  Hamlet's 
"pale  cast  of  thought"  will  hesitate,  consider,  weigh 
....  and,  as  a  reward  for  their  moral  earnestness,  be 
knocked  over  by  the  other  party  and  treated  by  the 
bystanders  with  ironic  pity  and  contempt.  Such 
crises  require  the  free,  firm  hand  of  genius,  the 
courage  to  "go  to  it,"  with  the  old  sailor-prayer 
''God  zegen  de  greep''^^  ["God  bless  the  grip"],  and 
to  break  through  the  cobweb  of  lies,  at  the  risk  of 
committing  some  great  and  irretrievable  wrong.  But 
the  genius  of  the  act  lies  precisely  herein  that  the 
actor  is,  in  ways  beyond  reason,  convinced  that  this 
risk  is  slight.  I  believe  that  this  sort  of  genius  is 
one  of  the  most  indispensable  factors  in  a  great 
statesman.  ^^  We  miss  it  in  the  all  too  conscious 
reasonings  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor. 

So  we  are  beginning  to  doubt,  too,  if  it  looks  well 

range  herself  naturally  on  the  side  of  France!'"  [I'll  copy 
this  important  and  little  known  citation  in  the  original :  "Le 
jour  viendra  oii  la  neutralite  de  la  Belgique,  en  cas  de  guerre 

europeenne,  disparaitra  devant  le  voeu  du  peuple  beige La 

Belgique  se  rangera  naturellement  du  cote  de  la  France!"]  Is 
it  not,  taken  all  in  all,  truly  marvelous  that  the  English  presen- 
tation has  made  such  easy  way  into  men's  minds?  How  well 
she  knows  her  pubhc....and  how  she  must  despise  it.  Was 
there  really  any  well-informed  person  to  whom  Germany's 
appearance  on  the  scene  offered  anything  for  shocked  surprise? 
Would  not  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  private  gladly  entrust  his  last 
penny  to  the  Imperial  Chancellor?  Can  he  look  Mr.  Asquith, 
his  fellow-augur,  in  the  face  without  laughing? 

13  [I.  e.,  the  grip  on  the  oar,  rudder,  rope,  or  possibly  some 
weapon  of  attack.] 

1*  Cf.  Frederick  the  Great  in  1756. 

[110] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

for  Germany  to  make  the  effort  to  present  the  above- 
mentioned  proof — her  "reasons  grounded  in  knowl- 
edge." Perhaps  H.  S.  Chamberlain^^  says  here  the 
right  word :  "Nor  do  I  consider  the  explanations  and 
excuses  now  eagerly  proffered  at  all  happy.  They  will 
only  breed  more  insolence.  Qui  s' excuse  s' accuse  is 
one  of  the  truest  sentiments  ever  uttered.  Do  what  is 
right  and  let  the  ousiders  take  it  out  in  talk !  How 
fine  would  it  have  been  if  the  Germans  had,  after  a 
brief  notification,  simply  marched  into  Belgium. 
What  good  did  it  do  to  interrogate  England  and  to 
offer  apologies!  The  initiated  knew  then  already 
what  the  whole  world  knows  to-day.  Everything 
was  bound  to  be  cleared  up  soon  enough,  and  the 
effect  would  have  been  much  greater,  if  the  authori- 
ties had  kept  in  dignified  reserve.  For  the  same  con- 
flict that  had  happened  before  was  at  issue  now,  the 
contest,  as  Carlyle  puts  it,  'between  noble  German 
veracity  and  obstinate  Flemish  cunning.' " 

15  Houston  Stewart  Chamberlain,  the  brilliant,  somewhat 
too  "Pan-Germanic,"  English-born  and  French-educated  Ger- 
man author  of  widely  known  philosophical  works.  Labberton 
cites  from  his  German  text,  Kriegsaufsdtze,  p.  93.  The  version 
above  is  not  my  translation,  but  Chamberlain's  own  English 
from  his  English  pamphlet  England  and  Germany — distributed 
gratis  by  him  "for  readers  in  neutral  countries."] 


[Ill] 


XI. 


I  ANTICIPATE  another  objection,— relatively 
justified  and  hence  demanding  some  discussion. 
A  moral  right  over  against  another  person  can  only 
rest  upon  a  moral  duty  of  the  person  acting,  for  the 
performance  of  which  that  right  is  indispensable. 
Can  the  moral  right  of  war  be  established?  Is  war, 
is  this  war,  for  Germany  a  moral  duty? 

In  these  last  words  I've  split  the  question  into 
two.  But  the  former,  the  moral  justification  of  war 
in  general,  is  no  question.  War  is  an  action,  an 
action  of  a  state;  and  actions  in  themselves  are 
neither  moral  nor  immoral.  Moral  or  immoral  is 
alone  the  will  which  expresses  itself  in  the  action. 
War  is  the  necessary,  the  only  possible  result  of  the 
clashing  of  the  irreconcilable  decisions  of  two  na- 
tional wills.  If  two  national  wills — or  two  individ- 
ual wills — come  into  conflict  with  each  other,  there 
are  then  three  possibilities :  one  gives  in ;  both  give 
in  in  part  so  that  a  compromise  results;  or  the  one 
will  breaks  the  other  with  all  the  instruments  of 
power  whose  use  is  not  forbidden  by  the  moral  con- 
sciousness— and  let  it  be  here  remembered  that  the 

[112] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

moral  consciousness  knows  no  fixed  rules,  but  only- 
concrete  actions.  If  the  state  is  a  wise  state,  it  will 
then  look  into  itself  to  see  whether  its  decision  is 
essential,  i.  e.,  whether  its  decision  touches  its  moral 
vocation.  If  that  is  not  the  case,  it  gives  in,  wholly 
or  in  part  (as  Germany  did  more  than  once).  If 
the  state  is  foolish  or  bad,  then  it  will  hold  fast — 
and  without  compelling  inner  reasons — to  its  initial 
decision,  and  strive  to  put  that  decision  through  on 
lower  grounds  of  passion  (as  France)  or  of  self- 
interest  (as  England).  Such  a  war  may  be  foolish, 
but  it  is  not,  as  such,  necessarily  immoral.  For  it 
has,  indeed,  a  goal  beyond  itself-  it  is  means  to 
solution  of  problems,  means  to  world-forming.  Only 
absolutely  immoral  is  war  for  war's  sake,  for  the 
sake  of  nothing  else  than  the  direct  result  of  war, 
namely,  the  weakening  of  the  opponent,  —  with 
whom  no  concrete  differences  existed,  but  whose 
power  stood  simply  in  the  way  of  ourselves — of  our 
egotism — without,  as  such,  thwarting  our  vocation. 
That  is  the  type  of  wars  that  England  again  and 
again  has  unleashed  upon  the  continent — and,  for 
the  most  part,  to  boot,  left  for  her  allies  to  fight 
out,  and  so  got  double  profit.^ 

But,  as  we  have  seen,  for  the  wise  state,  too,  the 
possibility  that  war  may  result  is  by  no  means  ex- 

1  [Zoodat  het  mes  van  twee  kanten  sneed,  "so  that  the  knife 
(Engl,  ax)  cut  both  ways,"  but  in  English  the  proverb  has 
come  to  mean  often  "to  get  hoist  with  one's  own  petard" — a 
very  different  matter!] 

[113] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

eluded.     This  we  can  find — as  everything  else — 
superlatively  expressed  in  a  little  poem  of  Goethe's : 

"Was  euch  nicht  angehort, 
Miisset  ihr  ipeiden. 
Was  euch  das  Innre  start 
Diirft  ihr  nicht  leiden. 
Dringt  es  gewaltig  ein, 
Miisset  ihr  tiichtig  sein: 
Liebe  nur  Liebende 
Bringet  hinein." 

War  becomes  a  lofty,  an  unavoidable  duty  which 
it  were  perdition  to  shirk,  if  "the  inner  life"  is 
threatened.  But  aggressive  war  may  also  be  an 
ethical  duty.  For  the  ethical,  the  moral  urge  within 
us  is  in  its  deepest  nature  expansive :  it  is  not  satis- 
fied with  its  own  ethical  completion  [volmaking], 
but  is  inexorably  driven  to  work,  besides — as  far 
as  in  its  power — on  the  completion  of  the  whole 
world. 

It  will  remain  eternally  "idea,"  never  fully  to  be 
realized  here  upon  earth;  but  it  strives  unceasingly 
thitherward.  It  is  prompted  by  the  fulness  of  its 
being  to  labor,  according  to  its  abilities,  for  the 
establishment  of  the  divine,  for  the  "Incarnation 
of  the  Word,"  though  the  fulness  of  its  kingdom 
is  not  of  this  world  (see  the  conclusion  of  Faust,  II). 

So,  in  considering  the  existence  of  war,  I  come 
practically  to  the  same  results  as  does  Steinmetz 
in  his  Philo Sophie  des  Krieges,  though  upon  other 
grounds.    I  believe  that  only  the  man  whose  sense 

[114] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

of  reality  is  so  developed  that  his  ethical  insight 
has  led  him  into  the  mysterious  deeps  of  per- 
sonality can  fully  understand  war  in  all  its  vast  and 
sublime,  its  fated  unavoidability.  This  insight  is 
toto  coelo  different  from  the  romantic-mystic  glori- 
fication of  war,  which  had  been  tried  out  before. 
It  glorifies  war  least  of  all ;  it  views  war  as  a  most 
heavy  and  terrible  task;  it  is  not  romantic,  but 
realistic.  And,  finally,  I  believe  that  Professor  Stein- 
metz,  if  he  came  to  think  the  ethical  side  entirely 
through,  would  come  really  to  the  same  insight; 
indeed  that  he  really  proclaims  the  same, — 

"Nur  mit  ein  bischen  andren  Worten." 

On  pages  7  and  8  of  his  Philosophic  des  Krieges 
we  read :  "Social  utilitarianism  in  the  deepest  sense 
would  be  then  the  real  content  of  all  morality ;"  and 
"evolutionary  utilitarianism  in  the  deepest  sense,  en- 
riched by  the  ideal  of  race,  constitutes  the  highest 
and  broadest  ethics  which  we  can  conceive,  the  only 
ethics,  moreover,  that  can  satisfy  us  critically." 

But  for  me  this  ethics  is  not  in  the  least  critically 
satisfying.  Utilitarianism,  as  against  formal  ethics 
in  the  sense  of  Kant,  Lipps  and  Heymans,  is  to  this 
extent  the  same  that  it  seeks  for  ethical  values;  but 
it  is  not  the  same,  where  it  purports  to  be  able  to 
reduce  the  values  all  to  social  utility.  I  may  consider 
myself  excused  from  a  specific  critique  of  utili- 
tarianism.    Plenty  of  such  critiques  are  ready  to 

[115] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

hand.  In  reply  to  Professor  Steinmetz  it  is  enough 
to  point  out  that  it  is  simply  impossible  to  "enrich" 
utilitarianism  with  any  ideal  whatever,  without  es- 
sentially canceling  it  past  recovery.  An  ideal,  a 
Platonic-Kantian  "idea,"  operating  in  the  world  of 
concrete  reality  as  an  urge,  as  "dunkler  Drang," 
concerns  itself  not  with  utility,  not  even  with  social 
utility — albeit  in  "the  deepest  sense";  but  simply 
and  solely  with  its  own  realization,  for  the  very 
sake  of  that  realization,  without  additional  utili- 
tarian considerations,  without  hope  of  reward. 

Therefore,  when  Professor  Steinmetz  abandons 
utilitarianism  as  even  for  him  untenable,  when,  be- 
sides, he  sets,  in  place  of  his  "ideal  of  race,"  the 
general  moral  ideal  that  includes  all  ideals,  and  hence 
also  the  ideal  of  race,  we  are  then  entirely  agreed. 

But  what  is  the  moral  ideal  in  its  fundamental 
demand,  as  made  not  concretely  upon  an  individual, 
but  in  general  upon  the  whole  world?  We  are  un- 
able to  tell.  It  appears  in  the  creative  activities  of 
living,  in  the  slow  onward  weaving  of 
"Der  Gottheit  lebendiges  Kleid." 

It  is,  as  Stefan  George  once  so  profoundly  said^ 
in  a  sort  of  dialogue  with  the  moral  ideal: 

"*Du  sprichst  mir  nie  von  Sunde  oder  Sitte.' — 
*Ihr,  meine  Schuler,  Sprossen  von  Gebliit, 
Erkennt  und  kiirt  das  Edle  unbemuht, 
Auch  heimlich  bin  ich  Richie  eurer  Tritte.' " 

2  Der  Teppich  des  Lebens,  p.  21. 
[116] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

Again,  no  one  can  tell  how  a  morally  ideal  world 
would  look  as  to  content,  since  ethical  wisdom,  the 
knowledge  of  values,  can  arise  only  in  and  through 
the  historic  process  of  becoming.  But  as  we  do 
know  the  nature  of  ethical  intention  [gezindheid, 
feeling^ , — so  brilliantly  analyzed  by  Professor  Hey- 
mans, — we  can  tell  how  it  would  look,  as  to  form. 
It  would  manifest  this  characteristic:  that  then  all 
states  would  in  practice  "have  become  objects  to  them- 
selves'^  [German,  "^wm  Objekt  geworden''] ;  that 
means,  they  would,  every  instant  with  entire  free- 
will, assume  such  place  and  such  influence  in  the 
whole  order  as  befitted  their  moral  worth — whatever 
it  were — for  the  sum  total  of  the  Community  of 
States.  Only  when  this  condition  is  fulfilled,  will 
warfare  be  necessary  no  more.  ^'Einstweilen/'  how- 
ever, 

"Einstweilen,  bis  den  Lauf  der  Welt 
Philosophie  zusammenhalt, 
Erhalt  sich  das  Getriebe 
Durch  Hunger  und  durch  Liebe." 

The  war  now  raging,  for  instance,  could  only 
then  have  been  prevented,  if  England,  recognizing 
that  Germany  as  a  member  of  the  Community  of 
States  possessed  a  greater  value  than  now  in  her 
actual  position  was  accorded  her,  had  then  of  her 
own  free  will  made  room  by  yielding  something  of 
her  own  overplus  of  place.  Let  one  once  try  to 
think  his  way  into  this  conception;  and,  when  he 

[117] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

reacts  with  the  judgment  "that  is  unthinkable,"  he 
has  then  at  the  same  time  thereby  pronounced  logical 
and  ethical  sentence  upon  every  form  of  pacifism,^ 
and  the  situation  continues  to  remain,  as  presented 
in  Goethe's  words: 

"Traumt  ihr  den  Friedenstag? 
Traume,  wer  traumen  mag! 
Krieg  heisst  das  Losungswort, 
Sieg,  und  so  klingt  es  fort...." 

8  There  is  a  certain  Paul  Otlet,  who  has  worked  out,  in  the 
midst  of  beleaguered  Brussels,  a  "chart  mondiale"  ["world- 
chart"],  down  to  all  details,  to  regulate  the  whole  world  for  all 
future  times,  without  possibility  of  further  strife !  It  is  scarcely 
possible  to  understand  what's  going  on  inside  the  heads  of  such 
fellows.  They  are  simply  children,  physically  grown  up,  who 
in  the  midst  of  the  stress  of  reality  continue  to  play  with  their 
toys.     {La  Hn  de  la  guerre,  1914).    At  bottom  his  method  is 

that  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  whose  work resulted  in  a 

whole  series  of  wars ! 


[118] 


XII. 


THUS  far  on  the  moral  right  of  war  in  general. 
But  this  particular  war  ?  It  is  remarkable  how 
the  question  as  to  the  moral  right  of  the  parties  is  met 
by  almost  every  one  in  identical  fashion  with  the 
question :  who  began  it  ?  Who  was  the  aggressor  ? 
Who  let  loose  the  storm  that  now  rages  over  the 
world?  It  seems  to  me  that  it  is  unworthy  of  Ger- 
many to  take  part  in  this. 

Even  an  aggressive  war  can  be — see  above — per- 
fectly moral,  absolutely  defensible.  This  whole  line 
of  thought  is  really  pacifistic:  it  begins  with  the 
assumption  that  war  is  an  evil  in  itself.^  It  is  this 
assumption  which  entirely  controlled  the  diplomatic 
negotiations,  now  lying  before  us  in  the  divers 
"books,"  at  least   from  the  side  of  the  Entente- 

1  [It  is  not  for  me  to  say  much — ^but  I  cannot  permit  my 
dissent  to  go  unexpressed.  There  is  a  still  deeper  conception 
of  war  than  Labberton's  deep  conception — and  that  conception 
must  consider  it  "an  evil  in  itself,"  and  an  evil  that  the  re- 
sources of  the  moral  intelligence  of  mankind  can  and  must 
work  to  abolish.  Life  can  be  solved  without  murder some- 
time. Indeed,  it  is  precisely  "in  itself,"  i.  e.,  absolutely,  that 
war  is  an  evil;  it  takes  on  the  only  good  it  has  when  it  is 
considered  not  "in  itself,"  but  in  relation  to  relatively  good 
ends,  at  present  only  to  be  achieved  through  war,  as  it  seems.] 

[119] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

powers.  There  was  an  affair  to  settle,  the  Austrian- 
Servian,  or,  more  broadly,  the  German-Slavic  ques- 
tion. The  affair  pressed  for  adjustment,  it  was 
^'jus  constituendumJ'  That  left  the  Entente-party 
entirely  cold;  it  was  preoccupied  with  but  one  aim 
— to  avoid  war.  At  least  it  was  so  in  appearance. 
(In  the  case  of  Russia  this  can  have  been  nothing  at 
all  but  appearance.  That  lies  in  reason.  Or  was 
she  only  in  appearance  involved  in  the  Servian  in- 
terests? One  or  the  other!)  Had  this  will-in- 
appearance  [schijn-wil]  triumphed,  there  would 
have  been  no  war,  and  the  affair  would  have  re- 
mained as  it  was,  i.  e.,  the  world  would  not  have 
advanced  a  step  upon  the  path  of  historical-political 
improvement.  It  was  the  veritable  peace-movement, 
with  the  finger  on  the  trigger  and  the  eyes  riveted 
on  the  finger  of  the  other  fellow.  It  was,  in  a  word, 
a  living, — and  considering  the  contrast  with  the 
ever  threatening  mobilizations —  a  comic  illustration 
of  the  situation  which  would  ensue  if  pacifism,  con- 
trary to  all  likelihood,  should  unexpectedly  achieve 
its  desire:  peace,  yet  not  the  true,  essential,  inner 
peace,  but  only  the  outward  order,  the  stillness  of 
death,  where  all  growth,  all  solution  of  pending  and 
pressing  problems,  would  be  evermore  impossible — 
the  whited  sepulcher,  the  final  triumph  of  the  Phari- 


2  [But  "affairs"  can  be  "settled"  by  thinking  no  less  than  by 
fisticuffs.] 

[120] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

And  who  was,  then,  really  the  aggressor  ?  When 
one  probes  this  question,  not  superficially  but  to  the 
bottom,  it  resolves  itself  into  empty  nothingness, 
and  one  is  simply  face  to  face,  once  again,  with 
the  fated  necessity  of  the  entire  event. 

All  the  governments,  moreover,  have  been  con- 
descending enough  to  provide  us  with  a  whole  varie- 
gated compilation  of  data  in  answer  to  the  some- 
what school-boy  question:  "who  began  it?"  One 
would  have  to  be  more  naive  than  is  the  present 
writer — to  his  sorrow,  or  rather  not  to  his  sorrow 
— in  order  to  believe  that  all  this  was  done  with  the 
essential  and  serious  purpose  of  making  clear  the 
truth. 

This  reflection,  however,  gives  the  historian  no 
right,  as  far  as  he  is  concerned,  to  consign  without 
more  ado  the  publications  in  question  to  the  shelf 
of  children's  books.  To  be  sure,  the  spectrum  isn't 
altogether  complete;  there  is,  as  far  as  I  know,  no 
"green"  book, — and  "indigo"  and  "violet"  books 
are  hardly  to  be  expected;  yet  nevertheless  he  may 
faintly  hope  that  the  available  colors,  taken  together, 
could  bring  forth  something  at  least  approaching 
the  unbroken  light  of  truth.  It  would  be  a  sort  of 
spectral  synthesis,  the  reverse  of  the  spectral  anal- 
ysis of  the  astronomers. 

However  it  be,  all  Europe  has  seized  upon  these 
"books"  with  passionate  zeal  and  studied  them  over 
from  a  to  ^,  only  skipping  such  letters  as  could 

[121] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

not  serve  the  proof  of  what  stood  fixed  a  limine, 
that  is,  that  the  other  party  "had  done  it," — the 
enemy,  or,  among  neutrals,  the  party  which  en- 
joyed the  antipathy  of  the  demonstrator.  Mean- 
time, that  the  demonstrandum,  beforehand  so  fixed, 
seemed  deduced  with  such  relatively  slight  difficulty 
from  the  available  data,  proves  apparently  that 
among  the  data  themselves  something  must  be  miss- 
ing, which  must  be  supplied,  with  tacit  insertion  in 
the  spirit  desired,  before  the  conclusion  is  possible. 
And  so  it  is  in  fact.  The  conclusion  to  which 
one  comes  through  the  study  of  these  books,  at  least 
with  respect  to  the  question  of  Austria-Germany 
vs.  Russia,  depends  entirely  on  the  conception  one 
has  of  the  Austrian  ultimatum  to  Servia,  and  the 
conception  can  be  nothing  but  a  preconceived  con- 
ception, because  there  are  in  the  diplomatic  corre- 
spondence no  data  whatever  adequate  for  an  answer 
to  the  question,  what  were  the  real  motives  of  this 
Austrian  activity  and  what  idea  Austria  had  of  the 
consequences  that  this  activity  would  or  could  have. 
No  one  is  likely  to  be  so  naive  as  to  suppose  that  the 
note  of  July  23,  1914,  simply  fell  out  of  the  air. 
The  French  ^'Yellow  Book"  contains,  indeed,  some 
pieces  that  don't  say  much  (Nos.  7-21)  from  before 
the  note — so,  too,  the  Austrian  "Red  Book"  (Nos. 
1-7) — and  in  the  report  which  the  English  ambassa- 
dor at  Vienna,  Sir  Maurice  de  Bunsen,  gave  out  to 
his  government  on  September  1  we  read:  "It  was 

1122] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

from  a  private  source  that  I  received  on  the  i^th 
July  [sic]  the  forecast  of  what  was  about  to  happen 
which  I  telegraphed  to  you  the  following  day."^ 
We  can  rest  assured  that,  when  Austria  sent  her 
note,  the  telegraph  apparatus  between  the  great  cap- 
itals had  not  been  idle  all  those  weeks,  and  that 
Austria  had  thus  good  grounds  for  the  belief  that 
to  a  certain  extent  the  cards  were  already  dealt  and 
the  play  already  determined.  This  conviction  is 
strengthened,  moreover,  by  the  impression  made  by 
many  of  the  published  documents  as  if  really  these 
gentlemen  were  continually  telling  each  other  things 
which  each  of  them  could  and  must  have  known  all 
along.*  So,  for  example,  as  to  Belgian  neutrality: 
every  expert  could  know  and  did  know — if  it  were 
only  by  virtue  of  the  German  strategic  lines  to  the 
Belgian  boundary — that  Germany  had  for  some  time 
felt  the  impracticability,  in  the  more  and  more 
threatening  European  war,  of  eventually  respecting 
that  neutrality.  Nevertheless  the  negotiations  pro- 
ceeded as  if  it  was  a  most  weighty  and  a  most  un- 
settled point.    I  fancy  we  must  construe  many — not 


3  Great  Britain  and  the  European  Crisis ,  p.  81. 

*  Another  impression  these  documents  make  is  this :  it  never 
depends  upon  the  matter  pending  whether  there's  to  be  war  or 
not,  but  only  upon  the  question,  determined  by  the  proportion 
of  power,  whether  the  desire  for  war  exists.  If  it  doesn't,  then 
the  weakest  gives  in,  does'nt  find  the  "matter"  so  serious, 
doesn't  get  huffy  about  it.  If  the  desire  is  there,  then  at  once 
all  becomes  momentous  and  grave.  All,  of  course,  sheer  mdce- 
believe. 

[123] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

all — of  these  documents  as  the  official  declarations 
[constateeringen]  of  the  positions  and  contentions 
of  each  side,  unchangeable  as  to  the  future  of  the 
case  and  as  to  history,  but  containing  in  themselves 
for  the  parties  concerned  nothing  new.  It  is  in  a 
way  the  public  performance — or  a  performance  in- 
tended later  for  the  public — of  a  theatrical  piece,  the 
general  tenor  of  which  was  long  since  definitely 
fixed;  to  be  loosely  compared  with  an  open  sitting 
of  a  parliament  in  its  relation  to  the  preceding 
negotiations  and  discussions  in  private  which  had 
already  really  settled  the  whole  affair. 

Therefore,  as  to  Austria's  note  an  objective  judg- 
ment is  impossible ;  and,  consequently,  as  to  the  sec- 
ond point,  about  which  the  arguments  are  forever 
twisting  and  turning:  whether  it  was  the  Russian 
mobilization  or  the  German  ultimatum  that  was 
precipitous  and  hence  the  spark  in  the  powder.  If 
one  sides  with  Austria  in  the  matter  of  the  note, 
then  the  Russian  mobilization  was  needlessly  ag- 
gressive and  thus  indefensible;  if  one  condemns  the 
note,  then  the  mobilization  was  commendable  cau- 
tion, and  hence  the  German  ultimatum  constitutes 
the  "attack."  He  who  can  get  effectively  out  of  this 
vicious  circle  with  the  data  given  is  a  cleverer  man 
than  the  present  writer;  but  he  who  only  thinks  he 
can,  knows  still  less  than  the  same,  for  he  himself 


[124] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

doesn't  know  that  he  doesn't  know.  It  may  serve  us 
here  to  remember  Socrates.^ 

What  motives  and  conceptions  of  the  results  may 
we  suppose  Austria  to  have  had?  There  was  the 
given  necessity  of  teaching  Servia  a  lesson.  The 
question  was :  Will  the  Entente  permit  this  without 
taking  a  hand?  We  know  that  the  armaments  of 
the  immediately  preceding  period  had  been  notice- 
ably increased,  so  that  all  could  see  ^^dat  de  hoel 
op  springen  stond"  ["that  the  whole  business  was 
ready  to  explode"].  Did  Austria  know  that  its 
note  would  be  the  spark  in  the  powder?  Assume 
she  did,  then  the  supposition  is  justified  that  she 
thought :  "If,  for  this  my  good  cause  they  really  want 
to  unleash  the  European  war,  then  the  situation  is 
through  and  through  so  morally  rotten  that  it  must 
come  to-morrow  or  the  day  after,  and,  if  it  must 
come  anyway,  then  the  sooner  the  better."  The  un- 
deniable fact  that  the  ''suaviter  in  modo"  was  neg- 
lected, can  then  be  interpreted  as  the  manner  whereby 


^  A  comical  gentleman  is  Herr  Van  der  Goes,  who  on  page 
27  of  his  hroc^nv^Aanzviedeschuld?  ["Who  is  to  Blame?"] 
quite  correctly  censured  in  another  man's  brochure  En^elands 
rol  bij  het  uitbreken  van  den  wereldstrijd  ["England  s  Role 
in  the  Outbreak  of  the  World  War"]  the  above  mentioned 
petitio  principii  on  the  Austrian  side  of  the  argument,  only  to 
adopt  it  himself  with  entire  contentment  and  enviable  aplomb 
in  his  own  bad  logic — on  the  opposite  side.  So  it  goes  with 
all  these  arguments.  It  was  at  first,  maybe,  a  pretty  little 
game ;  but  it  becomes  boresome.  Chess  is  really  much  prettier : 
one  isn't  tied  down  to  any  data,  but  invents  them  as  he  goes 
along. 

[125] 


^      BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

the  earnest  will  not  to  give  in  at  any  price  manifested 
itself  a  limine. 

The  German  "White  Book"  contains  two  clauses 
that  support  this  supposition :  "We  were  well  aware 
that  an  eventual  military  procedure  on  Austria- 
Hungary's  part  toward  Servia  might  bring  Russia 
in,  and  involve  ourselves  in  a  war,  as  in  duty  bound 
to  our  ally."  And  further:  "We  have  emphatically 
taken  the  standpoint  that  no  civilized  state  has  the 
right,  in  this  fight  against  uncivilization  and  political 
thug-morality,  to  fall  upon  Austria  and  to  protect 
Servia  from  her  just  punishment." 

Assume  she  did  not,  then  that  is  conceivable  only 
in  this  fashion:  namely,  that  Austria  made  a  mis- 
take with  respect  to  the  plans  of  the  Entente, — 
whether  the  mistake  was  due  to  the  incapacity  of 
her  diplomats,  or  whether  to  intentional  misleading 
on  the  part  of  Russia.  The  last  supposition  is  quite 
in  accord  with  what  has  become  known,  now  and 
then,  as  to  the  methods  of  Russian  diplomacy;  but 
is  yet  of  such  a  dreadfully  serious  sort  that  we  have 
no  right,  in  justice,  to  make  it  on  the  evidence  of 
the  available  data. 

Yet,  in  passing,  let  me  note  No.  33  of  the  British 
"White  Book,"  from  which  it  appears  that  on  July 
26  the  English  embassy  at  Berlin  sent  a  dispatch 
to  Grey  that  the  German  ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg had  informed  his  government  that  the  Russian 
minister  had  said  "that  if  Austria  annexed  bits  of 

[126] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

Servian  territory  Russia  wouldn't  remain  indiffer- 
ent." And  then  follows :  "Under-Secretary  of  State 
drew  conclusion,  that  Russia  would  not  act  if  Aus- 
tria did  not  annex  territory."  One  may  well  admit 
that  this  conclusion  rests  solely  upon  the  illogical  rule, 
qui  dicit  de  uno,  negat  de  alterOj  but  remember,  on 
the  other  hand,  that  it  is  customary  among  respectable 
people,  whenever  their  words  as  a  result  of  this 
rule  make  psychologically  an  almost  inevitable  false 
impression,  to  remove  that  impression  by  an  explicit, 
equivalent  explanation.  And  let  me  note,  further, 
the  great  agitation  to  which — as  appears  from  the 
English  "White  Book,"  No.  97 — the  German  am- 
bassador at  St.  Petersburg  fell  a  prey,  when  on 
July  30  at  Minister  Sassonof's  it  became  clear  to 
him  that  the  war  was  unavoidable.  Can  this  agita- 
tion have  been  also  indignation?^ 

But  in  either  case,  whether  the  aggressor  for  a 
cause  it  held  right,  or  the  unintentional  unleasher 
of  the  war  under  a  mistake  or  through  deception, 
I  cannot  see  that  the  German- Austrian  will  is  in  this 
to  be  regarded  as  immoral. 

Let  us  take  the  most  unfavorable  supposition: 
Germany  and  Austria  as  willingly  and  wittingly  ag- 
gressive, i.  e.,  as  having  willed  a  war  at  this  moment 


6  See  also  English  "White  Book,"  No.  80  (July  29)  :  "There 
seemed  to  be  a  difficulty  in  making  Germany  believe  that 
Russia  was  in  earnest." — Whence  arose  the  difficulty? 

[127] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

of  time.  The  judgment  upon  this  will  depends  on 
the  circumstances  in  which  they  found  themselves, 
and  on  their  motives.  As  to  the  circumstances,  I 
may  spare  the  reader  argument  by  referring  directly 
to  that  excellent  and  too  little  regarded  book  of 
Herr  Valter.  From  this  he  can  readily  remark — 
what,  to  be  sure,  for  a  year  and  a  day,  has  been  no 
secret  to  any  well-informed  individual  of  good  wits 
— that  England  was  now  the  aggressor  not  in  a  dip- 
lomatic but  in  a  political  sense.  The  concept  "ag- 
gressor" here  begins  to  grow  vague.  He  who  is 
only  diplomatically  the  aggressor  can  quite  properly 
claim  to  be  acting  defensively,  in  case  he  is  attacked 
politically.  Attack  is  often  nothing  but  the  best 
method  of  defense.  Melius  praevenire  quam  prae- 
veniri.  But  let  us  ask  further :  what  brought  Eng- 
land to  determine  upon  her  aggressive  politics? 
Then  it's  Germany  over  again  who  puts  in  her 
appearance  as  the  aggressor  now  (merely  to  avail 
myself  of  the  expression)  in  a  biological  sense: 
alone  through  the  fact  of  her  increasing  growth 
and  bloom  whereby  England's  position  as  beatus 
possidens  became  threatened.  And,  as  Germany  had 
no  thought  of  yielding,  that  growth  was  the  fact  that 
brought  England  to  her  Entente-politics,  whereby 
she  understood  how  to  use  for  her  own  ends  the 
partially  just  claims  of  Russia  and  th^  idle  grudge 
of  France,  throwing  overboard  the  fact  that  the 
interests  of  these  countries  in  Africa  and  Asia  were 

[128] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

diametrically  opposed  to  her  own  so  that  she  could 
desire  a  great  strengthening  of  their  power  quite  as 
little.     But  a  common  hate  brought  them  together. 

Was  that  not  allowable?  Was  not  the  other  side 
united  in  a  common  alliance?  I  believe  that,  as  we 
compare  these  two  political  combinations,  we  cannot 
be  long  in  doubt  as  to  the  moral  worth  of  the  one 
and  the  moral  worthlessness  of  the  other.  The 
alliance  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  is  an 
alliance  of  real  friends  who  form  a  unity,  who  have 
common  interests  and  positive  ends — the  defense 
and  the  growth  of  their  interests.  The  entente  of 
England,  Russia  and  France  is  a  combination  ad  hoc 
of  enemies  who  form  nothing  more  than  a  con- 
spiracy, since  they  have  only  a  common  hate  and 
only  negative  ends — the  destruction  of  another *s 
prosperity.  There  is  in  Hello's  Uhomme,  p.  118,  in 
the  chapter  "Le  Monde" — the  "world"  is  for  Hello 
the  sphere  of  "tiedeur  morale'' — a  paragraph  of  ex- 
traordinary appositeness  for  this  whole  contrast: 
"Unity  has,  we  say,  its  parody — coalition.  Men 
of  the  world  are  not  friends,  but  they  are  in  coali- 
tion. Unity  lives  by  love.  Coalition  lives  by  hate. 
Men  in  coalition  [les  coalises]  are  private  enemies 
who  join  together  against  the  public  enemy.  Men 
of  the  world  have  a  common  hate,  which  gives  them 
a  common  occupation  which  determines  the  central 
point  of  their  activity." 

Would  the  deep  and  great  soul  who  spoke  these 

[129] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

words  have  been  able  to  stand  in  these  times  at 
heart  on  the  side  of  his  own  country  ?  Yes,  it's  not 
so  unHkely — out  of  compassion  for  her  blindness. 

In  view  of  this  character  of  the  coalition,  it  is 
exceedingly  significant  that  the  three  "allies"  found 
it  necessary  to  sign  on  September  4,  1914,  at  Lon- 
don a  declaration  whereby  they  solemnly  vowed — not 
to  leave  one  another  in  the  lurch!  '' Difficile  satiram 
non  scribere.'^  One  will  find  the  document  in  the 
French  "Yellow  Book,"  No.  160.  Both  the  place  of 
the  transaction  and  the  whole  ulterior  purport  indi- 
cate that  it  was  an  English  device — which  bound  the 
other  two  unalterably  to  the  service  of  England's 
own  ends.  It  occurs  to  me  that  we  have  here  a 
practical  example  of  a  treaty  that  can  be  morally 
abrogated  "rebus  stantibus^' :  as  soon  as  France  and 
Russia  come  to  better  insight,  and  see  that  they  are 
dupes,  not  allies  but  exploited  parties,  then  they 
will  be  morally  justified  in  shattering  these  fetters 
with  the  laughter  of  scorn.  Will  Russia  some  day 
do  so  perhaps?  It  doesn't  seem  altogether  incon- 
ceivable. 

"As  Germany  had  no  thought  of  yielding,"  I 
said  above.  Would  it  not  have  been  perhaps  better, 
more  ethical,  for  the  sake  of  peace  to  yield  indeed, 
and  to  remain  content  in  the  narrow  limits?  No, 
because  the  realization  of  the  ethical  ideal  required 
that  this  morally  valuable  people  achieve  larger 
scope.    It  was  not  allowable  for  her  to  remain  con- 

[130] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

tent.  That  would  have  been  the  morality  of  the 
cloister,  the  morality  of  the  ungenuine  Christianity, 
of  which  Goethe,  perhaps  the  greatest  Christian  since 
Christ,  has  said: 

"Den  deutschen  Mannern  gereicht's  zum  Ruhm, 
Dass  sie  gehasst  das  Christentum." 

The  biological  aggressiveness  gets  here  a  deep- 
ened significance:  the  moral  aggressiveness.  Gen- 
uine morality,  as  I've  already  said,  is  expansive, 
striving  to  create  a  divine  world-order  [wereld- 
vergoddelijking,  "deification  of  the  world"].  The 
moral  will  must  live  itself  out;  it  may  not  be  the 
"anvil,"  it  must  be  the  "hammer,"  or  rather,  it  can 
he  nothing  else.  But  in  this  last  aggressiveness  lies 
also  the  final  defense  of  the  entire  morality  of  the 
German  cause. 

Moral  worth,  the  positive,  as  opposed  to  moral 
worthlessness,  the  negative  element,  the  empty  ap- 
pearance, becomes,  just  like  light  as  opposed  to 
darkness,  already  the  aggressor  by  its  very  presence, 
even  though  it  does  not  intentionally  take  the  offen- 
sive. We  don't  need  to  contend  against  evil;  by 
doing  the  good  we  already  contend  against  it  ipso 
facto — and  make  it,  ipso  facto,  our  foe.^ 

8  Concerning  England's  political  aggressiveness,  see,  amid 
the  ocean  of  literature,  Rudolf  Kjellen's  Die  Grossmdchte  der 
Gegenwart  ["The  Great  Powers  of  the  Present"],  pp.  119-123, 
which  quite  properly  insists  that  English  politics  of  the  last 
ten  years  is  nothing  but  a  repetition  of  a  method  continually 
applied,  of  which  Edward  VII  was  not  at  all  the  inventor  but 

[131] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

Every  one  who  sets  fresh,  upward-striving,  worthy- 
content  above  old,  time-eaten  form;  every  one  who 
considers  it  vitally  desirable,  for  the  self-renewal 
and  civilizing  of  mankind,  that  the  undue  influence 
which  such  form  can  still  exercise  (by  virtue  of 
the  inveteracy  of  all  forms)  be  justly  reduced  to  the 
real  proportions  of  the  actual  content — he  must 
desire  with  all  his  heart  victory  for  Germany  and 
defeat  for  England.  Both  are  but  two  sides  of  one 
matter. 

only  the  last  carrier.  Also  in  Paul  Rohrbach's  Der  Kriep;  und 
die  deutsche  Politik  ["The  War  and  German  Politics"]  one 
will  find  much  of  interest,  especially  touching  the  strained 
relations  between  England  and  Germany  since  1911.  He  asks 
the  question,  as  to  whether  the  attitude  of  England  was  not  a 
disguise  (p.  84).  In  passing  I  think  that  the  question  can  now 
be  definitely  answered:  from  the  English  "White  Book,"  No. 
105,  it  appears  that  in  Novermber,  1912,  at  the  time  of  the 
Balkan  War  which  so  threatened  German-Austrian  interests 
there  occurred  the  correspondence  between  Grey  and  the  French 
ambassador  at  London  which  practically  amounts  almost  to  a 
military  agreement,  whilst,  moreover,  one  thing  and  another 
has  become  known  as  to  the  maritime  arrangements  made  with 
Russia  in  1914  (cf.  Gottlob  Egelhaaf,  H ist oris c h-po litis c he 
Jahresilbersicht  ["Historical-Political  Annual  Review"],  1914, 
pp.  89-91) — all  this,  while  negotiations  were  going  on  with 
Germany  as  to  Central  Africa  and  Mesopotamia,  apparently  in 
the  most  willing  spirit  of  cooperation.  For  a  good  notion  of 
German  world-politics,  especially  of  the  influence  thereon  of 
Germany's  continental  position  and  vice  versa,  a  most  service- 
able book  is:  J.  J.  Ruedorffer's  Grundsiige  der  Weltpolitik  in 
der  Gegenwart,  1914. 


[132] 


XIII. 


IN  the  foregoing  inquiry  into  the  diplomatic  ag- 
gressiveness, no  particular  heed  has  been  paid 
to  the  role  of  England.  The  matter  lay  from  the 
beginning  between  Germany-Austria  and  Russia. 
Hence  England  assuredly  did  not  cause  the  war,  in 
a  diplomatic  sense.  Yet  what  has  been  already  ob- 
served above  as  to  her  political  aggressiveness  in- 
vites to  a  little  closer  scrutiny  of  her  diplomatic 
role  also.  For,  taking  into  account  her  persisting 
purpose  of  late  years,  it  might  well  turn  out  that 
this  role  was  less  innocent  than  it  seems  at  first 
sight.  In  this  inquiry  there  is  the  advantage  that 
England's  role — since  it  was  outside  the  special 
Servian  question — begins  in  the  main  of  itself  only 
after  the  Austrian  note  and  can  thus  be  studied 
more  effectively  from  the  diplomatic  correspon- 
dence.^ 

Directly  after  the  appearance  of  the  note,  Russia 
took  a  decided  stand  against  it,  and  Germany  was 
quite  as  decided  in  her  readiness  to  support  her  ally. 

1  [Cf.  the  analysis  of  Prof.  J.  W.  Burgess,  The  European 
War  of  1914,  especially  pp.  1-44.] 

[133] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

It  was  thus  immediately  clear  that,  as  soon  as  both 
parties  should  have  the  courage  for  it,  war  would 
inevitably  come.  That  was  forthwith  the  impression 
of  everybody,  also  at  London. 

It  was  also  known  on  July  26  that  Italy  would 
remain  neutral.^ 

Apart  from  Servia,  it  was  thus  two  against  two, 
with  a  slight  advantage  in  strength  for  Germany  and 
Austria. 

Hence  England  had  the  decision  in  her  hands. 
If  she  declared  for  France  and  Russia,  then  the 
scales  turned  in  their  favor.  If  she  declared  for 
neutrality,  then  there  was  a  good  chance  that  France 
and  Russia  would  in  the  end  prefer  to  withdraw 
from  the  dangerous  adventure,  and  let  Austria  take 
her  course,  under  the  pledges  she  was  ready  to  give 
to  annex  no  territory. 

If  England,  therefore,  wished  to  prevent  the  war, 
she  would  have  had  to  declare  herself,  in  the  one 
sense  or  in  the  other ;  and  both  parties  put  forth  all 
their  efforts  to  get  her  to  do  so.  But  now  take  into 
account  that  England  could  be  tolerably  certain  that 
Germany  would  not  respect  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium, so  that  she  was  sure  of  a  demonstrable  casus 
belli,  if  such  should  eventually  seem  necessary,  with- 
out for  the  present  taking  a  definite  stand.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  was  quite  as  much  to  be  expected 
that  France  would  not  violate  that  neutrality:  she 
2  See  French  "Yellow  Book,"  No.  51. 
[134] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

would  have  neither  adequate  motive,  nor  the  op- 
portunity by  virtue  of  her  less  effective  mobiliza- 
tion. Thus  also  on  this  side  there  was  no  appre- 
ciable danger  that  the  game  would  be  spoiled. 

So  we  can  well  say  that  presumably  never  in  all 
history  such  vast  power  lay  in  the  hands  of  two  men 
as  Messieurs  Asquith  and  Grey  possessed  in  those 
days  before  the  war.  They  had  the  power,  by  de- 
claring themselves,  to  hold  the  war  in  check,  or  by 
keeping  silent,  by  doing  nothing,  to  let  it  burst 
forth. 

They  chose,  under  all  sorts  of  unsatisfactory 
pretexts, — the  latter.  Their  misdeed^ — for  a  purely 
destructive  war  merely  out  of  self-interest  is  a  mis- 
deed,—  was  a  delictum  omissionis  [a  sin  of  omis- 
sion.]^ When  on  July  24  the  Austro-Hungarian 
ambassador  communicated  the  note  to  London,  and 
on  the  very  same  day  ("White  Book,"  No.  6)  the 
English  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  sent  the  dis- 
patch that  in  his  opinion  "even  if  we  decline  to  join 
them,  France  and  Russia  are  determined  to  make  a 


3  D.  G.  Jelgersma  seeks  the  cause  in  the  great  deference  of 
the  democratic  English  statesmen  to  public  opinion  in  England 
(Gids  ["The  Leader"],  March,  1915).  As  if  it  wasn't  every- 
where known,  that  it  is  with  English  statesmen  simply  the  reg- 
ular device  to  appeal  to  public  opinion  when  they  want  to  effect 
something  against  other  countries  or  to  evade  their  well-justi- 
fied demands  (cf.  Helmolt,  Die  geheime  Vorgeschichte  des 
Weltkrieges,  passim).  If  public  opinion  doesn't  serve  their 
turn,  it  is  quietly  shelved,  and  the  "democracy"  is  nothing  but 
make-believe.  As  a  matter  of  fact  Asquith  and  Grey  are  all- 
powerful  in  foreign  relations. 

[135] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

Strong  stand,"  then,  as  I  picture  it,  there  began  an 
extraordinary  process  in  that  most  intricate  com- 
plex which  constitutes  the  consciousness  of  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey.  This  gentleman,  Sir  Edward  Grey,  is 
a  highly  polished,  sensitive,  kind-hearted,  philan- 
thropic twentieth-century  West-European,  who  has 
a  holy  aversion  to  bloodshed  and  who  would  behold 
with  deep  horror  any  one  that,  when  the  necessity 
arose,  would  not  shrink  from  causing  a  European 
war;  in  short,  he  is  really  a  pacifist.  But  he  is  a 
pacifist  only  in  the  foreground  of  his  intricate  con- 
sciousness. In  the  background,  well-nigh  in  his  sub- 
consciousness, he  is  himself  England's  conscious- 
ness; and  that  consciousness  has  been  for  years 
completely  preoccupied  with  the  unheard-of  fact 
that  somewhere  on  the  continent  there  appears  to 
have  arisen  a  barbaric  people  that  threatens  Eng- 
land's world-empire,  or  at  least,  in  England's  eyes, 
appears  to  threaten  it.*  Now  on  July  24,  1914, 
that  sub-consciousness,  like  Hamlet,  saw  a  ghost, 

*  In  a  remarkable  romance  of  H.  G.  Wells,  The  Passionate 
Friends,  1913,  I,  p.  191,  a  father  says  to  his  son,  in  a  conversa- 
tion on  trade-politics,  in  which  the  latter  cites  the  example  of 
the  Germans :  "Fancy  quoting  the  Germans !  When  I  was  a 
boy,  there  weren't  any  Germans.  They  came  up  after  70." 
This  is  the  whole  affair.  It  is  simply  a  repetition  of  Rome  vs. 
Carthage,  Germany's  single  misdeed  is  that  she — exists.  The 
situation  of  before  Bismarck's  day  must  be  restored.  The 
romance-writer,  Paul  Bourget,  makes  his  entrance  into  politics 

by  openly  announcing  this  and  by  giving  as  his  grounds 

the  value  of  small  states  (King  Albert's  Book,  page  183), 
Shouldn't  France  have  to  be,  at  the  same  time,  dissolved  into 
her  historic  components,  O  glorious  enfant  terrible  of  the  En- 
tente ? 

[136] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

the  ghost  of  Edward  VII;  and  this  ghost  spake 
thus:  "Hora  est.  Bethink  thee  of  it,  now  I  desire 
my  petite  guerre.  Thou  needest  do  naught, — just 
let  things  take  their  course." 

As  a  result,  there  arose  in  the  foreground  a  stren- 
uous bustle  about  all  sorts  of  petty  expedients  and 
schemes,  conferences  at  London,  stieps  taken  at 
Berlin,  mediation  of  England  and  Italy,  incitements 
to  moderation  from  Berlin  to  Vienna,  direct  "con- 
versations" between  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg ;  but 
all  that  was  only  comedy,  the  puppet-play,  the  whi- 
tening of  the  sepulcher, — in  good  Dutch,  ^'larie  en 
koude  drukte''  ["Fiddle-faddle  and  the  big  noise" — 
"in  good  American"].  The  one  real  thing  was  the 
voice  of  the  ghost.  And  the  ghost  was  not  alto- 
gether contented  with  the  course  events  were  tak- 
ing. There  was,  indeed,  a  slight  weakness  in  the 
entire  scheme :  the  balance  of  power,  as  left  to  itself, 
was  tipping  in  the  wrong  direction.  What,  then,  to 
do  ?  A  slight  pressure  must  be  applied  on  the  oppo- 
site end  of  the  beam.  The  ghost  urged  to  that; 
but  the  fore-part  of  Sir  Edward's  consciousness 
opposed :  In  this  way,  verily,  it  would  be  working 
for  war,  and  it  was  working,  precisely  all  the  while, 
zealously,  and  on  all  sides,  for  peace  (see,  however, 
"White  Book,"  No.  47). 

Then  did  this  fore-part  of  Sir  Edward's  con- 
sciousness and  the  ghost  of  Edward  VII,  by  way 
of  agreement,  together  concoct  one  of  the  most  dex- 

[137] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

terous  diplomatic  sleights  which  have  ever  been  ex- 
hibited :  encouragement  for  the  Entente  was  to  take 
the  form  of ....  a  kindly  warning  to  Germany.  On 
July  29  it  was  given.  Let  one  read  in  the  English 
"White  Book,"  No.  89,  that  most  friendly,  most 
benevolent  conversation,  inspired  by  the  noblest  of 
motives.  In  sober  truth,  that  conversation  was 
morally  equivalent  to  the  drinking  cup  which  the 
guests  of  Caesar  Borgia  used  to  get,  for. ..  .the 
plan  of  holding  it — the  German  ambassador  had 
assurances  it  was  *'quite  private" — had  been  be- 
forehand, that  morning  in  fact,  communicated  to  the 
French  ambassador  (English  ''White  Book,"  No. 
87).^  Inasmuch  as  the  French  position  would  be- 
come, through  that  conversation,  not  weaker  but 
precisely  stronger,  it  cannot  possibly  have  been  in- 
tended as  a  warning  to  France.  And  if  the  warn- 
ing was  to  take  effect  on  Germany,  it  was  necessary 
to  give  it  a  strictly  confidential  character;  since 
Germany  could  with  difficulty  retire  before  Eng- 
land openly,  i.  e.,  in  full  view  of  the  other  Entente 
powers, — but,  at  a  pinch,  doubtless,  if  the  real  cir- 
cumstances remained  secret.^ 


^  The  same  day  France  gave  Russia  definitely  the  promise  of 
unconditional  support  (Russian  "Orange  Book,"  No.  55  and 
No.  58)  and  the  following  day  they  were  convinced  at  St. 
Petersburg  that  England  was  cooperating  (letter  of  Baron  de 
I'Escaille). 

^  Here  is  a  point  for  the  consideration  of  those  who  plead 
for  the  greater  publicity  of  diplomatic  business. 

[138] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

Every  prosecuting  attorney^  is  acquainted  with 
the  phenomenon  of  the  higher  sort  of  criminal,  who, 
after  having  constructed  with  great  intelHgence  and 
caution  a  whole  complicated  scheme  to  send  justice 
off  on  a  false  scent,  makes  almost  invariably  a  small 
slip  in  some  minor  point,  that  may  seem  afterwards, 
in  the  light  of  the  whole  case,  almost  unbelievable  in 
its  stupidity.  This  phenomenon  is  very  easy  to  com- 
prehend: it  is  simply  a  result  of  the  fact  that  the 
system  did  not  grow  organically  in  the  world  of 
reality,  but  was  mechanically  pieced  together  in 
empty  space  by  the  understanding;  and  the  human 
understanding  has  certain  admitted  weaknesses — it 
overlooks  and  it  forgets. 

I  see  a  little  slip  of  this  sort  in  the  inclusion  of 
the  beginning  of  document  No.  87  in  the  English 
"White  Book."  Speaking  from  the  English  stand- 
point, it  ought  not  to  have  been  there.  History 
will  sometime,  principally  on  ground  of  this  very 
document,  call  England  to  account  for  her  conduct 
and  she  will  find  it  hard  to  reply. 

Herewith  the  game  was  played.  The  war  be- 
tween Germany-Austria  and  Russia-France  could 
begin.  The  ghost  of  Edward  VH  withdrew  con- 
tented to  the  heavenly  abodes.  Now  the  matter 
had  gone  so  far,  Sir  Edward  could  handle  it  alone 

^  [Rechtervan  instructie,  m th^Tiuich  Code-Napoleon, dotsn't 
correspond  exactly  to  any  legal  official  in  American  law-courts.] 

[139] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

for  the  future.     His  better  part  could  found  no 
more  evil. 

The  question  for  England  was  now  only  this: 
shall  we  take  a  hand  or  not?^  The  question  might 
be  answered  only  after  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 
Germany  must  still  be  left  to  suppose  there  was  a 
chance  of  England's  neutrality.  Moreover,  she 
could  naturally  get  no  exact  promise  of  this,  on 
whatever  conditions,  for  then  the  other  party  would 
perhaps  take  in  sail.  Therefore,  England  might  not 
say  explicitly  what  she  would  do  if  the  Belgian 
neutrality,  as  was  to  be  expected,  was  disregarded. 
Moreover,  here  is  a  slight  flaw  in  the  English  scheme : 
that  which  on  August  4  was  called  (and  is  still 
unceasingly  called)  an  atrocious  outrage,  seemed  on 
August  1  (English  "White  Book,"  No.  123),  at 
the  most,  indeed  a  highly  serious  affair,  but  not 
definitely  furnishing  a  casus  belli.  It  is  difficult 
to  read  the  last  two  sentences  of  document  No.  123 
without  aversion.  Germany  stood  on  the  verge  of 
the  great  war  and  the  upshot  of  her  question  was 
really  if  England  would  perhaps  be  so  good  as  not 
to  hit  her  in  the  back  too.  For  this  favor  she  was 
ready  to  make  far-reaching,  well-nigh  impossible 
concessions.  But  she  desired  certainty;  she  desired 
in  any  case  to  know  where  she  was ;  she  desired  not 


8  The  answer  was  naturally  not  a  mere  matter  of  course,  for 
England  is  the  last  to  desire  a  too  great  strengthening  of 
Russia  and  France. 

[140] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

to  be  perpetually  exposed  to  the  chance  that  England 
in  her  own  good  time,  would  begin  too.  She  stood, 
to  use  the  fit  word,  virtually  more  or  less  as  a 
suppliant  before  England.  The  world  is  so  curi- 
ously arranged  that  one  can  often  do  nothing  but 
supplicate,  even  for  perfectly  proper  and  reasonable 
things,  and  supplicate  mostly  in  vain,  in  the  pres- 
ence of  our  moral  inferiors  who  happen  to  be  the 
more  powerful.  I  seem  to  hear  the  honest  German 
voice  asking,  was  there  then  no  means  at  all  of 
obtaining,  not  England's  neutrality,  but  only  Eng- 
land's frankness, — since  a  people  in  such  circum- 
stances has  a  right  to  frankness.  But  Sir  Edward 
Grey,  the  pacifist,  was  not  the  man  to  be  tenderly 
moved:  "I  could  only  say  that  we  must  keep  our 
hands  free/'  The  sword  of  Damocles  always  over 
Germany's  head  —  that  was  the  intention!  And 
yet  there  are  still  people  who  find  it  "clumsy"  of 
Germany  that  by  this  violation  of  Belgian  neutral- 
ity she  made  England  her  foe  too!  As  if  a  neutral 
England  were  to  be  trusted  for  an  instant  during 
the  whole  course  of  the  war,  and  as  if  it  were  not 
much  better  that  she  were  forthwith  induced  to 
come  out  into  the  open.  This  put  at  least  an  end 
to  all  uncertainty  and  to  the  chance  that,  at  some 
moment  most  inopportune  for  Germany,  there  would 
suddenly  arise  one  or  another  "legal  cause"  which 
would  induce  righteous  England  (who  had  on 
August  2  given  France  the  unconditional  promise 

[141] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

of  guarding  her  coast)  to  her  deepest  sorrow  to 
enter  the  Hsts. 

I  hesitate  no  longer  for  a  moment  in  my  ethical 
judgment  upon  the  role  of  England;  and  I  attach 
some  value  to  it,  since  my  first  impression  was 
otherwise.  My  final  judgment,  however,  is  entirely 
in  agreement  with  that  zvhich  the  whole  German  peo- 
ple have,  with  instinctive  certainty,  passed  upon  her.^ 

We  are  wont  to  speak  of  the  mob-blindness  of 
Germany  on  this  point  and  to  be  grandiloquently 
astonished  that  even  her  aristocracy  of  intellect  has 
not  escaped  it.  We  forget  that  a  judgment  is  not 
necessarily  unjust,  because  it  is  the  judgment  of  a 
whole  people.  We  can,  for  all  that,  examine  the 
content  of  the  judgment  independently.  And  there 
exists,  for  all  that,  still  something  or  other  like  a  vox 
populi,  vox  Dei.  This  exists  when  the  speaker  is  not 
the  erring  intelligence  of  the  few  and  the  imitation 
of  the  many,  but  the  folk-soul  itself.  The  German 
folk-soul  has  now  found  such  a  voice.  It  is  the 
Mene  Tekel  of  England,  albeit  she  sees  for  the 
present  forsooth — a  good  ten  years  after  the  Boer 
War — her  chance  still  to  parade  before  the  world  as 
the  guardian  of  international  law  and  small  nations. 
Mundusvult  decipi.  Therefore  England,  this  cherisher 
of  forms,  has  always  sailed  under  a  false  flag,  just 

®  See,  e.  g.,  Wilhelm  Dibelius,  England  und  wir ;  Georg 
Irmer,  Los  vom  englischen  Weltjoch;  Jacob  Riesser,  England 
und  zvir;  Arthur  Dix,  Der  Weltwirtschaftskrieg. 

[142] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

as  she  now  in  a  literal  sense  is  beginning  to  do.  She 
has  been,  through  all  modern  history,  the  Mephis- 
topheles  of  the  continent,  the  destroyer  of  all  which 
became  vigorous  over  there  and  so  stood  in  the  way 
of  her  self-interest.  But  the  end  will  show.  Mephis- 
topheles  is 

"Ein  Teil  der  Kraft, 
Die  stets  das  Bose  will  und  stets  das  Gute  schafft," 

and  so  he  falls  himself  at  last  into  the  pit  which  he 
digged  for  another. 


[143] 


XIV. 


THUS  this  war,  which  could  have  been — what- 
ever besides — at  least  an  honorable  strife,  has 
become,  through  the  participation  of  England — and 
Japan ! — a  murderous  ambuscade  [a  French  expres- 
sion, giiet-apens].  Will  Germany  sustain  the  test? 
Will  she  succumb  to  superior  physical  strength? 

It  is  an  illusion  to  suppose  that  moral  right  always 
triumphs.  Napoleon's  remark  that  God  is  always 
on  the  side  of  the  heaviest  cannon  is  nothing  else 
than  blasphemy — a  proof  of  how  shallow  was  the 
inner  life  of  this  Genius  of  Action.  Moral  right 
is  a  spring  of  great  potency;  it  is  by  no  means  in- 
different in  a  contest  of  physical  power.  But  equally 
true  it  is  that  God  cannot  make  head  against  un- 
limited cannon.  It  is  precisely  one  of  the  hardest 
and  deepest  problems  of  the  world-tragedy  that 
moral  right  certainly  does  not  always  win  the  vic- 
tory. A  genuinely  ethical  philosophy  of  life  cannot 
be  other  then  tragi-heroic. 

But  one  thing  we  do  know :  moral  right  can  be 
beaten,  but  it  cannot  be  slain,  cannot  be  annihilated. 
It  is  a  fact,  a  reality;  and  facts  are  not  to  be  elim- 

[144] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

inated  from  the  world.  Only  moral  wrong,  the 
nothing  that  appears  something,  the  empty  appear- 
ance, can  be  annihilated. 

Human  memory  is  a  strange  thing.  From  out 
what  queer  hiding-places  does  the  power  of  associa- 
tion sometimes  bring  our  slumbering  ideas  to  light! 
Whilst  I've  been  meditating  during  these  last  months 
over  the  war  and  its  origin,  and  saw  in  my  mind's 
eye  the  awful  possibility  that  Germany  might  not  be 
able  to  hold  her  own,  there  came  back  to  my  spirit, 
from  years  and  years  ago,  a  little  German  song,  a 
simple  song,  but  unutterably  pure  and  deep,  such  as 
is  only  to  be  found  in  the  German  tongue.  That 
little  song  was  sung  on  a  relatively  small  occasion, 
which  had,  however,  in  form  great  similarity  with 
the  world-event  of  to-day ;  and  all  words  spoken  by 
human  beings  depend  for  their  worth  and  greatness 
more  on  the  worth  and  greatness  of  the  speaker 
than  on  the  worth  and  greatness  of  the  occasion. 
Thus  I  could  fancy  I  heard  in  this  song  a  prophecy 
of  the  whole  story  of  to-day,  and  a  clear  indication, 
too,  of  how  Germany  under  a  possible  defeat  would 
hold  to  herself.  I  will  transcribe  it  entire.  Per- 
haps there  is  one  or  another  reader  whose  soul 
appreciates  what  deep  emotions  have  stirred  the 
German  people — and  with  that  people,  the  present 
writer — in  these  last  months.  I  refer  to  the  song  of 
August  von  Binzer,  which  was  sung  at  Jena,  No- 
vember 26y  1819,  on  the  occasion  of  the  dissolving 

[145] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

of  the  "Burschenschaft.''^  Each  word  has  now  for 
me  a  purport  deep  and  unutterably  great ;  the  whole 
is,  indeed,  wrought  of  blood  and  tears,  great  in  its 
unconquerable  self-reliance.  It  is  as  if  the  eternal 
historic  becoming,  the  eternal  shaping  and  shatter- 
ing of  forms,  the  whole  tragedy  of  human  history, 
there  achieved  expression. 

"Wir  hatten  gebauet 
Ein  stattliches  Haus, 
Und  drin  auf  Gott  vertrauet 
Trotz  Wetter,  Sturm  und  Graus. 

"Wir  lebten  so  traulich, 
So  einig,  so  frei, 

Den  Schlechten  ward  es  graulich, 
Wir  hielten  gar  zu  treu ! 

"Sic  lugten,  sie  suchten 
Nach  Trug  und  Verrat, 
Verleumdeten,  verfluchten 
Die  junge,  griine  Saat. 

"Was  Gott  in  uns  legte, 
Die  Welt  hat's  veracht't; 
Die  Einigkeit  erregte 
Bei  Guten  selbst  Verdacht. 

"Man  schalt  es  Verbrechen, 
Man  tauschte  sich  sehr : 
Die  Form  kann  man  zerbrechen, 
Die  Liebe  nimmermehr. 

"Die  Form  ist  zerbrochen. 
Von  aussen  herein; 
Doch,  was  man  drin  gerochen, 
Ist  eitel  Dunst  und  Schein. 

^  ["Student  Society,"  founded  in  1815  for  patriotic  purposes.] 
[146] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

"Das  Band  ist  zerschnitten, 
War  Schwartz,  Rot  und  Gold, 
Und  Gott  hat  es  gelitten  : 
Wer  weiss,  was  Er  gewollt! 

"Das  Haus  mag  zerfallen, — 
Was  hat's  denn  fiir  Not? 
Der  Geist  lebt  in  uns  Allen, 
Und  unsre  Burg  ist  Gott!" 

[The  translator,  realizing  the  great  significance 
of  these  stanzas  for  the  spiritual  argument,  has  done 
his  poor  best  to  make  them  available  for  readers 
ignorant  of  German. 

"We  builded  together 
The  stateliest  house, 
And  there,  through  wind  and  weather, 
Had  made  our  God  our  vows. 

"We  lived  there  so  truesome, 
So  friendly,  so  free, 
The  base  folk  found  it  gruesome 
That  men  so  true  should  be  I 

"They  waited,  they  prated 
Of  treason  and  fraud, 
Reviled  and  execrated 
The  green,  young  seed  of  God. 

"What  God  in  us  planted 
The  world  did  despise; 
Even  good  men  doubting  scanted 
Our  league  and  enterprise. 

"They  plotted  a  matter 
They  wotted  not  of — 
The  Form  can  all  men  shatter, 
But  nevermore  the  Love! 

[147] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

"The  form  has  been  shattered, 
From  outward  the  blow — 
But  what  their  hands  have  scattered 
Is  empty  smoke  and  show. 

"The  Ribbon's  been  slitted, 
The  Red,  Gold  and  Jet, 
And  God  he  has  permitted : 
Who  knows  what  God  wills  yet! 

"The  House  may  go  under, — 
What  matters  the  hour? — 
The  Soul  is  not  to  sunder, 
And  God  is  still  our  tower !"] 

Let  us  rest  assured:  if  the  German  people  is  in- 
deed what  we  hold  it  to  be,  then  its  present  ''form" 
can  be  shattered  by  external,  mechanical  violence; 
but  then  it  will  create  for  itself  in  its  own  good 
time,  purified  by  suffering,  a  newer  form,  still  more 
beautiful  and  more  mighty.  "The  swiftest  beast 
that  carries  ye  to  perfection  is  suffering''  (Eckhart). 


[148] 


XV. 


AFTER  all  this  about  Belgian  neutrality,  the 
k.  reader  will  permit  me  to  conclude  with  a  word 
about  our  own.  I  believe  that  the  case  of  Belgium 
contains  a  serious  lesson  for  ourselves. 

I  will  express  no  judgment  about  our  neutrality. 
To  do  so  publicly — intus  ut  libet — is  forbidden  by 
one's  duty  as  citizen.  Moreover,  it  is  presum- 
ably sufficiently  clear  from  the  foregoing  discussion 
how  I  regard  the  "dignity"  of  our  impartial  atti- 
tude.^ The  man  who  could  pronounce  that  word 
was  filled  with  petty  vanity,  with  the  calm,  intellec- 
tual, unpresuming,  intolerable  vanity  of  the  scholar ; 
and  had  no  conception  of  the  warm,  strong  and 
living,  of  the  pressing  and  driving,  the  creative 
feeling  for  moral  values  and  the  differences  between 
moral  values :  his  soul  was  cold.  A  mere  pupil 
forever,  he  is  and  he  remains  hide-bound  in  ethical 
and  esthetic  formalism,  because  at  Groningen  no- 
body has  told  him  that  these  functions  have  also  a 
material  side  which  is  immensely  more  important. 

1  Cf.  R.  Casimir,  Waardige  onzijdigheid  ["Dignified  Impar- 
tiality"]. 

[149] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

"Vanity !  This  odious  personage  is  all  in  these  two 
words:  coldness  and  vanity!"  (Hello,  Uhomme, 
chapter,  "L'homme  mediocre,"  p.  67.) 

Quite  as  little  will  I  discuss  the  queer  and  some- 
what comical  phenomenon  that  has  just  now  started 
up  here  at  home^ — this  new  growth  of  pacifism 
that  is  now  and  then  itself  somewhat  aggressive. 
We  might  call  it  the  ethical  parallel  of  the  estheti- 
cism  of  a  man  like  Albert  Verwey:^  ethical  and 
esthetic  illusionism. 

All  these  things  spring  from  the  inner  discontent, 
from  the  need  of  doing  something  or  other,  or  of 
taking  some  sort  of  an  attitude.  It  seems  to  me 
that  the  stiller  we  keep  and  the  less  we  extol  our 
neutrality  the  more  honest  the  idea  we  give  of  our 
true  position  and  attitude. 

I  venture  only  to  speak  an  earnest  word  as  to 
what  our  action  should  be,  should  our  neutrality 
become  endangered, — whether  from  one  side  or  the 
other.  There  are  then  two  ways  possible ;  and  I  am 
not  so  sure  that  our  state,  which  is  intelligent,  will 
then  give  proof  that  she  is  more  than  intelligent, — 
that  she  is  wise. 

^  Beweging  ["Movement,"  edited  by  Verwey],  Dec.  1914,  p. 
177 :  "Precisely  now,  precisely  in  opposition  to  this  horrible 
exertion  of  power  of  the  material  (?)  and  political  world, 
must  Poesy  and  Idea  be  that  world's  foe  in  the  world,  and 
vindicate  their  independence  therefrom."  As  if  "Poesy  and 
Idea"  could  fetch  their  content  from  any  source  at  all  but  the 
rational-ethical  reality  of  human  life !  As  if  it  was  not  in  this 
way  alone  that  they  can  become  strong  and  deep! 

[150] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

The  first  way  is  this:  as  impersonal  logical  ma- 
chines to  deduce  our  conclusion  from  the  arti- 
ficial, lifeless,  and  deceitful  abstractions  of  interna- 
tional law,  according  to  the  syllogism:  our  neutral 
territory  is  inviolable;  here  is  warring  power  A, 
which  will  not — cannot! — respect  the  inviolability; 
warring  power  A  is  thus  our  enemy.  That  is  the 
method  of  the  apprentice  in  magic: 

"Die  ich  rief,  die  Geister, 
Werd'  ich  nun  nicht  los." 

The  second  way  is  this:  when  the  time  comes, 
as  living  and  creative  personalities  to  bring  forth 
our  conclusion  for  ourselves  from  our  own  choice; 
in  other  words,  whoever  the  "violator"  be,  to  show 
our  colors,  to  chose  our  party,  and  to  gather  to 
that  side  which  is  really  ours. 

I  see  with  satisfaction  that  Professor  Kernkamp 
in  Vragen  des  Tijds,  March  number,  has  had  the 
same  thought.  But  what  is  unfortunately  missing 
is  the  decisive  choice  in  the  right  direction.  It  is, 
I  am  firmly  convinced,  at  the  present  moment  the 
duty  of  all  Hollanders  who  think  farther  and  deeper 
and  have  the  real  good  of  ther  fatherland  at  heart, 
to  do  their  share  in  spreading  just  views,  in  harmony 
with  reality,  concerning  the  great  problem,  England- 
Germany — views  grounded  not  upon  subjective  fac- 
tors, but  upon  facts  and  their  logical-ethical  impli- 
cations.   This  is  not  contrary  to  political  "neutral- 

[151] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

ity,"  and  for  the  government  it  can  be  nothing  but 
desirable  to  have  light  on  what  is  going  on  among 
the  best  of  the  people.  It  has  very  properly  re- 
quested the  daily  press  to  refrain  from  political  ob- 
servations. Papers  like  the  Telegraaf  and  the  ear- 
lier^ Amsferdammer  show  well  enough  to  what  pass 
things  would  have  come  otherwise  —  not  to  men- 
tion the  noble  guild  of  Writers-of-letters-to-the- 
editor  [de  ingesonden-stukken-schrijvers!].  Yet,  let 
those  who  are  really  abreast  of  things  —  I  fear 
their  number  is  small  —  have  the  courage  to  speak, 
now  there  is  still  time.*  And  let  them  continue 
in  their  labor,  even  after  peace  is  declared,  for 
then — no  matter  who  wins — the  question  of  a  Mid- 
European  League  or  at  least  of  a  Customs-Union 
will  become  acute,  and  our  own  vital  interests  will 
be  involved. 

For  the  present,  however,  the  question  is  only: 
What  to  do,  if  things  should  go  wrong  with  our 
neutrality  ? 

I  believe  that  our  people,  especially  in  the  lower 
intellectual  circles,  fancies  itself  to  be,  or  to  have  to 
be,  anti-German.  But  la  volonte  generale  n'est  pas 
la  volonte  de  tous,  and  our  form  of  government, 
luckily  for  us,  has  since  August  1914  been  more 

8  [A  reference  to  this  paper  as  it  was  before  the  radical 
change  in  its  staff  about  the  end  of  1914.] 

*rNote  Prof.  Verrijn  Stuart's  excellent  study  De  economische 
oorlog,  "Economic  Aspect  of  the  War,"  translated  in  The  Open 
Court,  1916.] 

[152] 


BELGIUM  AND  GERMANY 

nearly  the  intellectually  aristocratic — which  is  the 
ideal  form — than  it  has  ever  been  since  1866.  If 
the  great  hour  ever  comes,  may  such  wisdom  be 
given  us,  that,  conscious  of  our  historic  lineage  and 
of  the  origin  of  our  mother  tongue,  and  obedient 
to  the  voice  of  the  Germanic  blood  that  streams, 
even  though  not  unmixed,  through  our  veins,  we 
may  realize  in  freedom  whither  our  highest  and 
deepest  interest,  whither  our  Duty  calls  us! 


[153] 


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